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ABSTRACT
American University in Cairo
Formal Verification of Automotive Embedded UML Designs
By
Ghada Moussa Bahig
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Amr El-Kadi

Software applications are increasingly dominating safety critical domains. Safety critical
domains are domains where the failure of any application could impact human lives.
Software application safety has been overlooked for quite some time but more focus and
attention is currently directed to this area due to the exponential growth of software
embedded applications. Software systems have continuously faced challenges in
managing complexity associated with functional growth, flexibility of systems so that
they can be easily modified, scalability of solutions across several product lines, quality
and reliability of systems, and finally the ability to detect defects early in design phases.
AUTOSAR was established to develop open standards to address these challenges. ISO26262, automotive functional safety standard, aims to ensure functional safety of
automotive systems by providing requirements and processes to govern software lifecycle
to ensure safety. Each functional system needs to be classified in terms of safety goals,
risks and Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL: A, B, C and D) with ASIL D
denoting the most stringent safety level. As risk of the system increases, ASIL level
increases and the standard mandates more stringent methods to ensure safety. ISO-26262
mandates that ASILs C and D classified systems utilize walkthrough, semi-formal
verification, inspection, control flow analysis, data flow analysis, static code analysis and
semantic code analysis techniques to verify software unit design and implementation.
Ensuring software specification compliance via formal methods has remained an
academic endeavor for quite some time. Several factors discourage formal methods

adoption in the industry. One major factor is the complexity of using formal methods.
Software specification compliance in automotive remains in the bulk heavily dependent
on traceability matrix, human based reviews, and testing activities conducted on either
actual production software level or simulation level. ISO26262 automotive safety
standard recommends, although not strongly, using formal notations in automotive
systems that exhibit high risk in case of failure yet the industry still heavily relies on
semi-formal notations such as UML. The use of semi-formal notations makes
specification compliance still heavily dependent on manual processes and testing efforts.
In this research, we propose a framework where UML finite state machines are compiled
into formal notations, specification requirements are mapped into formal model theorems
and SAT/SMT solvers are utilized to validate implementation compliance to
specification. The framework will allow semi-formal verification of AUTOSAR UML
designs via an automated formal framework backbone. This semi-formal verification
framework will allow automotive software to comply with ISO-26262 ASIL C and D unit
design and implementation formal verification guideline. Semi-formal UML finite state
machines are automatically compiled into formal notations based on Symbolic Analysis
Laboratory formal notation. Requirements are captured in the UML design and compiled
automatically into theorems. Model Checkers are run against the compiled formal model
and theorems to detect counterexamples that violate the requirements in the UML model.
Semi-formal verification of the design allows us to uncover issues that were previously
detected in testing and production stages. The methodology is applied on several
automotive systems to show how the framework automates the verification of UML
based designs, the de-facto standard for automotive systems design, based on an implicit
formal methodology while hiding the cons that discouraged the industry from using it.
Additionally, the framework automates ISO-26262 system design verification guideline
which

would

otherwise

be

verified

via

xiv

human

error

prone

approaches.

Chapter 1.

Introduction

Software plays a major role in almost all industries nowadays from cooking in our
kitchens, to driving our cars, to working in our offices. Some of these systems are safety
critical which means that failure of the software could cause hazardous consequences on
human life. Safety Critical Computing (SCC) aims to optimize system safety in the
design, development, use, and maintenance of software systems and their integrations
with safety critical hardware systems in an operational environment. In fact, one of the
very first seen ambiguities of SCC is the way it is viewed across industries and regulatory
bodies. Some ongoing research efforts address safety based on measuring how well the
system does exactly what it is intended to do while others view safety as designing a
system that is able to handle cases when a system does not work as expected. In the later
context, safety engineers assume that any system will fail and then they work through the
consequences to ensure that they are well handled through inductive and deductive
techniques.

Attention to safety software engineering started when failures in embedded critical
systems led to critical failures. In March 2008, a Medtronic heart pacer device was
reported to be vulnerable to remote attacks [1]. In 2003, an electrical blackout took place
in North America for hours and it was reported that key phase 1 events started with a
software system failure [2]. In the 1980s, a bug in the code controlling a radiation therapy
machine was found to be the reason why at least 5 patients died due to administering
incorrect volume of the radiation during treatment sessions [3]. A good number of such
failures are also attributed to incompliance to specification, a glitch in an automaker‘s
software design and testing approach in airbags design resulted in the recall of 47,401
vehicles in the US and a further 3,099 in Canada and Mexico [4]. Other reported
incidents took place in space exploration, medical, electric power transmission, financial,
telecommunications, military, media, and automotive domains.
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In automotive systems, it is crucial to ensure design correctness from compliance to
specification perspective as early as possible. Safety standards put strict processes that
involve manual reviews and requirements traceability in all software life cycle to ensure
specification compliance. Industry still heavily relies on manual reviews and processes
which is impractical since specification is still captured in informal and semi-formal
notations which open the door for requirement specification ambiguity. In recent years,
software costs increased exponentially due to the increasing number of software enabled
features in a car. A modern car can contain up to 90 Electronic Control Units (ECUS), 11
networks and might host one million lines of code (LOC) [85]. This increases software
complexity and with it, the probability of failures. The task of verifying software to detect
failures is becoming more and more difficult, time consuming and critical. A good
number of failures are attributed to incompliance to specification.
1.1

Existing Approaches

Existing approaches that target software/system safety include:
1. Dependency on standards and processes enforced by regulatory committees to
ensure software safety. Regulatory agencies such as ISO publish software safety
standards. ISO-26262 is the automotive standard that is based on IEC 61508. This
is the functional safety standard across electrical and electronic E/E systems.
Several regulatory entities, such as German law, hold car producers liable for
damage to a person because of malfunction of a product. If it was not possible for
the malfunction to be detected via the current technical state, the liability is
omitted. In this context and within the automotive software and hardware
domains, ISO 26262 is considered the technical state of the art. Standards rely on
a system of steps to govern and manage functional safety and govern product
development on a system, hardware and software level.
2. Code level approaches, such as, static analysis and unit testing coverage. Static
analysis is a way of examining a code without executing it. The process depends
on analyzing code structure and ensuring the code adheres to industry coding
standards such as MISRA-C. Unit testing is also done on the code level. Several
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metrics are generated to ensure that unit testing addresses potential issues in the
code. Some utilized metrics are: code coverage, cyclomatic complexity and
maintainability index.
3. Extensive testing at different levels including white box testing, black box testing,
system and integration testing based on a variety of algorithms, such as, random
test generation, path oriented, goal oriented, and expert based adhoc test designs.
Testing is iterative, incremental and includes several stages beginning with
module test, simulation testing, hardware in the loop testing and finally
integration testing when all system components (Hardware and Software) are
ready.
4. Model driven approaches which rely on modeling a system abstraction and being
able to simulate these abstractions manually or automatically based on designing
test cases and finally formal methods but on a very small scale [5][6][7]. Modeldriven approach in software engineering is gaining wide ground in both industry
and academia. Legacy approaches still focus on implementation unlike model
driven approaches, which depends on models in all levels of the software
development process. The outcome of this shift has triggered quite a big change in
the approach to software development in design, implementation and testing
stages. Model based development utilizing the Unified Modeling Language
(UML) has driven many researchers to use UML diagrams like state machine
diagrams, use-case diagrams, sequence diagrams, etc. to generate test cases and
even code. Model-based testing approaches come with a big edge which is
increasing productivity as well as quality by changing the focus away from testing
to much earlier stage of the software development process. Additionally,
generating test cases are becoming more independent of any implementation of
the design
5. Formal methods which had traditionally not been widely adopted due to several
barriers. To name some, entry cost is high (education, legacy methods migration),
problem space scalability shortcomings, and insufficient tool support for formal
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methods since most of the existing tools originated from academia as opposed to
industrial endeavors and finally lack of expertise/training to formal methods. In
truth, it is very hard and unrealistic to assume that an ABS (Anti brake locking
system) application engineer will be able to define safety attributes in formal
notation to ensure that the system function is safe from a design perspective.

An automotive functional safety standard, ISO-26262 [13], has been published in 2011 to
ensure software functional safety. ISO-26262 is a functional safety standard that declares
its objectives as: providing an entire automotive safety lifecycle from management,
development, production, operation, service, and decommissioning of the product and
supports adapting the needed activities during the different lifecycle phases depending on
an automotive specific risk-based approach for determining risk classes (Automotive
Safety Integrity Levels, ASILs). The standard highly recommends capturing the design in
semi-formal notation and also highly recommends the use of semi-formal verification
methods to ensure design correctness in ASILs C and D. The use of formal method is
only recommended for ASIL D software. In this research, we will present a framework
that allows software designers to formally verify a specified software in a semi-formal
notation (UML). This complies with ISO-26262 design verification guidelines for ASILs
C and D which highly recommends semi-formal verification of the design for ASILs C
and D. Several automotive modules were used as case studies. An industrial ASIL B
compliant implementation and reported testing/production level defects is used to
conduct a comparative analysis and evaluation of the proposed framework. The
production level and late testing defects in the industrial use-case can be discovered via
our framework at the design stage. The aim of this research is to show that defects
identified on the code level during testing and release stages could be identified on the
design level via our proposed framework.

Our intent in this research is to address software verification in the early stage of the
software lifecycle, namely, the design stage. The research was motivated by the steep
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growth of critical software functions in embedded systems, the fact that 50% of defects
are introduced by the design stage, cost of finding a defect during testing is much higher
than finding it during design, late defects are mostly due to specification incompliance
defects, and the birth of AUTOSAR Automotive standard and ISO-26262.

We will present how existing V&V techniques still heavily depend on testing and little
effort focuses on pushing the verification to the design stage. Our research aims to
address the motivations while addressing the current shortcoming that have discouraged
the industry from using formal methods in the design stage of automotive software
development. Formal methods have not been widely adopted due to complexity of
notations, lack of support and lack of support tools. Automotive suppliers are also
looking for non-disruptive techniques that integrate with their used models and design
environments so that they do not have to re-invent the wheel for their software
development lifecycle.

1.2

Dissertation Organization

The dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 explains why the problem is hard or
why a solution is needed, chapter 3 discusses state of the art, chapter 4 defines all basic
blocks of the framework followed by a description of the framework flow, chapter 5
introduces the case study modules, chapter 6 details the case study results and the
comparative analysis with industrial flow for an automotive module and chapter 7
summarizes the conclusion and future work.

Chapter 2.

Research Motivation

The surge of electronic systems has led to major ramifications in vehicle engineering.
Today’s vehicle can have up to 4 kilometers of wiring in comparison to 45 meters in
manufactured vehicles in the 50s. Apollo 11 utilized nearly 150 Kbytes of onboard
memory in the late 60s to go to the moon and back. Nowadays, a moderate family car can
use up to 500 Kbytes in infotainment computer in order to keep the CD player from
skipping tracks.

The industry change had its toll on power demands as well as design, which led to major
innovative changes in electronic networks for automobiles. Researchers have shifted
focus to try to ensure that developed systems are safe, efficient and reliable and could
replace entire mechanical and hydraulic applications. Control networks connect
electronic equipment in a car just as LANs connect computers. The networks allow
communication between the different computers in the vehicle to transfer and share data.
The vehicle is now a LAN of connected computers that need to talk to each other to make
smart and critical decisions. Traditionally, networks connectivity depended on wiring.
However, currently, due to the surge in communication within the vehicle, the use of
wiring hit a technological wall. Several protocols are now the backbone of existing
control and communications networks to accommodate the wall of using discrete wiring.
Centralized followed by distributed networks have replaced point-to-point wiring. Figure
1 shows an example of the electronic surge, which triggered the number of systems and
applications contained in a modern car network architecture to increase drastically.

Nowadays, car electronics represent more than 30% of the total cost of a car [87]. In a
2008 BMW 5 series, it is estimated that there are up to 80 electronic modules
communicating together that is made up of nearly 10 million lines of software code. As
car electronic architectures become more and more complex, carmakers outsource the
design of electronic modules to automotive electronic suppliers. The design of an
6
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automotive electronic module (hardware, software and mechanical skills) typically
consumes 24 months of development and involves tens of team members, both technical
and managerial. The attributed software defects of such a project is more than 80% of the
total number of defects although software testing takes up to 50% of the time spent on
project management and technical activities.

In automotive industry, the engineering processes of the software development life cycle
are performed according to the standard V-model. The main engineering processes are:
Requirements specification and management, global design, component development,
integration, and validation. These processes are carried out before each carmaker delivery
of the software product. In fact, an incremental-type design process is initiated between
the carmakers and their suppliers in order to take the carmaker constraints and
requirements priorities into account.

Figure 1 Modern Car systems and Networks
The number of iterations is defined based on the project’s complexity and adjusted
according to the carmaker inputs and project constraints. Considering a fairly complex
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project, the number of iterations between supplier and manufacturer can reach ten. Each
iteration (delivery) follows Verification and Validation (V&V) activities imposed by the
supplier and ends with a substantial number of software defects. This number depends on
the size (in terms of lines of codes), complexity and maturity of the delivered software.
In automotive industry, both static and dynamic software V&V techniques [88] are
practiced in order to ensure that the resulting software product implementation is
compliant to the specification and customer needs. Although static techniques are
necessary to detect defects earlier in the development process, testing techniques are
considered the ultimate techniques in the detection of software bugs. Testing represent up
to 90% of the time spent in V&V of an automotive software product. Many automotive
industries have invested on automating test execution; however, the test design activity is
still manual and completely based on the test engineers’ experience.

As the software products become more and more complex, it is impossible to be able to
check that the software product responds correctly to all possible test input data. In
[89,90], the authors demonstrate that software testing is a NP-Complete (complex)
problem and therefore impossible to achieve full coverage of test input data on any
software. Moreover, each engineer could have a different perception of the possible and
critical test input data based on experience. In automotive industry, a software product is
always tested against predefined objectives such as code and specification coverage.
Meanwhile, for time and budget reasons, managers could decide to stop testing a
software product even if the target coverage rate is not reached due to project timing
constraints.

Facing this growing software complexity, carmakers and automotive electronic suppliers
are looking for efficient methods to verify and validate software. As the automotive
market becomes more competitive, development time reduction and early software
defects detection become major drives in the domain. Figure 2 [92] shows how the cost
per fault multiplies by 5 in functional testing stage, 10 times in system testing and 50
times in production. The study also shows how the design organization introduces 40% of
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the defects introduced in the software and that currently fault discovery during design is
only limited to 6%. Additionally, defects introduced in the design stage leaks to the
development, testing, UAT, and Production stages. Any introduced solution needs to
ensure that defects leakage/slippage from Design to Development stage is minimal and
this should be a metric to evaluate design verification approach.

Figure 2 Cost Of Late Testing
2.1

Automotive - Fueling Change Factors

The birth of AUTOSAR and ISO-26262 automotive functional safety standard is a strong
proof of how automotive suppliers are committed to enhancing their software to meet
these challenges and it is one of the motivations behind the work presented in this
dissertation as detailed in next sections. In [91], the author shows that bugs are mainly
introduced during the first stage of the software development life cycle and reports that
around 90% is introduced in requirements analysis, design and implementation activities.
The cost of correcting a bug in the late stages of the software development lifecycle
becomes dramatic in comparison to early detection of the defect. It is inevitable to
propose methodologies that target early detection of defects in the first stages of the
software lifecycle. The overall goal of electronic embedded system design is to balance
production costs with development time and cost in view of performance and
functionality considerations. In other words, engineers are encouraged to shorten the
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overall design and validation cycle without compromising quality, reliability, and cost
targets.

According to a released study commissioned by the Department of Commerce's National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 2002), software bugs adds a cost overhead
on the U.S. economy of about $59.5 billion annually(0.6 percent of the gross domestic
product). The study also confirms that a third of these bugs could be improved via an
improved Validation and Verification activities that allow the early detection of defects.
An estimated 22.2 billion dollars could be saved via finding a higher rate of bugs in the
same development activity that introduced them. Currently, over half of all defects are
not found until the last testing activity in the development process (validation test) or
during post-sale software use (operational life). The current automotive software growth,
the need to decrease cost while enhancing quality and the explicit target of discovering
faults in the early design stage as opposed to late testing stage are several motivations
behind the research introduced in this dissertation.
2.2

What is AUTOSAR?

AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) is an open and standardized
automotive software architecture, jointly developed by automobile manufacturers,
suppliers and tool developers. AUTOSAR’s birth is motivated by the following goals:
1. Management of E/E complexity associated with growth in functional scope
2. Flexibility of product modification, upgrade and update
3. Scalability of solutions within and across product lines
4. Improved quality and reliability of E/E systems
Our research is aligned with objectives 3 and 4 where we focus on improving quality of
design and implementation via addressing the current shortcoming of formal methods
that discouraged the automotive industry from using them[81].
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AUTOSAR-standard relies on component based software design model in the design
stage of the vehicular system. Software components are used in the design model and are
linked through abstract component named the virtual function bus [86].

The basic unit in the application in the software development life cycle is a software
component. The automotive application is now a structure of components that have
different types of interfaces to talk to each other. The components can be re-usable within
some applications. AUTOSAR standards describes standardized interfaces for all the
application software components that are needed to build any automotive application.
This ensures that there is still freedom in the functionality that is contained within the
component as long as the component has standardized interfaces and could be plugged
in/out of existing systems[81].

VFB or virtual function bus is the bridge that aims to connect the different software
components in the AUTOSAR design model. This special component is responsible for
connecting the application software components as well as handling the data flow
between them. The virtual function bus is AUTOSAR’s approach to model all hardware
and system within a vehicular system. The approach allows the focus to be on the
application as opposed to the structure of the software via the designers[81].

The presence of the virtual function bus has allowed the software components to not be
aware about the other components that they communicate with. The output of every
software component is given to the VFB, which dispatches the information via ports of
the input of the software components that require this data which is feasible due to
standardized interfaces of the software components which defines the input and output
ports as well as the data format of the information that will be exchanged via the
components [81].
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This approach makes it possible to validate the interaction of all components and
interfaces before software implementation. This is also a fast way to make changes in the
system design and check whether the system will still function[83].

To support the Autosar-methodology, the consortium developed a metamodel to allow
designers to describe their systems based on this metamodel. A formal description of
methodology related information, which is modeled in UML was given. The benefit
below are a result of this definition:
o The structure of the information can be clearly visualized
o The consistency of the information is guaranteed
o Using XML, a data exchange format can be generated automatically out of the
meta-model and be used as input for the methodology.
o

2.2.1

Easy maintenance of the entire vehicular system
AUTOSAR Layered Architecture

Figure 3 depicts the AUTOSAR Interfaces[80].
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Figure 3 AUTOSAR Interfaces
Classification of Interfaces:
There are three different types of interfaces in Autosar Layered Architecture [80].
1. Standardized Autosar Interfaces:
A Standardized AUTOSAR Interface is an AUTOSAR Interface standardized
within the AUTOSAR project.
2. Standardized Interfaces:
A software interface is called Standardized Interface if a concrete standardized
API exists (e.g. OSEK COM Interface Com_ReceiveSignal &
Com_TransmitSignal which are called by RTE module)
3. Autosar Interfaces:
An AUTOSAR Interface describes the data and services required or provided by a
component and is specified and implemented according to the AUTOSAR
Interface Definition Language. An AUTOSAR Interface is partly standardized
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within AUTOSAR, e.g. it may include OEM specific aspects. The use of
AUTOSAR Interfaces allows software components to be distributed among
several ECUs. The RTEs on the ECUs will take care of making the distribution
transparent to the software components.
2.2.2

AUTOSAR Structure

Figure 4 shows the AUTOSAR layers while explaining the aim of each layer [80].

Figure 4 AUTOSAR Layered Architecture
Microcontroller Abstraction layer aims to free the software from the processor, ECU
abstraction layer frees the software from the physical ECU properties, is the lowest
software layer, and it contains internal drivers which are modules that have direct access
to peripherals and microcontroller. ECU Abstraction layer interfaces the drivers. It also
contains external drivers. It offers interfaces for access to peripherals regardless of their
location in the microcontroller (Internal or external) and their connections ( port pins,
interfaces) and mainly makes higher software layers independent of the ECU hardware
layout. Services layer is the highest layer of the Basic Software and offers operating
system functionality, network communication and management services, memory
services, diagnostic services, ECU state management, mode management, logical and
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temporal program flow monitoring. The RTE is a layer that provides communication
services to the application software. The software communication with each other via
services in the RTE[80].
2.3

ISO-26262

ISO-26262 is a functional safety standard that publishes its objectives as [13]:
o Provides an automotive safety lifecycle (management, development, production,
operation, service, decommissioning) and supports tailoring the necessary
activities during these lifecycle phases;
o Provides an automotive specific risk-based approach for determining risk classes
(Automotive Safety Integrity Levels, ASILs);
o Uses ASILs for specifying the item's necessary safety requirements for achieving
an acceptable residual risk; and
o

Provides requirements for validation and confirmation measures to ensure a
sufficient and acceptable level of safety being achieved.

Our research fulfils recommendations made by the standard in the validation and
verification activities of the design recommendation. The steps recommended by the
standard include semi-formal verification of the design and formal verification of the
design. Our proposed framework support these guidelines. Test derivation guidelines
recommend checks to be based on requirement of analysis, boundary conditions and
equivalence partitioning. We will show that our formal framework support these
guidelines while checking the model to report any violation.

The standards has been published in 10 sections, namely, vocabulary, management of
functional safety, concept phase, product development at the system level, product
development at the hardware level, product development at the software level, production
and operation, supporting processes, ASIL oriented and safety oriented analysis and
finally guidelines on ISO 26262.
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ISO 26262 automotive safety lifecycle envelopes the entire lifecycle all the way to
production. This incorporates the necessity of having a safety manager who manages the
evolution of a safety plan and develops a set of measures inclusive of a safety review,
audit, and assessment. These measures are intended to be the framework for developing
any E/E system [13].

ASIL is a primary element in ISO 26262 compliance. The ASIL is determined at the
beginning of the development process. The expected functions of any system are
specified and analyzed in comparison with potential hazards. The ASIL asks the question,
“If a failure arises, what is the side-effect on human lives, whether it be the driver or
pedestrians?" The risk estimation is established based on several probabilities, including
the probability of exposure, the possible controllability by a driver, and the possible
outcome’s severity if a critical event occurs, leads to the ASIL. The ASIL is not related in
any way to the technologies utilized within the system. It only focuses on any potential
harm that may come to the driver or road users in case the system fails. [13].

Every safety requirement has to be assigned an ASIL value, which can be A, B, C, or D,
with D having the most stringent safety critical processes and strictest testing regulations.
ISO 26262 standard related all guidelines and recommendations based on the ASIL level
and identified the least set of testing requirements based on ASIL level as well. This
governs the approaches that should be utilized for test once the ASIL level is determined
based on a system level safety goal, which describes what the system should do to ensure
safety [13].

In the example of a windshield wiper system, the analysis of the safety of the system will
render that the potential loss of wiper function can impair the visibility of the driver and
thus lead to a critical injury to the driver or a potential pedestrian. In this case, a high
ASIL level is assigned to the system. The system development will have to follow all the
guidelines in the standard that are applicable to this ASIL level. This guidance is meant to
be in addition to existing safety practices. Existing measures to manufacture automobiles
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could already be utilizing a good number of the approaches recommended by ISO-26262.
The publishing of the standard just aims to standardize the practices across the industry.
[13].

Hardware qualification is also part of the standard and it lists two main objectives in this
area. The first is to show how the individual parts are part of the big system and to define
failure modes and asses them. Regular existing qualification can be done for elementary
hardware components. Complex hardware components has to go through the analysis
phase and the ASIL level assignment phase and testing based on assigned ASIL level.
The hardware qualification is done via testing the part as a unit in different environmental
and operational conditions. Numerical methods are then used to analyze the results and
grouped into a qualification report that also documents the testing process, any
assumptions and different input categories. [13].

The activities to qualify a component is documented in ISO26262. It can be summarized
as defining functional requirements, the utilization of resources, and analyzing software
behavior in case of failure or overload situations. Whenever an existing software
component is qualified, the process to integrate it to an existing system or re-use it
becomes much simpler. The re-use aspect is really encouraged in AUTOSAR and
simplified via ISO 26262. AUTOSAR encourages the use of well-established entities that
have been used in several projects and ISO 26262 describes how to easily qualify such
entities for re-use. Example of such entities can include operating systems, libraries,
databases

or

even

driver

software.

[13].

The qualification via the standard for these entities would be to check their behavior
under normal conditions and abnormal ones (inducing faults to see system reaction). Any
Software defects are analyzed from a data path and runtime perspective as well and
addressed throughout the design process [13].

Existing components whether they are hardware or software components can also comply
with ISO 26262 via “proven in use” argument. This is a special clause in the ISO where it
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describes means to comply a component via proving that it has been used long enough by
other components with no reported failure. This was included in ISO 26262 to ensure that
existing systems that have been in production with no incidents for a long time does not
have to comply with the guidelines for safety in development life cycle. It makes no
sense to ask a module that has been deployed in several cars for years to apply standard
guidelines. The compliance of such components is established by proving that they have
been utilized in real world and can be shown to be defect free and reliable. Combining
components that are certified based on the new standard guidelines with those that have
been deployed for a long time is believed to reduce the overall complexity of the system.
[13].

A major challenge in any adoption of a new standard such as ISO 26262 is how to apply
the standard to existing processes. Usually, this is initiated via a pilot project to evaluate
the delta and the effect of the process on existing processes. Existing pilots tend to show
that ISO-26262 is similar to existing processes as the industry was already safety
oriented. Industry already saw the advantages of evaluating risks and doing program
safety analysis throughout a project and starting with the early phases of the project
definition to account for hazard analysis [13].

In summary, ISO 26262 could be seen as a standard that pushes for early understanding
of program goals and impacts, analyzing these goals and impacts from the start of the
project, linking the program to a correct ASIL accordingly and finally fulfilling these
requirements through ASIL guidelines all the way to production. [13].

Testing is critical in the development life cycle as described in ISO 26262. It is crucial
that systems react reliably towards testing scenarios. It must be shown that system
behavior always stay within a safe limit that is identified during the analysis phase of the
system even when exposed to expected and unexpected human or environmental inputs.
It is expected that increasing the test quality of the system will increase the performance
of the product, its quality as well as its reliability and recall rate. It is well known that the
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cost of finding an issue in production is far less than finding it in the field. The best
scenario would be to find the issue in the design stage where the cost is much less. [13].

The standard includes understanding of the fact that the above can be accomplished via
software tools. The tools could be used to automate a guideline or task within the
development lifecycle of the component. The standard describes a complete section on
tool qualification where a tool is evaluated based on a Tool Confidence Level Metric
[13].

The inputs and outputs of any tool decide the use-cases that will be used to test the tool.
Once the tool is put under test, the output is used to determine the Tool Confidence Level
(TCL). The TCL and ASIL determine the level of qualification required for the software
tool. Two specific parts are used to determine the confidence level:


The possibility of a malfunctioning software tool and its erroneous output can
lead to the violation of any safety requirement allocated to the safety-related item
or element to be developed



The probability of preventing or detecting such defects in its output

The Tool Confidence Level can be TCL1, TCL2, TCL3, or TCL4, with TCL4 being the
highest level of confidence and TCL1 being the lowest level of confidence [13].
2.3.1

Tool Qualification

ISO 26262 puts in place requirements to qualify tools that help in the product
development lifecycle or that adopt technologies that are recommended via the standard.
Requirements include the necessity to define an ASIL level and the tool must have a user
manual, unique Id, version number, some installation guide document, the needed
installation environment and details of the features of the tool. ISO 26262 requires the
following tool qualification work products:
o Software Tool Qualification Plan
o Software Tool Documentation
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o Software Tool Classification Analysis
o Software Tool Qualification Report
STQP or software tool qualification plan needs to be put in place in the early
development of any element or item that is impacted via the safety plan. It mainly targets
two areas, namely, showing that there is a plan in place to qualify the tool and
enumerating the use-cases that show that the tool has been categorized with a correct
ASIL with a good degree of confidence. STQP plan needs to include a unique tool
identifier, a version number, predefined ASIL level, use-cases, features, user manual as
well as the needed environment to run the tool.
In order to define Tool Confidence Level (TCL), a Software Tool Classification Analysis
(STCA) was put in place to guide the assignment of the TCL factor. Two main aspects
define the TCL, the first is the Tool Impact (TI) and the second is the Tool Error
Detection (TD). TCL is defined based on these two values as described in the ISO-26262
standard.

Tool impact can either be classified as TI0 or TI1. If the tool supplier can provide details
of why the tool mal-function can never affect a safety requirement, then the tool impact
can be assigned TI0. If no such argument can be given then the tool impact is assigned as
TI1.

In the case where a tool generates documentation and the documentation has a typing
defect, then this mild issue does not trigger or cause a safety requirement incompliance in
any way. It would be safe to assign such a tool an impact factor of TI0. In the case where
a tool can potential effect the behavior of a system in any way based on its output, then
an impact factor of TI1 is assigned.

On the other hand, Tool error detection can be assigned a range between TD1 and TD4.
The assignment is based on the confidence level of the tool. A high confidence level tool
is assigned TD1. TD2 is assigned for tools with moderate confidence level, and TD3 is
assigned for tools with low confidence level. If the tool could potentially mal-function
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and this can be detected via random cases as opposed to systematic ones, then TD4 is the
assigned value.

In static analysis tools case, a TD2 (moderate confidence degree) is assigned to the tools.
This is because static analysis tools detect a subset of defects that can exist in the
model/design. The tools cannot report all violations in a design model. As a result, TD2
indicates that additional testing or tools are needed to ensure that the model is correct
which is interpreted into a TD2 or a moderate confidence level in the tool.

A TCL factor can be assigned once a tool has already been evaluated from an Impact (TI)
and error detection (TD) levels. TCL can range from 1 to 4. It is possible that a tool can
be assigned different TCLs depending on different exercised use-cases. In which case, the
highest TCL value is the one used for the tool. The above classification needs to be done
for every tool. [13].

Finally, a qualification report that contains the outcome of the qualification activities and
the proofs showing that the assignments were done properly and the all qualification
guidelines have been met. Any unexpected outcome should also be well captured in the
report.

The standard also supports tool qualification based on the usage history of a tool. If the
tool has been used extensively then a high confidence factor could be assigned in the
qualification endeavor. This definitely will help existing suppliers from a cost and time
perspective in tool qualification since their tools have been used extensively in projects.
With that said, the tool must show that qualification is done for every safety requirement
before being used in developing any safety item. In such case, the tool must show that:
o It was historically used for a similar objective and similar use-cases
o The tool has not gone through major specification updates
o

The tool has not caused a previous safety violation in previous safety
requirements.
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If Tool X was used to validate Car A ABS (Anti Brake System) system. Tool X has not
violated any safety requirement for this module in car A. In this case, the standard allows
using Tool A for ABS system in Car B given that it is a similar Car and the ABS system
will be used in that car with a similar manner. [13].
2.3.2

ISO26262 Architectural Design level Guidance

The first objective of this subphase is to develop a software architectural design that
realizes the software safety requirements. The second objective of this subphase is to
verify the software architectural design.

The software architectural design represents all software components and their
interactions with one another in a hierarchical structure. Static aspects, such as interfaces
and data paths of all software components, as well as dynamic aspects, such as process
sequences, state machines and timing behavior, need to be described.
In order to develop a single software architectural design both software safety
requirements as well as all non-safety-related requirements have to be fulfilled. Hence in
this subphase safety-related and non-safety-related requirements are handled within one
development process.

The software architectural design has to provide the means to implement the software
safety requirements and to manage the complexity of the technical safety concept [13].
Inputs to this phase are:
1. Software safety requirements specification
2. Safety plan
3. Verification Plan
4. Other supporting documents/resources include [13]:


Technical safety concept
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System design specification


Design and coding guidelines for modelling and programming languages



Guidelines for the application of methods (from external source)



Software tool application guidelines



Qualified software components available

To ensure that the software architectural design captures the information necessary to
allow the subsequent development activities to be performed correctly and effectively,
the software architectural design shall be described with appropriate levels of abstraction
by using the notations for software architectural design listed in Table 1 [13].
Table 1 ISO26262 Recommended Design Abstraction Notation
ASIL
Methods
A

B

C

D

1a

Informal notations

++

++

+

+

1b

Semi-formal notations

+

++

++

++

1c

Formal notations

+

+

+

+

Adherence to design guidelines through verification methods is shown in Table 2. Our
research aims to empower the ISO-26262 guidelines with tools to achieve semi-formal
and formal verification of the design.
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Table 2 Methods for the verification of the software architectural design
ASIL
Methods
A

B

C

D

1a Informal verification by walkthrough of the design-a

++

+

o

o

1b Informal verification by inspection of the design-a

+

++

++

++

1c Semi-formal verification by simulating dynamic parts of the design-b

+

+

+

+

1d Semi-formal verification by prototype generation / animation

o

o

+

+

1e Formal verification

o

o

+

+

1f Control flow analysis-c, -d

+

+

++

++

1g Data flow analysis-c, -d

+

+

++

++

a

Informal verification is used to assess whether the software requirements are completely

and correctly refined and realized in the software architectural design. In the case of model-based
development this method can be applied to the model.
b

Method 1c requires the usage of executable models for the dynamic parts of the software

architecture.
c

Control and data flow analysis can be carried out informally, semi-formally or formally.

d

Control and data flow analysis may be limited to safety-related components and their

interfaces.
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Chapter 3.

Literature Survey

This chapter introduces the research’s state of the art. The existing software
defects as well as the existing verification and validation techniques used in the software
engineering cycle.
3.1

Software Defects

In order to claim there is an attempted solution that targets improvements in embedded
automotive software safety, it is imperative to capture problems that this solution need to
address and the software defects that any solution needs to target. IEEE defines software
defect to be a software related discrepancy between a computed, observed, or measured
value and condition and the true, specified, or theoretically correct value or condition [8].
To guide the measures for software defects corrective actions in some industries,
software defects in more than one domain / standard gets classified as negligible,
significant and catastrophic defects. Measures to identify problems in a typical software
program that is millions of lines of code are crucial. It is reported that the average
embedded device has 1 million line of code and doubling each year [9], a modern
passenger jet, such as Boeing 777 depends on 4 million lines of code[10], cars average
400 million lines of code so far[9]. Researchers have attempted to classify software
defects that should be addressed to guarantee software reliability and deterministic
behavior in more than one way.

Lutz classified defects based on existing identified defects in software safety critical
embedded projects as shown below [11]:
1. Program Faults
o Internal Faults (Syntax programming and language’s semantics). These are coding
defects that happen internally in the software. Not many of these internal software
defects appear during system testing and concludes that existing process flows
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discover most of these defects and that there should be no focus on these defect
categories.
o Interface Faults (Interactions with other systems components)
o Functional Faults (operating faults; omission or unnecessary operations;
conditional faults; incorrect conditions or limit value). These usually happen due
to behavior not satisfying the functional requirements. These defects are the most
frequently occurring software ones and could be easily detected via formal
approaches and verification approaches.
o Behavioral faults (incorrect behavior that does not conform to requirements).
These usually present half of the faults uncovered during system testing and could
be easily detected via formal approaches and verification approaches.
As classified above, functional and behavioral faults represent the bulk of the defects and
it is recommended that they be addressed via formal methods.
Analysis of program faults categories in Voyager and Galileo spacecraft projects
conclude the following software defects root causes [11]:


Interface defects are mainly driven by communication errors between the
members in the development team or communication errors between the
development team and other teams. Additionally a primary defect reason for
interface defects is misunderstood hardware and software interface specifications.
A typical identified use-case was the misconception of the initial state of relays or
unexpected timing patterns that were not explicitly indicated in the specifications.



Functional faults were observed to be mainly due to defects in identifying
requirements or implementing them. An example of this was reported as being
assumed condition or limit values that were not explicitly identified as
requirements and were incorrectly assumed.

Conclusion was that program faults category of defects is mainly caused by problems
with understanding/mapping requirements within the software [11].
2. Human Errors
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o Coding or editing errors
o Communication errors within a development team
o Errors in recognizing requirements
o Errors in deploying requirements
3. Process Flaws
o Utilized methods are old (Inspections and ad-hoc based testing approaches)
o Inaccurate or incomplete specifications that results from lack of communication
between programmers and designers.
o Incomplete or missing interface specifications between software and hardware
engineers.
o Inadequate requirements documentation that lacks complete description, which
lead

to

misunderstanding

those

requirements.

Requirements

not

identified/understood (Inadequate design)
The above classification was based on existing two spacecraft’s projects and identified
387 software defects in their software development, namely Voyager (18,000 lines of
code) and Galileo (22,000 lines of code). Table 3 lists a summary of program faults
classification in both projects:
Table 3 Fault Classification in Spacecraft's Project
Program Faults
Faults Types

Safety related program faults

Voyager

Galileo

Voyager

Galileo

(134)

(253)

(75)

(122)

Internal Faults

1% (1)

3%(7)

0%(0)

2%(3)

Interface Faults

34%(46)

18%(47)

36%(27)

19%(23)

79%(199)

64%(48)

79%(96)

Function

and 65%(87)
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Program Faults

Safety related program faults

behavior Faults

The above numbers show us that the focus should be on Interface, functional and
behavioral faults, as they are mainly the bulk percentage for the defects identified in both
projects.

Other existing research efforts focused on software design, implementation, and testing
problems [11] which they enumerated as follows:
1- Omission: The failure of a system to generate an output to an input.
2- Value: The failure of a system to produce the correct output to a given input although
the output was generated in the correct time requirement.
3- Timing: The failure of a system to generate the correct output towards an input in the
required time interval/constraint
4- Byzantine: Any failure that causes an invalid input-output combination.
Edward A. Lee focuses on the problems with embedded software and identifies them as
follows [12]:
1. Resource limitations (limited memory, small data word sizes, and relatively slow
clocks). Although there has been huge progress in semiconductor industry in the past,
embedded industries fall short of utilizing designs that utilize the new artifacts. Examples
include,
o Rarely see embedded development utilizing object oriented techniques, such
as inheritance and polymorphism.
o Processors used for embedded systems rarely use memory hierarchy
techniques that make use of virtual memory spaces to deliver faster execution
using caches.
o Automated memory management (Allocation, de-allocation and garbage
collection) is rarely utilized in embedded system.
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2. Most software systems abstract away time via ordering within the software system
development. In embedded software systems, integrations of software and hardware takes
place. Physical systems are concurrent and temporal. Actions and reactions happen all the
time simultaneously and concurrently thus temporal properties are crucial to embedded
safety systems. To the contrary, time is abstracted away and replaced by ordering.
Languages such as C/C++ and Java allow definition of the order of actions but not the
timing. The lack of timing in the core abstraction is a flaw in embedded systems.
Embedded frameworks such as Simulink (Mathworks), TinyOS(Berekley) and SCADE
(Esterel Technologies) have no threads or processes.
3. Developers find it extremely difficult to debug communication between threads. As a
result the behavior of concurrent systems is always not fully comprehended or defined
which puts their reliability to question. The only attempt to control the interaction is
based on mutex and semaphore technologies to try to control parallel access, which are
methods that have been defined in the 60s. Most of the time, there are race conditions in
the software that are manifested in production as opposed to in testing phase of the
software which causes a system to be non-deterministic.
Bugs introduced because of misusing sempahores or mutex are very difficult to
troubleshoot and almost impossible to be identified during testing. It is possible that a
program can be running correctly for years and then a flaw that is introduced at design
time is uncovered. Current concurrent development shortcomings are due to lack of
proper concurrent software engineering processes (Good reviews or specifications, proper
testing,

and

proper

planning

of

concurrent

systems

design

). It is possible to improve this via formal methods although it is believed that the
program itself in such cases will be difficult to understand which impacts the reliability
factor of the software.

The main dilemma is to be able to capture concurrent systems abstractions while
retaining understandability of the programs and design. In such case, these abstractions
need not be much more difficult compared to general non concurrent system. [12].
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Software V&V helps the product designers and test engineers to confirm that a right
product is build right way throughout the development process and improve the quality of
the software product. It makes sure that, certain rules are followed when developing a
software product and also makes sure that the developed product fulfills the required
specifications. This reduces the risk associated with any software project up to certain
level by helping in detection and correction of faults, which are unknowingly done during
the development process.

The standard definition of verification is: "Are we building the product RIGHT?"
e.g. verification is makes sure that the software product is developed the right way. The
software must confirm to its predefined specifications, as the product development goes
through different stages, an analysis is performed to ensure that all required specifications
are met.
The verification part of V&V comes before validation and incorporates software
inspections, reviews, audits, etc. During the verification, the work product (the ready part
of the software being developed and various documentations) is reviewed / examined by
one or more persons in order to find and point out the bugs in it. The verification helps in
prevention of potential bugs.
The standard definition of validation is: "Are we building the RIGHT product?"
e.g. a software product must do what the customer expects it to do. The software product
must functionally do what it is supposed to, it must comply with any functional
requirement set by the customer. Validation occurs at the end of the development process
in order to determine whether the product complies with specified requirements.
Validation starts after verification ends (after coding of the product is completed). Testing
methods are basically carried out during the validation.
3.2

Software Verification and Validation Techniques

Whatever the size of project, software V&V greatly affects software quality. Software that
has not been verified has little chance of working. Defects could lead to an operational
failure (bug) or non-compliance with a requirement. The objective of software V&V is to
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reduce software Defects to an acceptable level. The V&V techniques must be applied at
each stage in the software process. It has two major objectives
1) Discovery of bugs in a product and
2) Assessment of whether or not the product is useful and useable in an
operational situation.

V&V must establish confidence that the software is fit and safe. Confidence is certainly
subjective and depends on many factors such as software criticality which is very high in
automotive domain. The V&V consists of numerous techniques and tools, often used in
combination with one another. Processes such as ISO-26262 wrap the software
development process and utilize all existing V&V techniques via recommendations and
guidelines.

Software V&V both use static and dynamic techniques of product checking to ensure that
the resulting software product matches with its specifications and that the software
product as implemented meets the expectations of the customer. In fact, dynamic
techniques involve the execution of the software product under test, whereas static
techniques do not.
Static techniques (Review and Proof) are concerned with analysis of the static product
representation to discover defects throughout all stages of the software life cycle. It may
be complemented by tool-based document and code analysis.
Dynamic techniques (Testing) are concerned with exercising and observing product
behavior. The product is executed with test data and its operational behavior is observed.
3.2.1

Process Based Approaches

Domain specific regulatory bodies put down process measures to guide any industry in its
software engineering process in order to govern software under development and put
strict measures in different software engineering cycles that aim to minimize software
defects that are caused by process flaws as a result of miscommunications, ambiguities,
or misunderstandings. There are over 250 standards and the list below shows some of the
existing software engineering standards that are available [14]:

32

1. AECL CE-1001-STD REV.2: Standard for Software Engineering of Safety
Critical Software
2. ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: Risk Management - Part 1: Application of Risk
Management to Medical Devices
3. ANSI/AAMI/IEC 62366:2007: Medical devices - Application of usability
engineering to medical devices
4. ANSI/IEEE 7-4.3.2: Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer
Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations
5. ANSI/ UL 1998: Software in Programmable Components
6. BS EN 50128:2001: Software in Programmable Components
7. EIA SEB6A: System Safety Engineering in Software Development.
8. IEC 60880: Software for Computers in the Safety Systems of Nuclear Power
Stations
9. IEC60950-1 Amd.1 Ed 2.0: Information technology equipment
10. IEC 61508-1/2/3/5/6: Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/Programmable
electronic safety related systems
11. IEC 62304: Medical device software
12. IEEE 1228: Software Safety Plans
13. ISO IEC TR 15026: Systems and software engineering. Systems and software
assurance/
14. ISO / IEC 27002:2005: Information technology – Security management
15. MIL-STD-882D: System Safety Program Requirements
16. RTCA DO-178B: Software considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
certifications
17. SAE AS9006: Aerospace Software Supplement for AS9100A
18. ISO26262: Road Vehicles Functional Safety
There have been several attempts to evaluate standards and argue for/against their
effectiveness in software engineering. One of these attempts was the SMARTIE (
Standards and Methods Assessment Using Rigorous Techniques in Industrial
Environment) which was a collaboration aiming to provide an objective assessment of an
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existing standard since it argues that there is currently more than 250 standards in the
market. [14]
The study reports that many standards are not really standards at all. Many “standards”
are reference or subjective requirements, suggesting that they are really guidelines (since
degree of compliance cannot be evaluated) and recommend that organizations with such
standards should revisit their goals and revise the standards to address the goals in a more
objective way. More generally, they found that standards lack objective assessment
criteria, involve more process than product, and are not always based on rigorous
experimental results. Thus, their recommendation was that software engineering
standards be reviewed and revised. The resulting standards should be cohesive collections
of requirements to which conformance can be established objectively. Moreover, there
should be a clearly stated benefit to each standard and a reference to the set of
experiments or case studies demonstrating that benefit. Finally, software engineering
standards should be better balanced, with more product requirements in relation to
process and resource requirements [14]. In summary, SMARTIE project findings were:
 Standards define a best practice; however there is no consensus about what is best
practice.
 Standards heavily over-emphasize a process rather than a product.
 Software standards try to assure product quality through a good development
process.
 The standards outline a set of mandatory requirements. However these
requirements are not clear or precise, leading to the standards becoming ‘codes of
practice’ or ‘guidelines’.
 Standards prescribe, recommend or mandate the use of technologies that have not
been objectively validated.
Standards are too big, usually extremely large documents that address the complete
system development life-cycle. This makes them hard to apply.
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3.2.2

Static Techniques

The main aims of static analysis is to find improper practices in the code without
executing it. The improper practices are based on historic findings or practices that have
led to bugs in existing systems. Static analysis is very popular and used through the
automotive industry and recommended by ISO-26262 in all ASIL levels. They do
uncover issues in the model structure, data or control flow as well as ensuring syntax
accuracy. There are several techniques that can be categorized as static analysis ones.
Sections below give a brief on each.

3.2.2.1 Review
Some product output is presented to other project members, managers, technical
engineers, customers or end-users to review the output and provide feedback based on
experience. The review usually ends with an approval conditional some feedback to be
implemented or a rejection. If the product in the review is rejected, then another review
involving the same attendees shall be organized. A review can be utilized to check any
work product during the project lifecycle including requirements or specifications. Four
types of reviews have been introduced via IEEE (IEEE Std. 610-1990) to conduct
software verification, namely, technical review, inspection, audit and walkthrough.
These reviews are all “formal reviews” in the sense that all have specific objectives and
explicit rules of procedures. They expect to identify defects and discrepancies of the
software regarding the original specifications, plans and standards.

3.2.2.2 Technical review
A technical review is intended to assess a review item, which could be source code or a
document, to ensure that the item in review conforms to specifications, complies with
standards or procedures, any previous required change was properly included, no new
issues were introduced as a result of any requested change.
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3.2.2.3 Walkthrough
A Walkthrough is usually the first attempt to evaluate a project element such as a
document, design, some model or even source code. The objectives of the walkthrough
includes early identification of potential defects and proposing solutions towards these
defects. It is also possible to consider the walkthrough endeavor as an educational one for
team members and to avoid future defects of similar nature via different team members.

3.2.2.4 Inspection
Inspection can be used for the detection of defects in detailed designs before coding and
during the coding stage. Inspection may also be used to verify test cases. A study done by
Fagan (Fagan 1986) has shown that inspection could detect over 50% of the total number
of defects introduced in development stages. IEEE (IEEE Std. 610-1990) considers that
inspection is a more rigorous alternative to walkthrough, and is strongly recommended
for software with stringent reliability, security and safety requirements.

3.2.2.5 Audit
In order to ensure that requirements, standards, procedurers, coding guidelines, licensing
and contractrual agreement compliance is adhered to, an audit is conducted in an
independent fashion. The audit is usually done via members that are not part of the
development team.

3.2.2.6 Proof
A proof is a logical expression ensuring that software is correct. Testing on the other
hand only shows that a specific input can generate a specific output. Alternatively, proof
shows that inputs given a set of pre-conditions will result in defined post-conditions
being met. Proof is usually based on formal techniques that is based on mathematical
equations being solved. Any requirement is mapped to a mathematical equation and
checkers are launched to check if given a set of values and pre conditions happen, this
equation can never violate post conditions. Another name for this approach is formal
verification. Proof techniques are usually shown to ensure specification compliance in
comparison to actual design or code.
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Proof techniques are often used on critical software products. They often have precise
and logical specifications with no loopholes and they require being highly reliable, since
failures in this kind of products may lead to deathly consequences. Some areas where
proof techniques which have been successful are for the specification and verification of
safe and critical products such as aircraft avionics, nuclear power plant control and
patient monitoring. Automotive engineers are not familiar with proof techniques contrary
to aeronautic or defense engineers. Software testing is a widespread V&V technique in
automotive industry. Proof techniques are not widely used in automotive industry. In fact,
the difficulty of expressing software requirements in the mathematical form necessary for
formal proof has restricted a wider application of this technique.

3.2.2.7 Tools
As part of existing attempts to address safety in software, researchers / industry and
conformance bodies started identifying best or to be avoided practices that every
programmer should abide by. MISRA, the Motor Industry Software Reliability
Association was started in the early 1990 and was primarily concerned with safety
aspects of electronic systems. Initially, the project was expected to develop guidelines for
vehicle based software. One of the major outputs of this effort was MISRA-C which was
an attempt to develop an embedded C programming standard/guideline that addresses
shortcomings in C language or practices that could lead to a software failing and thus
impacting or influencing safety.

Software tool vendors take such guidelines and attempt to automate the rules validation
across the software under development. Such tools are called static analysis tools since
the analysis of source code takes place without execution. Because static analysis does
not require execution of the code, analysis for defects and vulnerabilities is done
throughout the software development process, and analysis conducted across all code
paths.
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Static analysis is simply looking for signatures of defects or patterns that have caused
defects historically in already developed programs. Sometimes, these patterns are vague.
Static Analysis main flaw is that it can give a good number of false positives where it
reports many violations that are false or meaningless. Static analysis also looks for
patterns that are already known. So, any new defect cannot be identified via static
analysis tools. Research is ongoing on static analysis to extend its scope and make it a
reliable step in the software development cycle [20].
Static analysis tools started emerging in the late 70’s. The first generation of such tools
started with the Lint tool. Lint was well perceived by developers and project managers
when it was first released. Developers were able to run a tool that automatically detects
software defects in the early stages of implementation and as a result, it was very easy
form them to correct such defects. This gave developers confidence in their code quality
before release. Lint was utilizing SAT or Boolean satisfiability as well as path simulation.
It also used compilers to be able to detect defects. Lint is seen to be the first usable static
tool. [15]

As with the rest of the tools conducting static analysis, Lint tool was never designed to
detect issues that can lead to run-time problems. Its main objective was to indicate code
constructs that could potentially be problematic or code constructs that could lead to
portability issues so that developers can fix them in the code. Problematic code or nonportable code could be viewed as code that is correct from a semantics and syntax
perspective but could potentially behave in a way that was not intended by the developer
due to its structure or composition. The dispute about marking problematic code is that
most of the time the code would work without changing it, the same for compiler
warnings. As a result, this tends to be ignored and the analysis capabilities of the tool’s
reported output would not be efficient due to high noise rate where only one issue out of
10 is a real defect. [15]
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As a result, developers ended up wasting time trying to analyze which of the reported
violations are real and which are not. Developers were asked to do manual review to
analyze the output of the static tool analysis. The overhead of doing output analysis
manually was exactly why static tools was introduced in the first place. As a result, Lint
was never deployed and trusted on a massive scale in the industry and it only survived
some success in a few organizations. Some of the initial Lint tool releases are still in use
by product development in some organizations until today. [15]

Static analysis remained for almost 20 years as a myth in identifying defects as opposed
to an actual dependable tool. A new generation of static analysis tool were released in
early 2000, Stanford Checker, which was seen to offer good value to make it a reliable
tool for defect detection. Unlike first generation tools which were only looking for
matching patterns, this tool utilized path coverage and was able to reveal more defects
that had run time failure indications. The tools ran on entire project code bases as
opposed to individual files. This switched the focus from, problematic code constructs to
defects that had run-time implications. The main theme of the new tool developers was to
understand the code composition, use complex technologies, namely, path analysis, and
inter procedural analysis to comprehend the program flow between functions in a
complete system. [18][19]

Although second generation tools were adopted by organizations, they still failed to strike
a balance between reliability and scalability. Some tools were accurate when it comes to
a subset of defect types but failed to work with systems that had millions of lines of code.
Other systems ran faster but ended up with output like Lint Tool where many false
positives were reported. The tools did show defects at a reasonable ration but only when
you restrict the input parameters during the execution of the tool. The dilemma of trying
to balance between accuracy and scalability to avoid false positives remained. This was
the problem that caused first generation tools not to be widely adopted and they remained
in second-generation tools, which also reduced the rate of their adoption. So, in a
nutshell, the technologies used in second generation tools were more advanced, the
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results were still far from what developers can claim as an accurate output. Second
generation tools also endured many issues due to the heterogeneous build and
development environment. The development and build environments are not standard and
are different in every organization which led to great pains, time and cost to integrate any
tool to existing build and development environments.[15][16]

Most recently, a new generation of tools emerged that are based on SAT solvers and path
analysis technologies. SAT is described as defining if variables of some formula can be
assigned in a way to make the formula end up being evaluated to true. It also tried to find
if no assignment exists that could lead the formula evaluation to be true. This would
imply that a function, which would be represented via the formula, is false given all input
parameters and variable assignment. In such case, the formula is declared as
unsatisfiable; else, it is satisfiable. The conclusion was that such static analysis tools were
able to find real defects and minimize the false positives. There was also a claim that the
underlying used technology can allow for further enhancements in static analysis [17].

Furthermore, some further programming language specific static analysis concepts were
introduced. In automobile design, the UK-based Motor Industry Software Reliability
Association (MISRA) mapped their concerns of safety in software into a set of
documentation limitations. Knowing that most automotive development happens in C,
they collected the pitfalls of C language and published guidelines in order to make
automotive programming in C safer.[21]
The result of UK’s MISRA association endeavor was a guidelines document to aid any
developer in using the C language. The guidelines, which was published in 1998, were
later given the acronym, MISRA C. It was a 70-page document that described all C
language pitfalls based on existing systems failures. [21]

MISRA C is comprised of 127 rules, 93 are mandatory and must be satisfied by any
automotive software developer and the remaining are recommendations. In order for any
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developer to confirm to MISRA C, they must show that they do not violate any of the 93
mandatory rules. Developers should also make every attempt to confirm to the advisory
rules as well. Therefore, briefly, either you are MISRA C compliant fan or you are not. [
21] The guidelines do not deal with issues related to invalid algorithms. It has no impact
on programming style and no constraints that can stop a developer form writing stupid
code. It will just ensure that your code has avoided known pitfalls of C language. [ 21]

Other tools out there also help in identifying code anomalies in different categories via
static tools. There are tools to ensure that code is compliant to standards, not redundant,
does not contain any division by zero, does not have constructs that can cause run-time
exceptions, does not cause memory leaks and finally does not mis-use variables in any
way. [22]. Such tools parse the source code and tries to find any of the above categories
error patterns in the code. Static analysis now include control and data flow analysis,
interface analysis, information flow analysis, and path analysis of software code.
Nowadays, static analysis tools can identify a good number of development defects but
there remains a good number of defects that cannot be detected via static analysis tools.
[22].

There exists a wide range of tools for code written in C or C++. FlexeLint2 is a Unix
based tool that checks C/C++ source code to find bugs, constructs that are not portable,
inconsistent code constructs or redundant code. inconsistencies, non-portable constructs,
and redundant code. Reasoning3’s Illuma is a static tool that detects bugs in applications
written in C/C++. Development teams send their code base to Reasoning3, which
conducts the static analysis, analyses the tool output to filter away false positives and
generates a report to be sent back to the development team. Illuma The tool focused on
detecting bugs that can cause applications crashes or corruption in data such as NULL
pointer dereferencing; out of bounds array access; memory leaks; bad de-allocation; and
uninitialized variables.
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Two static analysis tools provided by Klocwork4 are also in use by several organizations.
InForce conducts automated inspection of source code to provide code metrics that can
be used to identify defects, opportunities for code optimizations or security flaws.
GateKeeper inspects the source code architecture and provides an assessment report that
shows the cons and pros of the architecture, which reveals en evaluation of the code. The
evaluations address the quality of the code, defects that are hidden, and code that is hard
to maintain. Metrics also shows interdependency between modules, cyclic relationships
within modules, code files that exhibit high risk, potential logical defects, and areas for
improvement [22].

PREfix [22] analyzed the code to establish a call graph of the program. PREfast [22] tool
is a “quick” version of the PREfix tool where specific PREfast analyses revolves on
trying to identify matches in an abstract syntax tree representation of the C/C++ program
in order to identify programming defects. PREfix/PREfast are used in the industry to
detect defects, such as dereferencing of a NULL pointer, variables that are not initialized,
using uninitialized memory, and freeing memory or resources twice.
3.2.3

Dynamic Techniques

Require model execution where they evaluate the model based on its execution behavior.
Most dynamic V&V techniques require model instrumentation, the insertion of additional
code (probes or stubs) into the executable model to collect information about model
behavior during execution.

Software testing, a V&V dynamic technique is a widespread technique in automotive
industry. In Johnson Controls, software testing represents up to 90% of the total time
spent in verifying and validation a software product [93]. Moreover, in the academic
research, the traditional focus of software V&V techniques has been the software testing.
In fact, testing approaches are widely studied in academic research and deployed in
software industry.
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3.2.3.1 Testing
Testing is involved in every stage of software life cycle, but the testing done at each level
of software development is different in nature and has different objectives. Unit Testing
is done at the lowest level. It tests the basic unit of software, which is the smallest
testable piece of software, and is often called “unit”, “module”, or “component”
interchangeably. When more than one unit is combined together in a test, integration
testing is performed. The test is conducted on external interfaces to the individual units as
well as interfaces between these units. The test is often done on both the interfaces
between the components as long as it can assessed from the unit under test.

System Testing focuses on end-to-end testing of an entire system rather than focus on
internal components of the system. System testing makes a statement on the overall
quality of the software. It is usually based on functional requirements in specifications of
a system. System testing also can cover nonfunctional requirements such as
maintainability, reliability and security of the system.

Finally, acceptance testing is conducted when a complete system is handed over to
customers or users and aims to ensure that the system is functioning as opposed to trying
to find defects.[23]

Currently there are two major activities to ensure quality in systems. The first is static
analysis, which targets non-execution defects using several discussed techniques such as:
inspection of the code, analysis of the program, symbolic analysis, or model checking.
Dynamic analysis on the other hand focuses on methods to ensure system software
quality during actual executions using actual and under real or simulated conditions.
Inputs Synthesis, testing procedures and automating the generation of test environments
are examples of some techniques used in dynamic analysis. Static and Dynamic
techniques complement each other as one involves execution of a system and one does
not. [23]
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Input test cases and test results analysis depend on the testing strategy in question. The
testing strategy is decided based on testing data flow. Every testing technique reveal
different quality aspects of a system. Functional and Structural testing are two main
categories of testing techniques.

Functional Testing is conducted when the system under test or software to be tested is
seen as a black box with no concerns regarding its internals or interactions amongst its
components. Test cases in functional testing are primarily based on specifications of
requirements or design of the system under test. Results are sometimes called oracles or
gold models. The results usually include the original requirement that is tested, the
desired output in accordance to the specification, and the actual results. In functional
testing, the emphasis is on the external behavior of the system.

Structural based testing of a software system means viewing the system as white box
(transparent) where you see all the internal system details and need to test all internals of
that system. Test cases are based on how the software got implementation or on the
implementation itself. The main objective is to know specific constructs in the system
and aim to test them to verify that they operate as planned by the implementation.
Example include specific statements, specific program path or branch. The results of any
test are compared with the planned expected results of the implementation. Evaluation of
the tests are based on metrics such as coverage percentage of the statements within the
system being tested. There are several metrics used in structural testing such as coverage
of branches, coverage of data-flow, and coverage of paths in the system. Briefly,
structural coverage is concerned with the internal composition of the system as opposed
to its external behavior.

Traditionally, testing has been performed using adhoc and intuitive techniques. Testing
still remains the biggest part of software development life cycle. Testers utilized both
structural and functional techniques based on intuition in their testing cycles. There were
no techniques, methods or theory to design testing in an efficient, automated and
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structured way. Goodenough and Gerhart founded the main theorem of testing in a paper
to propose a Theory of Test Data Selection. This was the first work that got published
that tried to lay a theoretical foundation for testing. It categorized test data for test cases
as effective if it uncovers program defects. If the selected test data does not uncover
defects then this test data selection is not effective. They emphasized on statement
coverage in their work. Their foundation led to various successful research on testing
methods theory. Later, Huang added in his research the importance of having every
statement in the program executed at least once during the testing cycle. He also
emphasized that statement coverage does not guarantee that all defects will be detected.
He described a term, “edge strategy”, which aims to exercise every edge in a diagraph of
the program at least once.

Subsequent research introduced probe insertion technique and path coverage, which
appeared in 1976. Howden explained that test data needs to be selected to ensure that
every unique path of a program is visited at least once. He elaborated in his work that the
total number of paths in a program could be infinite and suggested that in practice a
subset of program paths ( or a superset) needs to be tested. Several studies were later
made to evaluate the efficiency of path testing and to define an upper bound that limits
the value of the subset of test cases to ensure reliable path coverage testing.

Functional testing also lacked any solid theory behind it although it was widely used in
industry and academia. In the first research that tried to lay a theoretical foundation
behind functional testing, Howden introduced the term design functions, which is code
surrounded by comments which describe the intent of the function. He described how
systematic design techniques could be utilized to design functional tests.

Further research addressed theories behind structural testing via introducing the term,
domain defect. Domain defect was described as a subset input to a program that triggers
an invalid path to be taken. Domain defects were described to be potentially triggered via
branch statements that have incorrect predicates or invalid computations that have an
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impact on predicates that are used within a branch statement. White and Cohen defined
some guidance on the selection of test data to uncover domain defects. Their work
described general reasons whey testing could be successful or not and proposed research
direction [56].

In 1985, Rapps and Weyuker introduced data flow analysis for structural testing in their
published research. They proposed guidelines on the test data selection to achieve data
flow analysis. They argued that path coverage criteria could let defects go uncovered.
They proposed new path selection criteria based on data flow analysis and discussed
relationships between the criteria. Their work laid the foundation to select test data based
on dataflow analysis techniques.

Richardson and others recommended an approach that revolves around test case selection
based on specifications. Generally, functional testing that is based on specification was
focused on manual hand selecting test cases rendering functional testing as simply based
on selective criteria. Automation of test cases for structural testing was possible which
led to the advantage of having a reliable and complete functional testing as opposed to
heuristics based. Their research started using formal methods via utilizing formal
specifications to empower a testing methodology that blends specification and
implementation methods. Their work was the first attempt to merge structural and
functional testing with formal specifications.

Boolean algebra appeared as a backbone for a testing method in the 90s. The intent was
to use it to simplify, convert and analyze specifications. Boolean algebra was used to
ensure that specification is consistent and complete which can definitely have a great
impact on testability of the specification. Functional requirements were represented using
decision tables, which makes it easier to design tests and to implement programs as well.
The proposed approach was based on using both Karnaugh-Veitch charts and decision
tables’ Boolean algebra based techniques to capture functional requirements. This was
the initial attempt to select data for test cases based on boolean algebra.
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Other research that focused on improving the testing theory revolved around defining
metrics that can be put in place to ensure software reliability. Traditionally, reliability
was based on failure cases during the test cycle. . This of course required a big amount of
data collection, post analysis of data, experience to interpret the analyze data and
computations to translate the results. In the late 90s, a new method was introduced to
calculate reliability based on coverage during testing. The program was mapped into a
graph and every function is a node in the graph. The reliability was calculated for every
node in the graph based on the number of times the node got executed during system
testing. The higher this number, the more the reliability factor for this node. The node
reliability value is then used to compute an overall reliability value for the entire system.
Since existing research was concerned with coverage analysis, it was concluded that
extending such methods with reliability analysis will increase the overall reliability of the
entire system.

In 1997, a framework was proposed for functional and structural testing based on
probability. Bernot and others concluded that they could ensure a high level of
confidence on the correctness of a system and provide a reliability metric via selecting
input test cases data based on generating data distributions that are domain specific. They
proposed using techniques such as integer intervals, Cartesian products, unions, and sets
that are defined inductively. Other research in the same year proposed using formal
notations to describe system architecture in order to automate tests for complex systems.
[56]

Another interesting research in 1997 used formal architectural description for rigorous,
automatable method for integration test of complicated systems. The authors described
CHAM formal language to capture the behavior of the system. The system interesting
use-cases or behavior was mapped into graphs to capture all the possible behaviors of the
system. The graphs were then shrunk after determining communications between entities
in the system. The reduced set of graphs were then used to generate integration tests with
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the coverage metric in mind or as an input parameter. The baseline of generation is
assumed to be a set of reduced graphs that capture architectural features of a system.
Later research started focusing on ‘off the shelf’ software entities. Briefly, re-usable
components that have already been design, verified and proven reliable. The work started
to be based on UML (Unified Modeling Language) which gained huge momentum in the
industry. Hartmann and others at Siemens worked on testing UML components via
combining generation and execution of a test in a UML modeling tool (e.g. Rational
Rose). A system is modeled into UML components and interactions. Test cases are then
generated and run against the model to ensure correct behavior. They also proposed
generating test cases from state charts and prototyped an environment, TnT, to evaluate
their approach based on use-cases [25].

Component based testing approach was introduced as well. Beydeda and others suggested
mapping component into a graphical representation. Testing was described as complex
when a component lacks its source code in UML. The research suggested a way to merge
structural and functional testing. Component is represented graphically, component-based
software flow graph (CBSFG), to simplify the specification and implementation details
captured in the component. The graphical representation was then used to generate test
cases. Existing structural testing approaches were described to be possible on this
graphical representation to classify test cases based on data flow analysis. The main
components are still tested with functional techniques. [23]

A multitude of techniques were proposed in testing theory for test case generation.
Examples include random generation, generation based on identified paths, generation
based on identified goals, and intelligent approaches. Fault distribution is used in random
test case generation to aid the generation of test cases. Control flow and data flow
analysis are utilized to generated test cases in path-based approaches. Some of these
methods are static while others are dynamic. Goal-oriented methods define test cases to
ensure that a specific goal is taken. A goal could be a statement, a condition or even a
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branch. Complex computations are used in intelligent techniques to generate test cases.
[24]

3.2.3.2 Model Based Techniques
Model Driven Engineering, MDE for short, aims to raise the level of abstraction in
program specification and increase automation in program development. The idea
promoted by MDE is to use models at different levels of abstraction for developing
systems, thereby raising the level of abstraction in program specification. An increase of
automation in program development is reached by using executable model
transformations. Higher-level models are transformed into lower level models until the
model can be made executable using either code generation or model interpretation.

A model is specified in some model notation. Some model languages are tailored to a
certain domain, such a language is often called a Domain Specific Language. A DSL can
be visual or textual[68].

As in each software engineering approach quality is an important aspect of MDE. Quality
in MDE can be checked, or ensured, with three different techniques: model
validation, model checking, and model-based testing.

MDE is often confused with Model Driven Architecture (MDA). MDA can be seen as
OMG's vision on MDE [42]. The MDA focuses on the technical variability in software,
i.e. how to specify software in a platform independent way.

In a nutshell, MDE is a software engineering paradigm that focuses on creating and
exploiting models, aka, abstract representations of the knowledge and activities that
govern a particular application) rather than on the computing (or algorithmic) concepts,
or platform setup/dependencies.

The MDE approach was driven by the need to increase productivity by maximizing
compatibility between systems (via reuse of standardized models), simplifying the
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process of design, and promoting communication between individuals and teams working
on the system (via a standardization of the terminology and the best practices).
A modeling paradigm for MDE is considered effective if its models make sense from the
point of view of a user that is familiar with the domain, and if they can serve as a basis
for implementing systems. The models are developed through extensive communication
among product managers, designers, developers and users of the application domain. As
the models approach completion, they enable the development of software and systems.
Main components of MDE paradigm involve the following:


Standardized or domain specific modeling languages to formalize the application
structure, behavior and requirements of an application in a specific domain.



Executable model: The ability to execute the application at the model level to
identify problems/issues in the application structure and behavior before worrying
about platform and programming languages dependencies.



Transformation rules: These map the application model into language/specific and
platform specific variant of the application model



Transformation engine: Accepts as input the model and the transformation rules
and generates language/platform specific variance of the application.

Using Formal Methods (FMs), which have rigorous mathematical foundations, for system
development is extremely needed in the current era, especially for safety critical systems
where formal proving is needed for safety or security requirements. On the other hand,
Model-driven Engineering (MDE) is considered to be developing as a new model in
software engineering. MDE is based on meta-modeling and model mappings in software
development, and adds means to build links between domains that are similar or
different[34]. It is now essential to use formal methods in system engineering,
particularly in the early phases of the development process. An abstract representation of
the system as a model can be utilized to ensure that the system under development fulfils
the specified requirements (via simulation and model-based testing), and ensures specific
properties using formal analysis (validation & verification). Indeed, there are several
cases to prove the relevancy and importance of formal methods in industrial applications
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and yielding very good results, many professionals and industry engineers are still
hesitant to adopt formal methods. Formal methods still suffer from lack of training,
which is mainly due to complex and mathematical notations that formal techniques use
rather than abstract graphical notation which is more lightweight and natural for an
application for a system engineer such as the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [42].
The absence of support tools for the development during the life cycle activities and the
lack of integration among existing formal methods techniques and languages is also a
major reason why industry has been discouraged to use formal methods.

MDE technologies with a bigger attention on automation and architecture render higher
degrees of abstraction in system development by advocating models as first-step artifacts
to support, analyze, verify, and eventually compile into code or into other models. Metamodeling is a crucial concept of the MDE architecture and it is designed as a way to
empower a language or formalism with an abstract notation, so as to separate the abstract
syntax and semantics of the language from its alternate concrete notations.

Although the basic elements of the MDE are still expanding, some MDE fundamentals
are part of the meta- modeling/programming frameworks such as Model-integrated
Computing (MIC) [34], OMG MDA (Model Driven Architecture) [34], Microsoft
Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs) tools (as part of the Visual Studio SDK) [34], and
Eclipse/EMF [43].

Modeling languages that are metamodel based are being specified and accepted for
different domains [64]. The languages address the lack by third-generation languages to
ease the platforms complexities and be able to capture domain notions efficiently [34].
Inspite of the fact that meta-model based definition of a language abstract syntax is well
grasped and utilized by many meta-modeling environments (GME/MetaGME,
EMF/Ecore , XMFMosaic/ Xcore , AMMA/KM3, etc.), the definition of semantics for
this languages class is a crucial and pending issue. Metamodeling environments are
capable of coping with the most complex syntax and mapping to other models issues.
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They still lack standardization and accurate support in order to give the (possibly
executable) semantics of metamodels[71]73[], which is usually given in natural language.
This entails that the majority of the currently employed metamodel-based languages
(such as the UML) are still not sufficient for efficient analysis of models due to their
strong semantics lack, which is vital for formal models analysis aided by tools. [34]

Software languages became a basic pillar in system development. Processes of Language
engineering have been taken into consideration in many facets of software engineering
[44]. Regarding the metamodeling paradigm of MDE for (software) language
engineering, many designs have been given, which focuses on the fact that language
descriptions have unique forms in different technical domains (e.g. metamodels, schemas,
ontologies and grammars). Ideally, multiple languages (from a variety of technical
domains) need to be integrated together on a system level approach in most software
development endeavors. The engineering of a language needs to address several angles of
a language: constraints, structure, textual representation, graphical representation, parser,
compiler, mapper to other notations and the ability to capture dynamic behavior via
executability features. Research tends to address only one of these aspects [34].

It is only recent that communities for formal methods have started to use metamodels and
MDE platforms for their tools. Examples of these efforts include but are not limited to:
An Event-B based metamodel and an Event B EMF based framework [34] which give a
frontend that is EMF based to Rodin platform. Rodin platform is an Event-B Eclipsebased IDE that enables refinement and mathematical proof of models based on Event-B.
Maude Formal Tool Environment [45] is a logic language that is executable and is
suitable for object oriented systems. It delivers tool support in order to reason about
specifications and a connector that is an Eclipse plug-in which allows the Maude
environment to connect to other metamodeling frameworks such as KM3 which uses
ATL (the ATLAS Transformation Language) transformations [46].
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A transformation language GReAT (Graph Rewriting And Transformation language)
which utilized the graph transformations based concepts and metamodeling within graph
communities [47] has been designed with the model transformation area of Model
Integrated Computing in mind. Several tools support it which aims to grant rapid
prototyping and transformation tools. ITU language utilized this metamodel [48] where
the authors put forward a methodology that is semi-automatic and reverse engineering
based which support the derivation of a metamodel from a formal syntax definition of an
existing language.

A comparable method which aims to arch model and grammer was developed by other
authors in [49] and in [50]. A forward engineering process approach that aims to derive a
a concrete textual notation from an abstract metamodel [34] was also developed. More
recently, work in [51] shows how to apply metamodel-based technologies for the creation
of a language description for the Sudoku game. Notations and tools have been developed
within the ASM community to enable specification and analysis [52].

Foundation Software Engineering Group developed an Abstract State Machine Language
(AsmL) at Microsoft. The aim was to develop an executable specification that is rich and
based on Abstract State Machines theory, integrates with .NET framework and object
oriented but AsmL does not offer a semantic structure to target the ASM method [53].
ASM popular tools also include CoreASM, TASM (Timed ASMs), extensible execution
engine developed in Java, a simulator-model checker for reactive real-time ASMs , an
encoding of Timed Automata in ASMs[54] , and ability to specify and verify properties
based on First Order Timed Logic (FOTL) on ASM models. Several model-to-text tools
are available for this flow[72].

Other endeavors allow the derivation of a language metamodel from language grammar.
Examples include Ecore metamodel EMFText [55], KM3 and TEF (Textual Editing
Framework) metamodel using TCS [46][58] (Textual Concrete Syntax) and Xtext [57].
Textual grammar and metamodel overview is given in [63]. Other more sophisticated
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model-to-text tools that can generate text grammars from MOF specific based
repositories also exist [59][60]. Such tools render the MOF- based repository content
(known as a MOFlet) in text format while complying to syntactic rules (grammar). The
tools are designed to be automatic and work with any MOF model in order to produce
their target grammar based on a set of defined patterns so as they do not allow detailed
customization of the generated language.

Work in [35] shows how object oriented software engineering flow can be on top of
graphical notation and formal methods using algebra and object-Z as specification
language. The flow uses UML as a modeling framework and Java as an implementation
language. The work in [75] shows an approach where formal notations are introduced in
safety critical software systems. Additionally, [61] introduces a transformation technique
that is based on a metamodel. The technique is based on structural mapping between
UML and B formal specifications in order to generate formal B specifications from UML
diagrams. Most of the approaches revolve around translating graphical models into
formal specifications. Work in [36] proposed an MDE-based approach to integrate
several formal techniques. In the work presented by [34], formal models are introduced
into MDE as domain specific languages based on constructing their meta-models. A set
of transformation rules are then constructed and finally model to text rules are developed
so that the models can be compiled into code. MARTE to LOTOS case study was applied
on the framework with a main goal of showing different formal notations and how they
can be translated into software in the software development life cycle but the approach
fails to framework semantics.

The work presented in [62] discusses the broad challenges of integrating tools and
interoperability of tools within a framework that is based on MDE principles. Further
research focuses on the semantics specification of languages based on meta-model so that
it is possible to have executability of the model within current meta-modeling
frameworks such as Kermeta[74]. Similar effort with the same aim is presented in [65]
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where the authors describe a framework called M3Actions framework which targets the
support of EMF models operational semantics.

The work presented in [66] specified semantics of modeling languages that are visual
based on Maude Formalism. A translation approach is discussed in [67] regarding the
application of ASMs in order to specify MDE style execution semantics and a translation
approach as well [69]. The research proposed semantic bridging to reputable formal
models of computation (such as data flow , FSMs, and discrete event systems) built upon
AsmL. This is done via the use of a transformation language, namely, GME/GReAT. The
approach that is proposed presents sets of semantic units that are pre and well defined for
potential translation/mapping endeavors. There are two cons to this approach [34]: the
first being that the user needs to be aware of language semantics from scratch and based
on a set of notations that are still new and did not exist previously. Secondly, in
heterogeneous systems, defining language semantics as composition of some selected
primary semantic units for basic behavioral categories is not always achievable. This can
be due to complex behaviors, which might not be possibly reduced to existing set of
combination [70].

In MDE, Automatic code generation or program synthesis techniques have been viewed
in recent research endeavors to help solve the predicament of ensuring software safety by
completely automating the coding phase. A code generator takes as input a domainspecific high-level description of a task (e.g.,a set of differential equations) and produces
optimized and documented low-level code (e.g., C or C++) that is based on algorithms
appropriate for the task (e.g., the extended Kalman filter).

This automation is claimed to increase developer productivity and is claimed to prevent
the introduction of human based coding defects. Ultimately, however, the correctness of
the generated code depends on the correct-ness of the generator itself. This dependency
has led several monitory agencies to require that development tools be qualified to the
same level of criticality as the developed software. [76]
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Model-based design and automated code generation have become popular, but substantial
obstacles remain to their widespread adoption in safety-critical domains: since code
generators are typically not qualified, there is no guarantee that their output is safe, and
consequently the generated code still needs to be fully tested and certified. Formal
methods such as formal software safety certification can be used to demonstrate safety of
the generated code (i.e., that the execution of the code does not violate a specified
property) by providing formal proofs as explicit evidence or certificates for the assurance
claims. However, several problems remain. For automatically generated code it is
particularly difficult to relate the proofs to the code; moreover, the proofs are the final
stage of a complex process and typically contain many details. This complicates an
intuitive understanding of the assurance claims provided by the proofs. Hence, it is
important to make explicit which claims are actually proven, and on which assumptions
and reasoning principles both the claims and the proofs rest. Moreover, the complexity of
the tools used can lead to unforeseen interactions and thus causes additional concerns
about the trustworthiness of the assurance claims.

Recent research to address the previously mentioned dilemma (traceability between code
and proof) focus on showing that traceability between the proofs on one side and the
certified program and the used tools on the other side is important to gain confidence in
the formal certification process. Approaches are currently under development to
systematically derive safety cases from information collected during the formal software
safety certification phase, in particular the construction of the necessary logical
annotations. The purpose of these safety cases is to provide a “structured reading guide”
for the program and the safety proofs that will allow users to understand the safety claims
without having to understand all the technical details of the formal machinery.

Fault tree analysis is an example of usage to identify possible risks to the program safety
and the certification process, as well as their interaction logic, and thus to derive the
structure of the safety cases. Generic, multi-tiered argument then gets used that is
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instantiated with respect to a given safety property and program. Its three tiers together
constitute a single safety case that justifies the safety of the program. The upper tier
simply instantiates the notion of safety and the formal definitions for the given safety
property while the two lower tiers argue the safety of the program as governed by the
property. The lower tiers are constructed individually to reflect the program structure.
This can be done systematically because their structure directly follows the course the
annotation construction takes through the program. Model driven engineering champions
allege that MDE principles and technologies mixed with formal methods drastically
increase the existing level of automation within system development and cater for needed
and demanded support for formal analysis. [34]

Because of its ability to address software complexity and productivity challenges, Modelbased design has become the preferred software engineering paradigm for the
development of application software components in central automotive domains such as
chassis and powertrain. The core idea is that an initial executable graphical model
representing the application software component to be developed serves as the primary
representation throughout multiple phases of software development. The executable
model is refined and augmented until it becomes a blueprint for the final implementation
through production code generation. In addition, executable models can be utilized for
various quality assurance activities.

The Simulink product family is a popular tool chain for Model-Based Design. Simulink
and Stateflow support graphical modeling with time-based block diagrams and eventbased state machines, and Real-Time Workshop Embedded Coder supports embedded
code generation. In the recent past, Model-Based Design with code generation has been
successfully employed to produce software for safety-critical applications. Examples
include application software components of the electromechanical APA steering system
[77] for the Volkswagen Tiguan, an urban SUV. Stringent software development
methods and techniques are already required to satisfy customer expectations and ensure
the essential quality and reliability of any in-vehicle software. [77] However, given the
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safety-related nature of some advanced automotive systems, application of techniques
above and beyond existing software development practices must be considered for these
applications [77]. The requirements imposed by safety standards also have to be met, and
the objectives and recommendations outlined therein need to be mapped onto ModelBased Design.

The software development activities for a driver assistance system at Carmeq were
evaluated to allow rationalizing such a mapping. In practice, the evaluation of this recent
project using Model-Based Design led to consolidated findings that became best practice
and will be introduced into guidelines for future projects. In their research, the authors
combine these project experiences with more general ideas on using Model-Based Design
with Simulink and Stateflow for safety-related automotive applications. The safety
standard currently relevant to automotive in vehicle applications is IEC 61508. Part 3 of
this international standard, IEC 61508-3 [77], is concerned with software development. In
IEC 61508, software failures are viewed as the result of faults systematically introduced
during software development. In recognition of this, IEC 61508-3 defines requirements
and constraints for the software development and quality assurance processes [77]. The
degree of rigor required in these processes depends on the criticality of the software
component within the embedded application and is expressed in terms of safety integrity
level (SIL) [77].

3.2.3.3 Formal Approaches
Formal methods are perceived differently by industry and engineers, and there are many
types of formal methods in software development. Formal technique involves the use of
mathematically precise specification and design notations. In its native form, formal
development is based on proof refinement to ensure software correctness at each stage in
the software development life cycle. [26] Formal methods use mathematical models for
analysis and verification at any part of the program life cycle. [27]

Formal methods are mathematical techniques that should be heavily supported by tools
for developing software and hardware systems. Mathematical rigor enables users to
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analyze and verify these models at any part of the program life-cycle: requirements
engineering, specification, architecture, design, implementation, testing, maintenance,
and evolution. The vital first step in a high-quality software development process is
requirements engineering. Formal methods can be useful in extracting, clarifying, and
defining requirements. Tools can provide automated support needed for checking
completeness, traceability, verifiability, and reusability, and for supporting requirements
evolution, different viewpoints, and inconsistency of management. Formal methods are
used in specifying software: developing a precise statement of what the software will do,
while avoiding constraints on how it is to be achieved. Examples of these methods
include ASM[72], B, and VDM [27].

Formal methods differ from other design systems through the use of formal verification
schemes, the basic principles of the system must be proven correct before they are
accepted [27]. Traditional system design has used extensive testing to verify behavior,
but testing is capable of only finite conclusions. Dijkstra and others have demonstrated
that tests can only show the situations where a system won't fail, but cannot say anything
about the behavior of the system outside of the testing scenarios [27]. In contrast, in
formal methods, once a theorem is proven true it remains true.

It is very important to note that formal verification does not cancel the need for testing
[28]. Formal verification cannot resolve invalid assumptions within the design, but it can
aid in identifying defects and in reasoning which would otherwise be left unverified. In
several cases, engineers have reported finding flaws in systems once they reviewed their
designs formally [28]. Roughly speaking, formal design can be seen as a three step
process, following the outline given here [29][30]:
1. Formal Specification: The engineer defines the system using a modeling
language. The language has some fixed grammar that allows modeling
complicated structures of defined types within the specification.
2. Verification: As previously mentioned, formal methods contrast other
specification systems through detailed focus on provability and correctness. By
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building a system using a formal specification, the designer is actually developing
a set of theorems about his system and proving these theorems are correct. The
formal verification is not an easy process since mapping your system into a set of
theorems that each has to be proved is complex and ends up resulting a huge
number of theorems for small systems. Even a traditional mathematical proof is a
complex matter. Given the demands of complexity and Moore's law, almost all
formal systems use an automated theorem-proving tool of some form. These tools
can prove simple theorems, verify the semantics of theorems, and provide
assistance for verifying proofs that are more complicated.
3. Implementation: Once the model has been specified and verified, it is
implemented by converting the specification into code. Many tools automatically
map formal specifications into code. As the difference between software and
hardware design grows narrower, formal methods for developing embedded
systems have been developed
Formal methods are viewed with a certain degree of suspicion. While formal methods
research has been progressing since 1960's, formal methods are only being slowly
accepted by engineers. There are several reasons for this. Most formal systems are
extremely descriptive and extensive / thorough, modeling languages have generally been
judged by their capacity to model anything. Unfortunately, these same qualities make
formal methods very difficult to use, especially for engineers that are not used to
modeling a system in formal notations or trained on type theory which is needed for most
formal systems[31]. Ultimately, formal methods will acquire some form of acceptance,
but compromises will be made in both directions: formal methods will become simpler
and formal methods training will become more common.

Formal methods are distinguished from other specification systems by their emphasis on
correctness and proof, which is ultimately another measure of system integrity. Proof is a
complement, not a replacement, for testing. Testing still remain a crucial part of
guaranteeing any system's operability, but it is finite. Testing cannot show that a system
operates properly; it can only show that the system works for some tested cases. Because
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testing cannot demonstrate that the system should work outside the tested cases, formal
proof is necessary [32].

Formally proving computer systems is not a new idea. Knuth and Dijkstra have written
extensively on the topic, but their methods of proof still remains to be heavily based on
the traditional mathematical methods. In pure sciences, proofs are verified through
extensive peer review before publication. Such techniques are time-intensive and less
than perfect; it is not unusual for a published proof to contain a flaw. Given the cost and
time requirements of systems engineering, traditional proving techniques are not really
applicable. [33] Because of the costs of hand verification, most formal methods use
automated theorem proving systems to verify their designs.

There has been recent focus on using formal methods in the specifications stage.
Specification is a technical agreement in writing between a software engineer and a client
to ensure that both have a common understanding of the objectives of the software. The
client uses the specification to guide application of the software; the software engineer
uses it to guide its implementation. A complex specification may be broken down into
sub-specifications, each describing a sub-component of the system, which may then be
assigned to other programmers, so that a programmer at one level becomes a client at
another [27]. Complex software systems require careful organization of the architectural
structure of their components: a model of the system that hides implementation detail,
allowing the architect to focus on the analyses and decisions that are most critical to
structuring the system to satisfy its requirements [27]. Wright is an example of an
architectural description language based on the formalization of the abstract behavior of
architectural components and connectors [27].

The purpose of software safety certification is to show that a program complies with its
high-level requirements and is safe in the presence of potential hazards. Formal software
safety certification is based on formal techniques, which are based on program logics to
show that the program does not violate certain constraints during its execution. Most
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endeavors depend on creating a safety property, which is an exact characterization of
these conditions, based on the operational semantics of the programming language. Each
safety property thus describes a class of hazards. A safety policy is a set of first order
logic rules (Could be using Hoare logic or other formal notations) designed to show that
safe programs satisfy the safety property of interest. A safety predicate that is added to
the computed verification conditions (VCs). However, the focus is on the information
provided by constructing the annotations, and the details of constructing is left out (i.e.,
applying the Hoare rules) and proving (i.e., calling the theorem prover) the VCs to the
complementary system-wide safety case. Formal software safety certification follows the
same technical approach as program verification. A VC generator (VCG) traverses the
code backwards and applies the Hoare rules to produce VCs, starting with any safety
requirements on output variables [33].

It is required that all VCs are proven by an automated theorem prover (ATP). The figure
below details the flow of software certification using formal methods and tags the
trusted/untrusted components.[29]

Figure 5 Software Certification using Formal Methods
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Formal methods are heavily employed in software design. Data refinement is established
based on state machine specification, abstraction functions, and simulation proofs, as its
central role in methods like VDM [27], and in program refinement calculi [27]. At the
implementation level. Formal methods are also utilized for code verification. Every
program-specification pair implicitly asserts a correctness theorem that, if certain
conditions are satisfied, the program will achieve the effect described by its specification.
Code verification is the attempt to prove this theorem, or at least to find out why the
theorem fails to hold. The inductive assertion method of program verification was
invented by Floyd and Hoare [29], and involves annotating the program with
mathematical assertions, which are relations that hold between the program variables and
the initial input values, each time control reaches a particular point in the program. Code
can also be generated automatically from formal models; examples include the B-method
[27] and SCADE [27]. Formal methods are used in software maintenance [27] and
evolution [27]. Perhaps the widest application of formal methods is in the maintenance of
legacy code: in some of Microsoft's most successful products, every tenth line is an
assertion.

A Formal method has to have a formal notation, semantics based on mathematics, and
formal deductive system. Given those requirements, no existing method is truly a formal
method. But there are many that are close. Some have mathematical semantics
(sometimes partial) but almost no deductive system, such as Z and State charts which are
named as conceptual techniques. Others have logic but almost no semantics, such as
VDM and Unity; these get labeled as deductive techniques. Still others are defined by an
evaluation mechanism (operational semantics or evaluation rules) and are executable
specifications. However, executability is not the main drive of formal methods and in
some cases gets in the way of their use. Researchers tend to distinguish between stateoriented (e.g. Z and VDM) and behavior-oriented (e.g. Lotos, Unity, RSL) techniques. So
it is clear that all formal methods are not created equal, and it is misleading to group all
such methods together to decide if formal methods make a positive difference to a
software project.[26]
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For some organizations, the changes in software development practices needed to support
such techniques can be revolutionary. That is, there is not always a simple migration path
from current practice to migrate to the use of formal methods, because the effective use
of formal methods can require a drastic change right at the beginning of the traditional
software lifecycle: how we capture and record customer requirements. Thus, the stakes in
this area can be particularly high. For this reason, strong evidence of the effectiveness of
formal methods is highly desirable.[26]

Unfortunately, past evaluations of the use of formal methods were not conclusive. The
few serious industrial uses of formal methods focused on formal specification alone, with
no widespread attempt at formal deduction, refinement or proof [26].

Some researchers report that the use of formal notations does not lead inevitably to
improving the quality of specifications, even when used by the most mathematically
sophisticated minds. In experiments, the use of a formal notation are claimed to lead to a
greater number of defects, rather than fewer. [26]

Meanwhile, evidence of the positive effects of formal methods continues to grow. Some
researchers described several instances of their use for safety-critical systems in early
1994 on a joint project between IBM Hursley and the Programming Research Group at
Oxford University. A serious attempt was made to quantify the benefits of using Z on the
CICS re-specification project, and a proceedings paper provides sanitized graphs and
general information. As a result, CICS provided a very good quantitative evidence to
support the efficacy of formal methods. However, the public announcements of success
have never been accompanied by a complete set of data and analysis, so independent
assessment is difficult. [26]

As unscientific support for formal methods has grown, industry has been more willing to
use formal methods on projects where the software is safety-critical. Formal methods are
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being incorporated into standards and imposed on developers. For instance, the interim
UK defense standard for such systems, DefStd 00-55, makes mandatory the use of formal
methods. ISO-26262, standard for automotive reliability, also imposes the use of formal
methods for software that could lead to safety hazards. Researchers believe such
standards formulation without a solid basis of empirical evidence can be dangerous and
costly as there is still no hard evidence to show that:
1. Formal methods usage is cost effective and has been used on a real safety project
complex project.
2. Using Formal methods increases the reliability and makes the project more costeffective compared to traditional structured methods with enhanced testing
3. Either developers or users can ever be trained in sufficient numbers to make
proper use of formal methods
Moreover, it must be understood how to choose among the many competing formal
methods, which may not be equally effective in a given situation [26].
3.2.3.3.1 Formal Methods in Architectural design
As shown in previous sections, formal methods are proposed is ISO26262 and is
potentially the only available methodology that could really help in architectural design
level safety certification. Formal methods for software development receives much
attention in research centers, but are rarely used in industry for the development of (large)
software systems. Several reasons contribute to this state:
1- Entry cost to FM is huge ( Education, legacy methods migration … etc)
2- Insufficient tool support for FM based rules as most of them are academic based
tools as oppose to industrial ones
3- Lack of expertise/training to FM
4- FM notations and flow are hard to understand/adopt by non-mathematicians.
On the other hand, Semi formal methods are widely used in the industry due to many
reasons mainly due to MDE (Model Driven Engineering) approaches which encourages:
1- Focus on creating models of a system at each stage in the development lifecycle
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2- Automatic model transformations (e.g. to code)
3- Intuitive, and abstract graphical notations
4- Good at abstracting away detail
With the above said, the usage of semi-formal methods (informally defined semantics)
cause:
1- Ambiguity
2- Inconsistency
3- Imprecision
4- Unable to be formally reasoned about methodologies
Formal methods can be used in conjunction with informal or semi-formal modeling
techniques in software development. In such integrated approaches, formal techniques
provide an effective means to check the validity of semi-formal models, thus providing
increased quality for both models and implementation. Despite its potential, application
of the integrated approach to large scale systems has been limited.
3.2.3.3.2 Benefits of Formal Methods
Formal methods offer additional benefits outside of provability, and these benefits do
deserve some mention. However, most of these benefits are available from other systems,
and usually without the steep learning curve that formal methods require.
Discipline: By virtue of their rigor, formal systems require an engineer to think out his
design in a more thorough fashion. In particular, a formal proof of correctness is going to
require a rigorous specification of goals, not just operation. This thorough approach can
help identify faulty reasoning far earlier than in traditional design[32][33]
The discipline involved in formal specification has proved useful even on already
existing systems.[ 35]
Precision: Traditionally, disciplines have moved into jargons and formal notation as the
weaknesses of natural language descriptions become more glaringly obvious. There is no
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reason that systems engineering should differ, and there are several formal methods
which are used almost exclusively for notation.[28]
For engineers designing safety-critical systems, the benefits of formal methods lie in their
clarity. Unlike many other design approaches, the formal verification requires very
clearly defined goals and approaches. In a safety critical system, ambiguity can be
extremely dangerous, and one of the primary benefits of the formal approach is the
elimination of ambiguity [32].
3.2.3.3.3 Weaknesses of Formal Methods
Bowen points out that formal method is generally viewed with suspicion by the
professional engineering community, and the propensity of tentative case studies and
advocacy papers for the formal approach would seem to support his thesis [28]. There are
several reasons why formal methods are not used as much as they might be, most
stemming from overreaching on the part of formal methods advocates.

Expense: Because of the rigor involved, formal methods are always going to be more
expensive than traditional approaches to engineering. However, given that software cost
estimation is more of an art than a science, it is debatable exactly how much more
expensive formal verification is. In general, formal methods involve a large initial cost
followed by less consumption as the project progresses; this is a reverse from the normal
cost model for software development [31].

Limits of Computational Models: While not a universal problem, most formal methods
introduce some form of computational model, usually hamstringing the operations
allowed in order to make the notation elegant and the system provable. Unfortunately,
these design limitations are usually considered intolerable from a developer's perspective.
Usability: Traditionally, formal methods have been judged on the richness of their
descriptive model. That is, 'good' formal methods have described a wide variety of
systems, and 'bad' formal methods have been limited in their descriptive capacities. While
an all-encompassing formal description is attractive from a theoretical perspective, it
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invariably involved developing an incredibly complex and nuanced description language,
which returns to the difficulties of natural language. Case studies of full formal methods
often acknowledge the need for a less all-encompassing approach [29].

Arguably, many of these failures can be attributed to overreaching on the part of formal
methods advocates. This reasoning has led to the lightweight approach to formal
specification.

While formal systems are attractive in theory, their practical implementations are
somewhat wanting. By attempting to describe all of any system, formal methods have
overreached, and generally failed.
3.2.3.3.4 Formal Model Checking of UML State chart Diagrams
UML has become a defacto standard for software industries. AUTOSAR specifications
are primarily depending on UML diagrams in its specifications. This, among others, was
the main reason why several research endeavors focused on model checking of UML
diagrams, namely state charts and sequence diagrams[84].
In [39], a UML state chart system based model is translated into π-calculus. The
intermediate π-calculus model is then translated into NuSMV input language based on
defined translation rules. NuSMV model checking is then run to evaluate any
incompliances or problems in the model. This is a 2 step translation process and it does
not show how the UML model developer will interpret the feedback in UML domain.

In [37], the authors translate UML state charts into FSMs (Finite State Machines), FSMs
are then transformed into NuSMV input model and NuSMV model checking is finally
run on the 2nd level translated model.

In [40], the authors translate UML models to an input language in a self-developed model
checker called PAT in such a way that is transparent to users. In particular this approach
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utilized PAT as the back end for verification capabilities. PAT is claimed to support
several modeling languages including CSP#. The authors tool flow is based on parsing
UML XMI (XML metadata Interchange), the object management group standard of
exchanging UML diagrams. The authors claim that PAT can address deadlock,
reachability, trace refinement relationship. The paper presents the framework but fails to
apply the theory to any industrial use-case. It also fails to show how the UML user will
get the model checking feedback to reason with it in UML domain.

Similar to [37], authors in [38] translate abstracted UML state chart railway interlocking
system model into FSM which is then translated into NuSMV input language and utilized
NuSMV checker. Again the work does not show how any counterexamples can be
expressed back in UML domain. It also lacks any documentation on how the safety
properties are constructed and translated into LTL formulas.

Similarly, [41], transforms UML verification model to PROMELA model which uses
hierarchical automata to describe the state machine and its formal semantics and then
verifies the correctness of the model using SPIN since SPIN accepts PROMELA based
models. The same drawbacks discussed in previous endeavors are also applicable to this
effort.

In [98], an approach to formalize UML is shown via transforming UML to Event-B. The
transformation only covers UML activity diagram to Event-B models and does not cover
state flow diagrams.

In [99], an approach is presented that semi-automatically generates formal specifications
from state machine and activity diagrams. The model is translated to text using MERL
language amd MetaEdit tool. State machine is transformed into SMV model description
and activity diagrams into LTL formulas. NuSMV model checker is then used to verify
the specification.
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In[100], a method is proposed to map UML state chart to BIR language, which is
designed for BOGOR model checking in order to only evaluate the deadlock property.

In [101], Echo verification is employed where the system under test has to be captured
with a PVS based formal specification including low level specification capturing pre and
post conditions. Additionally, the proof is semi-automated where the complete proof
needs to be done under human guidance.

Earlier attempts did not consider minimizing transformation steps due to ISO 26262 tool
qualifications recommendations and they address limited category of defects. They also
either propose a new low level specification language, limited to architecture as opposed
to functional mapping or lack showing how the model checker result can be interpreted
via a UML designer. Additionally, the existing endeavors were not evaluated based on an
industrial specification that was compared to an industrial implementation of the case
study module. Our proposed framework attempts to address these shortcomings
3.2.4

Comparative Analysis of Existing V&V Methods

Table 4 summarizes the existing V&V methods.
Table 4 Summary of V&V Techniques
Static

Dynamic

Formal



Cause-Effect Graph



Acceptance Testing



Induction



Control Analysis



Bottom-up testing



Inference



Data Analysis



Comparison



Logical Deduction



Interface Analysis

Testing



Proof of correctness



Semantic Analysis



Compliance testing

.



Structural Analysis



Debugging



Symbolic Evaluation



Execution Testing



Syntax Analysis



Fault insertion



Traceability Assessment

testing

.
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Static

Dynamic

.



Formal

Functional black
box testing

.



Interface Testing



Boundary Value



Equivalence
partitioning



Structural Testing –
White box

Static Analysis in general, aims to identify programming defects and is limited in
identifying these category of defects. Existing standards (e.g. ISO26262) mandate the use
of static analysis tools as part of the software development life cycle [13]. It is commonly
known that static analysis covers only a subset of software programming defects, is
usually language and domain specific, and usually produces false defects and sometimes
coding limitations that could introduce an implementation maneuver to conform to a
defined static rule. Safety standards mandate the use of these tools on all software that
needs to be safe. The reason being that all approaches that identify defects or good
practices should be integrated into one approach (Standard) to ensure safety. It is certain
that static analysis tools do not cover all software defects presented in section 3.1, for
example, timing and interface defects and static analysis is not capable to address such
category of defects since they are manifested as a run-time behavior defects while static
analysis focuses on defects that are outside program execution. In conclusion, static
analysis helps in identifying defects in a timely fashion (if compared to manual code
inspections) but no software safety could be concluded on software if it claims that it is
100% static analysis bug free software.

Even if static techniques are necessary to detect defects earlier in the development
process, they are not sufficient. In fact, these techniques focus on analyzing the static
product representation and do not test the product in its real life (dynamic).
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Testing implies executing the program on (valued) inputs. Since static techniques
(review, inspection …) are useful to evaluate the internal correctness of a software
product, testing is the used technique allowing the assessment of its behavior. Even for
simple programs, so many test cases are theoretically possible that exhaustive testing
would require years to execute. Dijkstra (Dijkstra 1972) calculated that the exhaustive
testing of a multiplier of two 27-bit integers taking “only” some tens of microseconds for
a single multiplication would require more than 10000 years to be completely tested.
Exhaustive testing is a NP-Complete problem from a computational viewpoint.
Generally, the whole test set can be considered infinite. In contrast, the number of
executions that can realistically be observed must obviously be finite (and affordable).
Clearly, “enough” testing to get reasonable assurance of acceptable behavior is a basic
need. This basic need points to 2 well-known issues of testing, both technical in nature
(criteria for deciding to stop testing) and managerial in nature (estimating the effort to put
in testing). Testing always implies a trade-off between limited resources and schedules,
and inherently unlimited test requirements.

Formal methods are rarely used in automotive industry, contrary to medical, avionics and
railways industries. The main argument of automotive industry managers was the high
cost of deploying and using formal methods. As automotive electronic products becomes
more and more complex, automotive industry is required to start adapting existing formal
methods to their context or developing new ones. Actually, the cost of non-quality
(warranty and customer dissatisfaction) exceeds the cost of using formal methods. Now,
in automotive industry, semi-formal and formal methods are highly recommended via
standards (ISO-26262) to ensure software reliability. Incompleteness and ambiguity are
the main characteristics of informal and semi-formal methods. The use of formal
specification methods is expected to lead to increased software quality and reliability.

A variety of advantages has been attributed to the use of formal software specifications.
These advantages include understanding of specifications, help in the verification of
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specifications and automatic generation of the source code and test cases. Management is
generally conservative and unwilling to use new techniques whose benefits are not yet
established. Given these difficulties in using formal methods, challenges remain in
integrating formal methods with the system development existing paths.

Chapter 4.

Proposed Approach

The main theme of the proposed framework is to introduce a solution that allows early
detection of design bugs via formal verification. Such a framework needs to address
existing challenges that discouraged the industry from moving to utilize formal
verification and still heavily relying on testing. In order for the framework to address
existing shortcomings or challenges, it needs to meet the below criteria:
1- The ability to capture detailed design using xtUML (Executable UML)
AUTOSAR specifications are based on informal notation (English text) and
Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagrams (state machine, sequence
diagrams ...). The use of informal notation to capture specification has caused
ambiguities in the specification that led up to several releases of AUTOSAR
standard to clarify such ambiguities. The framework should support capturing
conditions in the model that serve as a foundation for generating theorems in
formal domain which forces the model designer to question any ambiguities in
the specification. Additionally, ISO-26262 guidelines highly recommend
using semi-formal notation for capturing the design as shown in Table 1. Based
on the above, the framework supports modelling the software in UML
extended with behavior to ensure the possibility of exhaustive design
verification.
2- Automatic mapping of UML to formal notations
Once the software is modeled in UML, the framework supports automatic
translation from UML to formal notation and theorems in formal domain. The
objective is to ensure that the framework addresses formal complexities that
discouraged the industry from using them as discussed in 3.2.3.3.3.
3- Extend xtUML with Satisfiability conditions
The framework supports capturing specification requirements in UML model
so that it serves as the baseline for generating formal theorems, forces the
model designer to question any specification ambiguities and adds a separation
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between the design elements and requirements to ensure that theorem
generation is separate from deign implementation.
4- Formal verification of semi-formal model
Framework supports model checkers that ensure the design is correct and
incompliances to specification are detected. The ability of the framework to
check the model formally will allow software suppliers to be ISO-26262
compliant with unit design and implementation verification guidelines as
presented in Table 2. Additionally, formal model checking will ensure design
requirements are mathematically exhaustively proven as opposed to depending
on test cases to verify compliance to specification.
5- Integrate the flow in a well-established xtUML tool.
The framework integrates to existing UML model IDE which allows rapid
proof of concept and integration to existing verification activities.
Our proposed framework is based on several components, namely, a formal
framework called SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory)78] , BridgePoint which is an
executable UML (Unified Modelling language) integrated development environment
(IDE) [96], UML to SAL model compiler to compile UML model and requirements to
formal SAL notation, and finally model checkers that validate the generated SAL
model against generated theorems. In this chapter, we will introduce the framework
flow followed by a brief introduction on SAL, UML and BridgePoint IDE. The
framework allows software designers to formally verify a specified software in a
semi-formal notation (UML). This complies with ISO 26262 design verification
guidelines for ASILs (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) C and D which highly
recommend semi-formal verification of the design for ASILs C and D.
4.1

Design Flow

Design flow is initiated by a designer that starts with informal/semi-formal
specification document. The designer maps the specification to a UML design
augmented with action language to capture behavior. EXecutable UML - xtUML
model augmented with satisfiability conditions (Requirements) is the framework
starting input. Satisfiability conditions represent requirements that the design should
satisfy as captured in a requirement specification. Satisfiability conditions are the
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foundation for generating the formal theorems which are used to verify the design.
Satisfiability conditions can be captured on variable, state, and transition levels in
UML.

xtUML input model which includes satisfiability conditions is fed into a model
compiler which parses the UML model elements presented in XML format and
constructs object instances of all elements. The objects are traversed and mapped into
a SAL formal model based on transformation rules. SAL objects are also stored and
linked to their UML counterparts. Executable UML - xtUML model is mapped into a
formal SAL model and the UML satisfiability conditions are mapped into SAL formal
theorems.

SAL checkers get launched and any generated counterexample is mapped back into
UML domain so that the UML designer could fix the detected specification
incompliance in UML domain. Figure 6 summarizes the proposed flow. The process
is iterative until all theorems can be properly proved.

Figure 6 Proposed Framework Workflow
As shown in Figure 6, xtUML (eXecutable Translatable UML) model implementation
is initially done based on the software specification in BridgePoint xtUML IDE[96].
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The xtUML model contains the de-facto UML standard diagrams and elements
including but not limited to component(s), classes(s), state machine(s), transition(s),
states, abstract object language to capture behavior within the model, data type(s),
operation(s), attribute(s) etc.

The model also encapsulates the requirements captured as satisfiability conditions to
trace existing design elements to the original requirements in the software
specification. Once the model is complete, a manual build command is triggered from
the IDE which automatically triggers the model compiler. BridgePoint enables the
creation of a custom model compiler that traverses all UML model elements and
generates new model based on extendable implementation.

We have created a custom model compiler that generates SAL model from the
xtUML model. The model compiler developed component compiles the xtUML
model to generate a formal SAL model and LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) based
theorems. Model checkers are manually executed to identify model violations.
Examples of checkers include but are not limited to deadlock checker to detect any
deadlock in the model. Model checkers are manually triggered on the generated SAL
model for each generated theorem. The execution reports any model violation
(counter example). Any reported counter example can be analyzed by the designer to
trigger xtUML model fix/refinement to address the generated counter example.
Our UML model extensions – satisfiability conditions aim to address the ISO-26262
test case derivation basis as shown in Table 5. (‘++’ indicates that the method is
highly recommended for the identified ASIL, ‘+’ indicates that the method is
recommended for identified ASIL, ‘o’ means no recommendation)
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Table 5 Methods for Deriving Test Cases for Software Unit Testing in ISO-26262
Methods

ASIL

1a

Analysis of Requirements

1b

Generation

and

analysis

of

A

B

C

D

++

++

++

++

+

++

++

++

equivalence classes
1c

Analysis of boundary values

+

++

++

++

1d

Error Guessing

+

+

+

+

Satisfiability conditions are captured in xtUML to enable generation of theorems to
address the above methods. Variable satisfiability conditions (Upper and Lower limit)
generate theorems to cover boundary value analysis and equivalence classes. State
satisfiability conditions capture conditions to ensure requirement compliance of
variables in a given state in the state machine. Transition satisfiability conditions
capture conditions to ensure requirement compliance of variables in a given transition
in the state machine. Our work / research supports the above methods yet the
framework can be extended to cover other methods to verify the design.

4.2

Input Model – xtUML

Requirement Specification document is initially mapped to an xtUML model design
implementation. The requirements are mapped into UML packages, components,
classes (attributes and operations), and state machines. All defined data types,
attributes, functions are defined in the UML model. Once UML model is complete,
the model captures architectural design of the specification. OAL(Object Action
Language) is now embedded in states, transitions, operations (Instance or class
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based), ports, mathematically derived attributes, and functions to capture the
specification

behavior.
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Table 6 shows xtUML diagrams, purpose and usage of each as used within our
framework

and

case

study

modules.
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Table 6 UML Model Diagrams
UML Diagram
Class Diagram

Purpose

Usage

A UML class diagram is In a UML class diagram,
not only used to describe classes

represent

an

the object and information abstraction of entities with
structures

in

an common

characteristics.

application, but also show Associations
the communication with static

represent
relationships

its users. It provides a between

classes.

wide range of usages; from Aggregation is a special
modeling the static view of type
an

application

of

to which

association
objects

in
are

describing responsibilities assembled or configured
for a system. Composition together to create a more
is

a

special

type

of complex

object.

aggregation that denotes a Generalization
strong ownership.

is

a

relationship in which one
model element (the child)
is based on another model
element

(the

Dependency

parent).

relationship

is a relationship in which
one element, the client,
uses or depends on another
element, the supplier.
Component Diagram

It

allows

application The

UML

component

designers to verify that a diagram doesn't require
system's
functionality
implemented

required many notations, thus very
is

being easy to draw and requires
by only

two

symbols:
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UML Diagram

Purpose

Usage

components, thus ensuring component

and

that the final system will dependency.
be acceptable. Component
diagram

is

a

useful

communication

tool

among

stakeholders

to

discuss,

analyze

or

improve a system design.
State Chart

Statechart

diagrams

are A state is a condition

used to model dynamic during the life of an object
nature of a system. They during which it satisfies
describe all of the possible some condition, performs
states of an object as some activity, or waits for
events occur. So the most some external event. A
important

purpose

of start state is the state that a

Statechart diagram is to new object will be in
model life time of an immediately following its
object from creation to creation. An end state is a
termination.

state that represents the
object

going

out

of

existence. A transition is a
relationship between two
states indicating that an
object in the first state will
perform

certain

actions

and enter the second state,
when a specified set of
events and conditions are
satisfied.

82

UML Diagram
Package Diagram

Purpose

Usage

Package diagrams are used The package element in
to organize the elements of UML is represented by a
a

model.

They

are folder icon. Each package

typically used to depict the represents a namespace.
high-level organization of Packages
a

software

project. members

can

also

of

be

other

Package diagram can show packages, providing for a
both

structure

dependencies

and hierarchic

structure

in

between which top-level packages

sub-systems or modules. are broken down into subThey can be used to group packages.
any construct in the UML
such as classes, actors, and
use cases.

4.3

UML Satisfiability Conditions

We have extended the xtUML model to capture satisfiability conditions on the state,
transition, operations and variables in UML model. The Software specification
requirements from specification documents are mapped into satisfiability conditions
in the UML design. Currently, the conditions are captured as descriptions on the UML
element (State, transition, class operation, class attribute etc.). The description
captures the conditions that should be satisfied as a function of attributes, states,
and/or values given a state, transition or operation.
These conditions map to requirements and serve as the baseline for formal theorem
generation via the model compiler. The model compiler maps the condition to a LTL
(Linear temporal Logic) rule in SAL Language.
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4.3.1

State Level Conditions

A state models a situation during which some invariant condition holds. State is the
main entity of a state machine where state changes are driven by events. A state is a
condition of being at a certain time. It is also a point in the lifecycle of a model
element that satisfies some condition, where some particular action is being
performed or where some event is being monitored. States can trigger actions.

Every state in a UML state chart can have optional entry actions, which are executed
upon entry to a state, as well as optional exit actions, which are executed upon exit
from a state. Entry and exit actions are associated with states, not transitions.
Regardless of how a state is entered or exited, all its entry and exit actions will be
executed. Because of this characteristic, state charts behave like Moore automata.
Because entry actions are executed automatically whenever an associated state is
entered, they often determine the conditions of operation or the identity of the state.

Specifications always include state entry conditions, exist conditions and state actions
in informal notation or semi-formal notation. Informal text to define state conditions
from AUTOSAR specification of WatchDog Manager are shown in Figure 7 and
Figure 8.

Figure 7 AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager Informal State Details – 1
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Figure 8 AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager Informal State Details – 2
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show how informal text in specification document can represent
the state entry conditions and exit conditions. In our research, we count on mapping
the above informal text into state level satisfiability conditions. For example, a
satisfiability condition on state ‘WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED’ could be
defined as: at least one alive supervision entity (in UML design notation) is incorrect,
a zero fault tolerance OR at least one deadline supervision of a supervised entity is
incorrect OR at least one logical supervision entity of a supervised entity is incorrect.
This

will

ensure

that

any

design

defect

that

leads

to

being

in

‘WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED’ while the informal conditions ( that are
mapped in UML) are not true as a result of a design bug can be detected in the design
verification as opposed to the code level stage.

Table 5 Methods for Deriving Test Cases for Software Unit Testing in ISO-26262,
include Analysis of requirements. We consider that state level conditions is based on
deriving a test case ( theorem) to ensure that requirement 202 in Figure 8 is being
adhered to in the design based on analysis of requirements guidelines in ISO-26262.
4.3.2

Transition Level Conditions

A transition is a relationship between a source state and a target state. It may be part
of a compound transition, which takes the state machine from one state configuration
to another, representing the complete response of the state machine to an occurrence
of an event of a particular type. A Transition is the movement from one state to
another state. Transitions between states occur as follows:
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1. An element is in a source state
2. An event occurs
3. An action is performed
4. The element enters a target state

Figure 9 AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager Informal Transition Description
Figure 9 shows how informal text in AUTOSAR Watchdog specification document
can represent transition conditions. In our research, we count on mapping the above
informal text into transition conditions. For example, a satisfiability condition on
transition 5 could be defined to match the specification transition conditions. This
condition shall ensure that the transition goes to the correct target state and all
transition action outcomes are correctly set (e.g. failed supervision reference cycle is
decremented) (in UML design notation). This will ensure that any design defect that
leads to violations against the requirement in transition can be detected in the design
verification as opposed to the code level stage. Table 5 Methods for Deriving Test
Cases for Software Unit Testing in ISO-26262 include analysis of requirements. We
consider that transition level conditions is based on deriving a test case ( theorem) to
ensure that requirement 205 in Figure 9 is being adhered to in the design based on
analysis of requirements guidelines in ISO-26262.
4.3.3

Variable Level Condition

Table 5 Methods for Deriving Test Cases for Software Unit Testing in ISO-26262
include boundary analysis and equivalence partitioning in deriving test cases.
Variable level conditions aim to make sure that the design complies with any
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requirements in this category. The variable level condition can capture low bound,
high bound or that a certain value can only happen given a set of possible values in
other variables.

Figure 10 Specification Level Boundary Value Requirements
Figure 10 shows how the specification mandates upper/lower range limit for variables
in the system. This is captured in our proposed framework via defining variable level
conditions to ensure that at no point in the system, the requirement of range for
variables is violated. Any such violation shall be detected by the model checker.
4.4

UML to SAL Model Compiler

Once software is modelled in UML and specification requirements are captured as
satisfiability conditions, the next step is to launch the model compiler. The model
compiler is based on mapping UML notation to SAL notation automatically. This
section includes SAL notation subsection, UML notation subsection and finally
mapping rules to map SAL to UML subsection.
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4.4.1

SAL

SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) is a framework for combining different tools for
abstraction, program analysis, theorem proving, and model checking toward the
calculation of properties (symbolic analysis) of transition systems. A key part of the
SAL framework is an intermediate language for describing transition systems. This
language is intended to serve as the target for translators that extract the transition
system description for other modeling and programming languages, and as a
common source for driving different analysis tools [78].

The SAL intermediate language is a basic transition system language. SAL describes
transition systems in terms of initialization and transition commands. The current
generation of SAL tools comprises a collection of state of the art LTL model checkers
and auxiliary tools based on them.

4.4.1.1 SAL Language
As discussed previously, SAL is a framework for combining different tools for
abstraction, program analysis, theorem proving, and model checking toward the
calculation of properties (symbolic analysis) of transition systems. A key part of the
SAL framework is a language for describing transition systems. This language serves
as a specification language and as the target for translators that extract the transition
system description for popular programming languages. The language also serves as a
common source for driving different analysis tools through translators from the SAL
language to the input format for the tools, and from the output of these tools back to
the SAL language. The basic high-level requirements on the SAL language are :
1. Generality: It supports capturing the transition semantics of a wide variety of
source languages.
2. Minimality: The language does not have redundant or extraneous features that add
complexity to the analysis. The language captures transition system behavior without
any complicated control structures.
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3. Semantic Regularity: The semantics of the language is straightforward so that it is
easy to verify the correctness of the various translations with respect to linear and
branching time semantics. The semantics is definable in a formal logic.
4. Language Modularity: The language is parametric with respect to orthogonal
features such as the type/expression sublanguage, the transition sublanguage, and the
module sublanguage.
5. Compositionality: The language has a way of defining transition system modules
that can be composed in a meaningful way. Properties of systems composed from
modules can then be derived from the individual module properties.
• Synchronous composition: In this form of composition, modules react to inputs
synchronously or in zero time, as with combinational circuitry in hardware. In order
to achieve semantic hygiene, causal loops arising in such synchronous interactions get
eliminated. The constraints on the language for the elimination of causal loops is not
onerous as to rule out sensible specifications.
• Asynchronous composition: Modules that are driven by independent clocks are
modeled by means of interleaving the atomic transitions of the individual modules.

SAL language is divided into type system, expression language, transition language,
modules, synchronous and asynchronous composition of modules and the
specification of systems. Language syntax details are elaborated in APPENDIX A.
4.4.2

AUTOSAR in UML

Object oriented system design method has been widely adopted, and the Unified
Modeling Language (UML) has been recognized as standard modeling tool in object
oriented design [95]. UML provides schematic modeling diagrams to describe the
structure and behavior of target applications. There are nine modeling diagrams, five
of them for system behavior description, and another four of them for system structure
description.

Behavior modeling diagrams are use-case diagram, sequence diagram, collaboration
diagram, state chart diagram and activity diagram. Structural diagrams are class
diagram, object diagram, component diagram and deployment diagram. An additional
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package diagram provides a general mechanism to organize system elements into
groups. Use case diagram describe the scenario in the usage of system from a specific
aspect. Sequence diagram focuses on time ordered messages that passed among
related objects in a system to accomplish specific system function requirement.
Collaboration diagram is another presentation of system scenario of object
interactions that show the objects interconnection through messages. State chart
depicts the system states and the state transitions. Vehicles are integrating more and
more electronics parts to cope with stringent control and safety regulations, to
increase the system performance and driving comfort [95].

It is worth highlighting that ISO26262 highly recommends using semi-formal notation
to capture design in high ASIL levels since it forces the designer to address informal
notation ambiguities that ends up generating design level bugs and incompliance to
requirements.

AUTOSAR as an emerging architectural modeling standard in the automotive domain
is increasingly spreading into the broad industrial practice. It is a great chance to
establish explicit specifications of software systems' architectures with various
benefits such as distributed development and in particular a completely model based
development process, reaching even to the final source code. AUTOSAR architecture
models are lacking information of interest (behavioral aspects), and AUTOSAR does
neither address nor guarantee a transition from architecture into detailed design or
implementation.

AUTOSAR architectures are currently augmented with UML to add currently missing
expressiveness (interaction behavior) and how a seamless transition from
AUTOSAR/UML architectural

models

to

detailed

design

and

succeeding

implementation can be achieved [94].

As demonstrated by AUTOSAR itself (in terms of the Basic Software), UML could
also be used to document the behavior of components, using state charts, sequence
diagrams and other means. As UML defines behavior on top of structure, structural
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concepts must however exist in order to achieve this. Most of the required structural
AUTOSAR concepts are directly representable in UML (components, ports,
connectors, interfaces).

In a model-based setting, the idea is to use models to semi-formally specify the
detailed design, which can then in turn be used as a means for documentation, similar
to as it was outlined for the Basic Software modules. However, there is a major
difference between Basic Software modules and software components with respect to
the level of abstraction that is used, which is higher for the latter. As such, in order to
use documentation models for the detailed design of software components, these
models must suit the respective level of abstraction. The relation between all
employed detailed design constructs and those elements that are directly derived from
the AUTOSAR architecture has to remain traceable.

UML can help to achieve this. If the architectural information of a software
component is already available in UML, then both, structural and behavioral diagrams
can be used for the specification of its detailed design. However, this detailed design
model will not be able to correspond so closely to code structures as the Basic
Software UML model, because for all architectural level elements the abstraction
level needs to be preserved in order to achieve above mentioned traceability. That is,
while the data elements of a sender/receiver interface will be ultimately mapped to
corresponding macros/functions in the application header of the software component,
using this representation in the detailed design model would clutter the model and
make it hard to read.

Performing such a transition manually would furthermore be an error-prone and
tedious task. Instead, as the mapping of these architectural concepts to the source code
constructs is well defined, this transition can be left to code generators. Dependent on
the completeness of the model, large parts or even the entire implementation may be
generated from the detailed design model. In the end, the concrete modeling
conventions therefore depend on what is to be generated and what code generator is
being used. Behavior diagrams could be used in addition to specify the behavior of

91

the modeled functions, so that a code generator could also generate function
definitions with implementation bodies corresponding to the modeled behavior.

We have selected BridgePoint as UML IDE [96] that is used in our framework. In
BridgePoint, the architectural design can evolve into detailed design using the action
language which captures behavior. Once the UML model is detailed with behavior
and action, the model compiler/code generator steps can be used to generate target
models or source code. Next section presents BridgePoint.

4.4.2.1 BridgePoint xtUML
Executable Translatable Unified Modeling Language [96] is a modeling dialect that
employs standard UML notation to express executable models following the Shlaer
Mellor Method of Object Oriented Analysis and Design [97]. The method is welldefined and documented and carries a substantial base of research, education and
industry usage through the last two decades. xtUML community is expanding and is
expected to gain a lot of grounds. Eclipse, Papyrus and open source community are
among the players of xtUML. It is observed that a fully open source governance and
ecosystem around xtUML has dramatically increased the pace of advancements in the
tooling and facilitated collaboration among users, suppliers and academics. This is
because openness, transparency and elimination of exclusive ownership fosters an
environment of security.

The order of modeling encourages as much information as reasonable to be captured
in data with the exposure of abstractions at the highest possible level. The method is
considered object-oriented due to its emphasis on data modeling. This object concept
emphasizes relations between the data abstractions. UML class diagrams provide the
notational richness required to capture clear abstractions of conceptual entities with
classes, attributes and various forms of associations relating them. UML state
machine diagrams formalize the lifecycles of individual UML classes. Concurrent
sequential processing is captured in a plurality of relatively simple, communicating
instance-based state machines. Finally, activity semantics are modeled in class
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operations, state machine states and transitions, and function bodies using an abstract
action language that is Turing Complete but platform independent.

Models are partitioned along subject matter boundaries and deployed as compositions
using UML component diagrams. xtUML models are interpretively executable
following a set of rules. These rules enforce the semantics of the model artifacts and
establish a basis to govern time, order and priority. Execution can be performed in
simulations run by humans enforcing the rules or by an xtUML interpreter that
automates the execution for model testing purposes. A corollary set of semantics
governs the transformation of xtUML from one representation into semantically
equivalent forms represented in lower-level target deployment languages such as Ada,
SPARK, Java, C, C++, MISRA-C, AUTOSAR, SystemC, or VHDL. The process of
translating xtUML into other forms is called model compilation and is performed by a
model compiler.

A model compiler is a refinement of code generation in its complete and strict
mapping of the semantic rules of the language. A model compiler must guarantee
adherence to semantics to preserve execution behavior between forms. Model
compilers can translate only from a higher level of abstraction to a lower level (or the
same level). Model compilers can insert additional platform-specific detail into the
transformation output. Shlaer Mellor xtUML model compilers translate PIMs
(Platform Independent Models) to PSMs (Platform Specific Models).

The purpose of xtUML is to capture executable models and not just diagrams. This
enables testing the application design before coding it which ensures a verified
executable specification. The execution is captured using OAL (Object Action
Language) which supports:
1. Create/Delete instances
2. Read/write attributes
3. Read parameter values
4. Relate/unrelated instances
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5. Invoke operations/set parameter values
6. Send events/set parameter values
7. Find instances
8. Computation
9. Create/read/write local variables
10. Control: iterate, loop, decision(if elif else endif)
OAL is used to define execution in several UML elements, namely:
1. States
2. Transitions
3. Operations ( Instance or class based)
4. Ports
5. Mathematically derived attributes
6. Bridge operations
7. Functions
The completeness of the executable model allows the generation of complete target
models as opposed to just skeleton that can be used to generate headers. Table 7
shows supported operators.
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Table 7 xtUML Operators
Type

Operators

Arithmetic

+, -, *, /. %, unary -

Boolean

AND, OR, unary NOT

Relational

==, !=, <, <=, >, >=

Assignment

Assign x=1

Instance Handles

==, !=, empty, not_empty, cardinality

Figure 11 shows an example of some expression in OAL [96]

Figure 11 xtUML Expressions

4.4.3

UML to SAL Mapping Rules

Table 8 UML/SAL Mapping Rules list model compiler mapping rules used to
generate UML to SAL.
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Table 8 UML/SAL Mapping Rules
UML

SAL Mapping

Element
Component

Translate into the entire context in SAL
Ex: WatchdogM: CONTEXT
BEGIN
END

System

Combines all defined SAL modules (UML state machines)
system: MODULE = MOD_1[] MOD_2;

State

The state machine is represented as a module in SAL.

Machine
Ex: SM_1: MODULE
BEGIN
<used instances>
INITIALIZATION
TRANSITION
END;
Initial State

INITIALIZATION block within the SAL module will contain the initial state
in the state machine
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UML

SAL Mapping

Element
INITIALIZATION
State = ST_STEADY;

Transition

Specified in TRANSITION block. The transition is specified as follows (the
first part is a Boolean statement): statemachine_status = SM_current_State
AND statemachine_action = SM_EVT_FIRED --> statemachine_status’ =
SM_Destination_state
<Set of actions>

(State = ST_DOWNSHIFTING AND CONT.timerStarted = TRUE AND EVT
= EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE) -->
EVT' = IF CONT.timerStarted = TRUE THEN
EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP ELSE EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE
ENDIF;
CONT'.timerStarted = FALSE;
Event

( Define new TYPE in system which contains all possible state machines

trigger for a events, then use as a global or input in the <used instances> block of the
transition)

module.

EVT_WdgM: TYPE = {
EVT_WDGM268,
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UML

SAL Mapping

Element
EVT_WDGM269,
EVT_WDGM201,
EVT_WDGM202,
EVT_WDGM203,
EVT_WDGM204,
EVT_WDGM300,
EVT_WDGM205,
EVT_WDGM206,
EVT_WDGM207,
EVT_WDGM291,
EVT_WDGM208,
EVT_WDGM209,
EVT_Startup
};

MOD_WdgM : MODULE =
BEGIN
%% Global Section
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UML

SAL Mapping

Element
GLOBAL EVT: EVT_WdgM
State

Define new TYPE in system which contains all possible states, then use as
local or input. Same exact way as EVT
ST_WdgM : TYPE = {
ST_STATUS_OK,
ST_STATUS_DEACTIVATED,
ST_STATUS_FAILED,
};
MOD_WdgM : MODULE =
BEGIN
%% Global Section
GLOBAL WdgM_State: ST_WdgM

State

Specified in a TRANSITION block to self. The transition is specified as

Actions

follows (the first part is a Boolean statement): statemachine_status =
SM_Origin_State AND variableInspect = 255 --> statemachine_status’ =
SM_Origin_State;
startupCounter' = 1;

Class
Attributes

Define bounded range for the variable:
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UML

SAL Mapping

Element
Extended to vehicleSpeed_idx: INTEGER = 240;
include max
limit

Define bounded type:
vehicleSpeed_type: TYPE = [0..vehicleSpeed_idx];

Define within class attributes structure in SAL

REC_GEARCONTROLLER: TYPE = [#
vehicleSpeed: vehicleSpeed_type,
#];

Define in Module as an instance to be used globally:

GLOBAL CONT: REC_GEARCONTROLLER

Class

Statements mapped to SAL and inlined in a state action when called inside

Operations

state or transition

Satisfiability Th<id>: THEOREM <module name> |- G((preconditions) => F(expected
conditions

outcome));

(UML
Model)

Ex:
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UML

SAL Mapping

Element
Satisfiability WDGM205: THEOREM system |- G(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus =
conditions

0

AND

WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus

=

0

AND

are mapped WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus=0 =>
to theorems)
G(WdgM_State = ST_STATUS_OK));

Th<id>: THEOREM <module name> |- G(Upper bound check) AND (Lower
bound check);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM327:
THEOREM system |- G(FailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol <= 255 AND
FailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol >= 0);

The transformation mapping model compiler is composed of several functions. Each
function is responsible for UML to SAL mapping. A list of functions implemented in
the model compiler is summarized below:
1. FilePro: responsible for generating SAL file prologue. It takes UML components
and generates <ComponentName>.sal file component. It additionally declares the
context of the .sal using the components name as the context’s name followed by
‘BEGIN’ keyword which is mandatory in SAL semantics.
2. FileStates: Given a UML class, creates the declaration of the different states,
events, input states and input events in an enumerated form in SAL notation. The
data type name format is <class name>_<State or InputState>.
3. FileModules: This function creates the SAL module for each state machine. It
takes component as a parameter and searches the component for all its classes’
state machines. For each class state machine instance, a module is created.
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‘MODULE=BEGIN’ preceded by the class’s generated name are written to the
SAL file. CreateDecls function is then called with a component and a class name
to define all modules relevant declarations. All SAL transitions in this class’s state
machine are then written to the SAL file. CreateBody function is then called with
a state/transition, class, and component arguments to traverse any state/transition
preconditions/post conditions to generate the transition/State actual body.
4. CreateDecls: As previously mentioned, this function takes the class and
component names. It creates declarations within each class’s respective module,
namely, declare an instance of the class’s states and input states, local to the
module as well as class’s events and input events global to the module. It will also
initialize the instance of the class’s status to the initial state in the UML state
machine.
5. CreateObjectSAL: Invokes previously described functions in the correct order to
generate the SAL representation of the state machine.
6. CreateBody: Parses the preconditions and post conditions checks and generates
state transition actions/checks and/or state actions.
7. CreateTheroems: Traverses all UML model satisfiability conditions to generate
theorem mapping in SAL notation.
4.5

Model Checking

Model checking is based on SAL model checkers. SAL model checkers are based on
several technologies. The below subsection introduces the technologies that SAL
model checkers are based on followed by a brief list of SAL model checkers.
4.5.1

Model Checkers Technologies

4.5.1.1 SAT Based Model Checking
Also Called Boolean satisfiability. SAT(Satisfiability) based checking is to determine
if there exists an interpretation that satisfies a given Boolean formula. In other words,
it establishes if the variables of a given Boolean formula can be assigned in such a
way as to make the formula evaluate to TRUE. If no such assignments exist, the
function expressed by the formula is identically FALSE for all possible variable
assignments. In this latter case, it is called unsatisfiable, otherwise satisfiable. For
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example, the formula "a AND NOT b" is satisfiable because one can find the values a
= TRUE and b = FALSE, which make (a AND NOT b) = TRUE. In contrast, "a AND
NOT a" is unsatisfiable. To emphasize the binary nature of this problem, it is
frequently referred to as Boolean or propositional satisfiability.

4.5.1.2 SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories).
The SMT problem is a decision problem for logical formulas with respect to
combinations of background theories expressed in classical first-order logic with
equality. Examples of theories typically used in computer science are the theory of
real numbers, the theory of integers, and the theories of various data structures such as
lists, arrays, bit vectors and so on. SMT can be thought of as a form of the constraint
satisfaction problem and thus a certain formalized approach to constraint
programming.

4.5.1.3

BDD - Binary Decision Diagram

A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a data structure that is used to represent a
Boolean function. On a more abstract level, BDDs can be considered as a compressed
representation of sets or relations. Unlike other compressed representations,
operations are performed directly on the compressed representation, i.e. without
decompression.
Bounded model checking algorithms unroll the FSM for a fixed number of steps K
and check whether a property violation can occur in K or fewer steps. The process can
be repeated with larger and larger values of k until all possible violations have been
ruled out

4.5.1.4

Model Solver dependencies/ Techniques

Correctness properties are expressed in SAL by means of LTL (Linear Temporal
Logic) or CTL (Computational Tree Logic) formulas. [Appendix A includes SAL
examples of correctness properties]. In SAL, verification of the models relies mostly
on the infinite-state bounded model checker. The model checker is used as a
refutation tool. It searches for counter examples to a given property. It is used as a
verification tool and applied to the models using two techniques: proof by induction
and proof by abstraction.
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Proof by induction (k-induction) assumes that a system S satisfies an invariant P in
two steps. The first step shows that all states that are reachable from initial state of S
in at most k steps satisfy P. In the inductive step, one shows that for any trajectory of
length k+1, if the first k states satisfy P then the last state also satisfies P. This
technique is not always scalable to industrial-size use cases.

Proof by Abstraction which amounts to finding a disjunctive variant that implies a
safety property under consideration which can be proven using induction at depth 1.
Proof by induction and abstraction is claimed to be a robust technique that is
applicable to a wide class of communication protocols. The method of discovering
suitable abstractions is claimed to be reusable across protocols.
4.5.2

SAL Model Checkers

SAL comes with a lot of model checkers based on technologies discussed in 4.5.1.
sal-wfc is a well-formedness checker or SAL syntax compiler. Sal-smc is a
symbolic model checker which is BDD-based for finite state systems [78]. Saldeadlock-checker is an auxiliary tool, based on the symbolic model checker, for
detecting deadlocks in finite state systems [78]. Sal-bmc is a bounded model checker
for finite state systems based on SAT(Satisfiability) solving. In addition to refutation
(i.e., bug detection and counterexample generation), the SAL bounded model checker
can perform verification by k-induction. SAL can use several SAT solvers, but
defaults to Yices [78]. Sal-inf-bmc is an infinite bounded model checker for infinite
state systems based on SMT solving. In addition to refutation (i.e., bug detection and
counterexample generation), the SAL infinite bounded model checker can perform
verification by k-induction. SAL can use several SMT solvers, but defaults to Yices
[78]. Sal-atg is an automated test generator which uses the symbolic, bounded, and
infinite bounded model checkers to perform automated generation of input sequences
[78].
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Chapter 5.

Case Study Modules

We have evaluated our proposed approach using three automotive modules. Two
modules are part of the AUTOSAR standard basic software module stack, namely,
FlexRay state manager and Watchdog Manager and the third module is an application
layer module, namely, automatic transmission controller. We present the background
of these case study modules in this chapter and the requirements that has been mapped
into the design based on informal specifications of all three modules in our
framework. These requirements will form the foundation for evaluating our
framework. We will implement these requirements in the UML design, introduce
design defects on the UML model and report the SAL model checkers response
towards these introduced defects.

Additionally, we used a commercial implementation from an AUTOSAR BSW
supplier of Watchdog Manager. The details of this commercial implementation
includes challenges faced during design verification of the module, ISO26262
compliance challenges, and defects that were uncovered beyond the design phase that
could have been detected in the design phase. We will present this implementation in
this chapter and use it for a comparative analysis against our approach in results and
discussions chapter. Our plan is to introduce these defects in our watchdog manager
implementation design and verify that the model checkers are able to detect the design
issues at the design stage.
5.1

AUTOSAR FlexRay State Manager

In the AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture, the FlexRay State Manager belongs to
the ECU Abstraction Layer, or more precisely, to the Communication Hardware
Abstraction as depicted in Figure 4. AUTOSAR modules specification are uniform. We
managed to verify two modules but our framework can be extended to any AUTOSAR
module since all specifications are similar. The FlexRay State Manager shall provide an
abstract interface to the AUTOSAR Communication Manager to startup or shutdown the
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communication on a FlexRay cluster. The FlexRay State Manager does not directly
access the FlexRay hardware (FlexRay Communication Controller and FlexRay
Transceiver), but by means of the FlexRay Interface. The FlexRay Interface redirects the
request to the appropriate driver module [103]. The FlexRay State Manager shall have
one state machine for each FlexRay cluster. Figure 12 shows the FlexRay State Manager
state machine as documented in the AUTOSAR FlexRay state manager AUTOSAR
specification.

Figure 12 State Machine of FlexRay State Manager
5.1.1

5.1.1.1

Requirements to be verified

FRSM073 and FRSM074

Figure 13 depicts requirements FrSm073 and FrSm074 that govern transitions 2a, 2b,
3a, 3b, 3c, 3d and 3e as documented in the AUTOSAR FlexRay State manager
specification. It shows the conditions that drive a transition and the actions to take
once the transition is made. In the results and discussions chapter, we will verify that
the below requirement hold in the design, introduce bugs and show how our
framework can detect the bugs on the design level via the formal model checkers
based on the automatically compiled UML design to SAL formal notation. All
requirements are retrieved from AUTOSAR software specification document [103].
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Figure 13 Requirements 73 and 74 in FlexRay State Manager Module
The requirements govern the conditions that should be satisfied for a transition/state
to be valid. These requirements shall be the basis for the theorems as well to ensure
that at no time, the conditions will be satisfied while in a wrong state or invalid
transition.

5.1.1.2 FRSM033
Verify range values are compliant to specifications for parameters [103]:
startupCounter: uint8 [0-255]
wakeupCounter:uint8[0-255]
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5.2

AUTOSAR WatchDog Manager

Most embedded systems need to be self-reliant. It is not usually possible to wait for
someone to reboot them if the software hangs. Some embedded designs, such as space
probes, are simply not accessible to human operators. If their software ever hangs,
such systems are permanently disabled. In other cases, the speed with which a human
operator might reset the system would be too slow to meet the uptime requirements of
the product. Watchdog module is used to automatically detect software anomalies and
take corrective actions such as a reset the processor.

The Watchdog Manager is a basic software module at the service layer of the
standardized basic software architecture of AUTOSAR as shown in Figure 4. It is able
to supervise the program execution abstracting from the triggering of hardware
watchdog entities. It supervises the execution of a configurable number of Supervised
Entities. When it detects a violation of the configured temporal and/or logical
constraints on program execution, it takes a number of configurable actions to recover
from this failure. The watchdog Manager provides three mechanisms [102]:
1. Alive supervision – for supervision of timing of periodic software
2. Deadline monitoring – for aperiodic software
3. Logical monitoring – for supervision of the correctness of the execution
sequence.
The Watchdog Manager supervises the execution of software. The logical units of
supervision are Supervised Entities. There is no fixed relationship between
Supervised Entities and the architectural building blocks in AUTOSAR, i.e., SW-Cs,
CDDs, RTE, BSW modules, but typically a Supervised Entity may represent one SWCs or a Runnable within an SW-C, a BSW module or CDD depending on the choice
of the developer. Important places in a Supervised Entity are defined as Checkpoints.
The code of Supervised Entities is interlaced with the calls of Watchdog Manager that
report to the Watchdog Manager when they have reached a Checkpoint [102].

Each Supervised Entity has one or more Checkpoints. The Checkpoints and
Transitions between the Checkpoints of a Supervised Entity form a Graph. This

108

Graph is called Internal Graph. Moreover, checkpoints from different Supervised
Entities may also be connected by External Transition, forming an External Graph.
There can be several External Graphs in each Watchdog Manager mode [102].

A Graph may have one or more initial Checkpoints and one or more final
Checkpoints. Any sequence of starting with any initial checkpoint and finishing with
any final checkpoint is correct (assuming that the checkpoints belong to the same
Graph). After the final Checkpoint, any initial Checkpoint can be reported. Within the
Watchdog Manager settings, it is possible to configure the required timing of
Checkpoints as well as the allowed External and Internal Graphs [102].

At runtime, Watchdog Manager verifies if the configured Graphs are executed. This is
called Logical Supervision. Watchdog Manager verifies also the timing of
Checkpoints and Transitions. The mechanism for periodic Checkpoints is called Alive
Supervision and for aperiodic Checkpoints it is called Deadline Supervision. The
granularity of Checkpoints is not fixed by the Watchdog Manager. Few coarsegrained Checkpoints limit the detection abilities of the Watchdog Manager. For
example, if an application SW-C only has one Checkpoint that indicates that a cyclic
Runnable has been started, then the Watchdog Manager is only capable of detecting
that this Runnable is re-started and check the timing constraints. In contrast, if that
SW-C has Checkpoints at each block and branch in the Runnable the Watchdog
Manager may also detect failures in the control flow of that SW-C. High granularity
of Checkpoints causes a complex and large configuration of the Watchdog Manager
[102].

The three supervision mechanisms supervise each supervised entity. A Supervised
Entity may have one, two or three mechanisms enabled. Based on the results from
each of enabled mechanisms, the status of the Supervised Entity (called Local Status)
is computed. When the status of each Supervised Entity is determined, then based on
each Local Supervision Status, the status of the whole MCU is determined (called
Global Supervision Status). Watchdog has three types of supervision: Alive
supervision, deadline supervision and Logical supervision [102].
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5.2.1

Alive Supervision

Periodic Supervised Entities have constraints on the number of times they are
executed within a given time span. By means of Alive Supervision, Watchdog
Manager checks periodically if the Checkpoints of a Supervised Entity have been
reached within the given limits. This means that Watchdog Manger checks if a
Supervised Entity is run not too frequently or not too rarely [102].
5.2.2

Deadline Supervision

Aperiodic or episodical Supervised Entities have individual constraints on the timing
between two Checkpoints. By means of Deadline Supervision, Watchdog Manager
checks the timing of transitions between two Checkpoints of a Supervised Entity. This
means that Watchodog Manager checks if some steps in a Supervised Entity take a
time that is within the configured minimum and maximum [102].
5.2.3

Logical Supervision

Logical supervision is a fundamental technique for checking the correct execution of
embedded system software. Please refer to the safety standards (IEC 61508 or
ISO26262) when logical supervision is required. Logical supervision focuses on
control flow defects, which cause a divergence from the valid (i.e. coded/compiled)
program sequence during the error-free execution of the application. An incorrect
control flow occurs if one or more program instructions are processed either in the
incorrect sequence or are not even processed at all. Control flow errors can lead to
data corruption, microcontroller resets, or fail-silence violations. For the control flow
graph this implies that every time the Supervised Entity reports a new Checkpoint, it
must be verified that there is a Transition configured between the previous
Checkpoint and the reported one [102].
5.2.4

Local Supervision State Machine

The local supervision status state machine determines the status of the Supervised
Entity. This is done based on the following:
1- Previous value of the Local Supervision Status
2- Current values of alive supervision, deadline supervision and logical
supervision.
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Figure 14 shows the Watchdog Manager state machine. The states and transitions are
detailed in AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager published Software Specification
document [79] [102].

Figure 14 Watchdog Manager Local Supervision Status
5.2.5

Requirements to be verified

In this section, we present selected requirements that we plan to verify using our
framework. In the results and discussions chapter, we will verify that the below
requirements hold in the design, introduce bugs and show how our framework can
detect the bugs on the design levels via the formal model checkers based on the
automatically compiled UML design to SAL formal notation. All requirements are
retrieved from AUTOSAR software specification document [102].

WDGM202
WDGM202 describes transition 2 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure
15[102]. The requirement specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in order for
a transition from OK to expired states to take place in the local state machine. We will
use our framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions will be met and the
transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than expired while the transition
conditions satisfying expired state are true.
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Figure 15 Requirement 202 - Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM203
WDGM203 describes transition 3 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 16
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a transition from OK to failed states to take place in the local state machine.
We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions will be met
and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than failed while the
transition conditions satisfying failed state are true.

Figure 16 Requirement 203 - Watchdog Manager

WDGM204
WDGM204 describes transition 4 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 17
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a stay in FAILED transition in the local state machine. We will use our
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framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions will be met the state
machine is in a state other than failed.

Figure 17 Requirement 204 - Watchdog Manager

WDGM300
WDGM300 describes transition 4 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 18
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a stay in FAILED transition in the local state machine. We will use our
framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions will be met the state
machine is in a state other than failed.

Figure 18 Requirement 300 - Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM205
WDGM205 describes transition 5 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 19
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
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order for a transition from failed to OK states to take place in the local state machine.
We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions will be met
and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than OK while the
transition conditions satisfying OK state are true.

Figure 19 Requirement 205 - Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM206
WDGM206 describes transition 6 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 20
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a transition from failed to expired states to take place in the local state
machine. We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below conditions
will be met and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than expired
while the transition conditions satisfying expired state are true.

Figure 20 Requirement 206 - Watchdog Manager Module
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WDGM207
WDGM207 describes transition 7 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 21
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a transition from OK to deactivated state to take place in the local state
machine. We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below condition
will be met and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than
deactivated while the setMode function is called with a deactivated state.

Figure 21 Requirement 207 - Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM291
WDGM291 describes transition 12 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 22
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a transition from Failed to deactivated state to take place in the local state
machine. We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below condition
will be met and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than
deactivated while the transition condition is met. We will also verify that the design
does not allow the transition from expired to deactivated as described in the
requirement.

Figure 22 Requirement 291 - Watchdog Manager Module
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WDGM208
WDGM208 describes transition 8 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 23
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for the state machine to stay in deactivated state in local state machine of the
Watchdog Manager Specification[102]. Verification of this requirement will ensure
that the state is correct given the conditions and that no supervision functions are
performed while in the state.

Figure 23 Requirement 208 - Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM209
WDGM209 describes transition 9 in the local state machine as depicted in Figure 24
[102]. The requirement basically specifies the conditions that should be satisfied in
order for a transition from deactivated to OK state to take place in the local state
machine. We will use our framework to verify that at no time, the below condition
will be met and the transition will not fire or that we are in a state other than OK
while the transition condition is met.

Figure 24 Requirement 209- Watchdog Manager Module

WDGM327
WDGM327 describes boundary conditions for a configuration parameter within the
module as shown in Figure 25 [102]. We will verify that it is not possible at any point
in the design for the failed alive supervision reference cycle tolerance to exceed the
specification range.
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Figure 25 Requirement 327 - Parameter range - Watchdog Manager
5.3

Automatic Transmission Controller - ATC

A transmission control entity is a device that controls transmission electronically to
achieve better fuel economy, reduced engine emissions, greater shift system
reliability, improved shift feel and improved shift speed. It uses sensors from the
vehicle and data provided by engine control unit to calculate how and when to change
gears in the vehicle. Figure 26 shows a state machine of the ATC [104]. The inputs
are throttle and vehicle speed and the output is the desired gear number.

Figure 26 ATC State Machine
The model computes the upshift and downshift speed thresholds as a function of the
instantaneous values of gear and throttle. While in steady_state, the model compares
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these values to the present vehicle speed to determine if a shift is required. If so, it
enters one of the confirm states (upshifting or downshifting). If the vehicle speed no
longer satisfies the shift condition, while in the confirm state, the model ignores the
shift and it transitions back to steady_state. This prevents extraneous shifts due to
noise conditions. If the shift condition remains valid for a duration, the model
transitions through the lower junction and, depending on the current gear, it
broadcasts

one

of

the

shift

events.

Subsequently,

the

model

again

activates steady_state after a transition through one of the central junctions. The shift
event, which is broadcast to the gear_selection state, activates a transition to the
appropriate new gear [104].
5.3.1

Requirements to be verified

In this application module, we will assume application level requirements or safety
assumptions.
If the vehicle is in a second gear vehicle speed range and throttle while in first gear
position, the state second should be active in gear_state and steady_state is active in
selection state [104].
If the vehicle speed exceeds 21 km/h given the previous condition, transition to upshift should happen, stabilize in up-shift and gear_state should be in second
state[104].
5.4

Industrial Challenges – Commercial Watchdog Manager Implementation

In order to evaluate the existing challenges faced by embedded automotive suppliers,
we got data regarding the hardships that currently face automotive embedded
suppliers as well as an analysis of the bugs they identify and interpretation of cons in
the process/flow that lead up to these bugs. This evaluation needed to be based on an
industrial partner that can benefit from our proposed flow and is willing to provide
data regarding the current flaws as well as defects that are still identified in the late
testing cycle or even after release. Mentor Graphics shared their challenges in
developing AUTOSAR Watchdog Manager implementation in compliance to ASIL B
ISO 26262 level as well as the defects that were uncovered during testing/production
releases.
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5.4.1

Verification challenges

BSW supplier reports that one of the major challenges faced during their verification
cycle of BSW modules while attempting to be ISO26262 complaint was the inability
to follow the design verification guidelines.

Formal and semi-formal verification methods generally apply when working with
model-based software but not with embedded C code, or with embedded software
designs. So, when working with embedded C software, static analysis, and control
flow/data flow analysis were considered as acceptable alternatives by the supplier and
an argument was made against performing semi-formal or formal verification against
ISO-26262 recommendations as shown in Table 2 Methods for the verification of the
software architectural design. This forced the supplier to drop to ASIL B compliance
since they were unable to comply with highly recommended requirement of design
semi-formal verification in ASILs C and D.

The supplier utilized methods that apply on the source code itself using manual
methods. Control flow/data flow analysis were done via manually analyzing the
control statements inside source code and creating control flow/data flow graphs for
control statements and variables. This was possible since the modules under
verification were small, however with larger scale modules, this will not be feasible
and has to be automated.

From the supplier perspective, control flow and data flow analysis execution on the
source code don’t really provide additional value over static analysis and code
coverage tools since most of the detectable bugs via control/data flow analysis can be
detected by static analysis tools and code coverage tools during unit testing, or by
manual code review. In a nut shell, verification is always assumed to be on the code
as opposed to the design level due to the lack of an automated verification flow on the
design level.

The supplier reports that design reviews were primarily based on several review
iterations and re-writes of the design since it lacked needed details and guidance to be
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a comprehensive design. Adding control/data flow in the design helped address this
design lack of details which primarily impacts the implementation and the
identification of design level bugs. The current flow basically pushes design bugs to
the implementation cycle and allows the detection of the bugs introduced in both
stages only after the code is written and is in a testable state.

The supplier also perceives semi-formal verification as means to automatically derive
test cases in accordance with ISO 26262 test case derivation guidelines on the design
as shown in Table 5. The recommendations show that in order to achieve at least
ASIL B, boundary value analysis and generation and analysis of equivalence classes
should be used in test case derivation.
5.4.2

Defects beyond Design Stage

Seventy one defects were raised during ASIL B compliancy endeavor of the
WatchDog Manager module. Additionally, some of the reported defects were
uncovered after production and during customer module integration endeavors. The
table below summarizes the raised defects number and classification.
Table 9 Categorization of identified Defects
Defect Count

Classification

16

Logic Bugs

35

Non-compliance to Specification

20

Traceability

Defects under logic bugs category include but are not limited to, bugs such as array
bound issues, incorrect array index, invalid mathematical operator, and last array
index not getting initialized properly. Defects under non-compliance to specification
includes defects such as WDGM triggers watchdog Interface to be in
WDGIF_OFF_MODE

while in WDGM_G_STATUS_STOPPED state (non-
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compliance to WDGM122) and WdgMExpectedAliveIndications, which is a defined
parameter in the specification holding the amount of expected alive indications, range
does not match AUTOSAR watchdog manager specification. The remaining defects
were related to traceability (Missing text cases, missing relations between requirement
and design/code/test elements). 5.4.3 details sampled defects that will be verified in
our results and discussions chapter.
71 defects were introduced in the design stage of this project. All of them slipped into
the testing stage and were not properly detected in the design stage. Part of our
approach evaluation is to decrease the 100% slippage factor between design and
implementation stages.
5.4.3

Defects

WdgMExpectedAliveIndications Range
This defect was reported after delivering the software to the customer. In the
customer’s attempt to define the alive indications to be 65535, which is valid
assignment since the specification indicates a range between 0-65535, the software
returned an error that only 0-255 is allowed for this parameter. Bug report is 17655.
We will introduce the same defect in our design and verify that model checkers will
identify the defect at the design stage via model checkers.

SetMode function Defect
This defect was reported in the integration testing stage. The specification indicates
that function SetMode should return E_NOT_OK while the state machine is in
FAILED or OK states. The requirement indicates that changing mode successfully
should trigger the function to return E_OK and failing should trigger the function to
return E_NOT_OK. In this defect, the function returned E_OK while state machine
was in state OK which is in direct violation to requirement 154. Bug report is 17988.
We will introduce the same defect in our design and verify that model checkers will
identify the defect at the design stage via model checkers.
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Improper Initialization
This defect was reported in system testing stage. The specification indicates that all
module variables shall be initialized in WdgM_Init call – WDGM018. The defect
elaborates on a non-initialized index of an array in the module. Bug report is 17907.
We will introduce the same defect in our design and verify that model checkers will
identify the defect at the design stage via model checkers.

Out of Bound array index
This defect was reported during integration testing. An array within the wdgM
module was accessed with out of bound index. Bug report 17971. We will introduce
the same defect in our design and verify that model checkers will identify the defect at
the design stage via model checkers.

Incomplete boundary testing
This boundary testing defect was reported during system testing stage. A bug was
raised that not all module parameters were boundary tested. The defect was intended
to show lack of testing to ensure compliance to ISO-26262. Bug report 18149. We
will introduce the same defect in our design and verify that model checkers will
identify the defect at the design stage via model checkers.
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Chapter 6.
6.1

Case Study results and Comparative analysis

AUTOSAR FlexRay State Manager Results

AUTOSAR FlexRay State Manager SWS served as a baseline for implementation of
the design in BridgePoint xtUML. It is a critical module in the AUTOSAR BSW
communication stack that is used by all ECUs connected via a FlexRay bus. FlexRay
supports high data rates, up to 10Mbits/s and supports both star and party line bus
topologies and has two independent data channels for fault tolerance. The first usage
was in BMW x5 2006 damping system. It is now used in several cars including Audi,
Bentley, BMW, Lamborghini, Mercedes Benz, Rolls-Royce, Land Rover and Volvo.
It is mainly used in bandwidth intensive safety critical applications. FlexRay state
Manager module is responsible for managing the state machine of a FlexRay cluster
impacting all modules running on top of ECUs depending on data being sent/coming
over the FlexRay communication channel. Any Failure in the state machine module
would affect all applications on ECUs that depend on data utilizing the bus. Similar to
FlexRay State manager, there is CAN ( bus protocol) state manager, LIN ( Bus
protocol ) state manager and Ethernet ( communication protocol) state manager
among others. Therefore, verifying this module is crucial in automotive and shows
that all state managers could be verified at the design stage in a similar manner.

The xtUML project consisted of a root package called FRSM. The root package
contained all data types as documented in the specification and a component named
FrSM_Comp. The component consisted of another package, Manager that contained a
class definition FrSM. The class contains attributes, functions and state machine
design as documented in the FlexRay state manager specification. Figure 27 shows a
summary of the xtUML design elements of FlexRay state manager module. Section
6.1.1 details the mapping of the specification into the xtUML design. The figure
shows a FlexRaySM xtUML project that has a FRSM package. The package hosts
user

defined

Std_ReturnType,

data

types

(

wakeup_Type,

comM_ModType,

FrSM_BswM_StateType,

WUReason_Type,

FrSm_ConfigType,
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Std_VersionInfoType) and a FrSM_Comp component. The FrSM_Comp contains a
package that hosts the FrSM class. THe xtUML class defines all attributes, operations,
and state machine as defined in the specification.

Figure 27 FlexRay xtUML Design
6.1.1

xtUML Design

FlexRay State Manager AUTOSAR specification [82] describes the module in the
following order:
1- Defines all states in the state machine (READY, WAKEUP, STARTUP,
HALT_REQ, ONLINE, ONLINE_PASSIVE) as shown in Figure 28.
2- Defines all variables used in the state machine and their type. Some
examples are shown in Figure 29 where specification indicates that a
variable reqComMode needs to be defined of type ComM_ModType,
startupCounter of type integer, wakeupType of type Enumeration and
others.
3- Condition variables that are evaluated at runtime that control transitions in
the state machine as shown in Figure 30.
4- A table that describes the transition, conditions for the transition to take
place and actions that should be executed once the transition happens as
shown in Figure 13.
5- Function definitions and actions to be taken inside functions. An example
is shown in Figure 31 where specification indicates that a function
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FrSM_Init needs to be defined that returns void and accepts a
configuration parameter of type pointer to FrSm_ConfigType. The intent
of this function is to initialize the state manager and set the configuration
parameters in the channel configuration.

Figure 28 FlexRay States

125

Figure 29 FlexRay Variables
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Figure 30 FlexRay Conditions

Figure 31 FlexRay Functions
The module specification was mapped into xtUML design. All defined types were
mapped into user defined types in xtUML. FrSm033 requirement indicates how
several variables should be defined. An example is reqComMode variable of type
ComM_ModType enum that should be defined with the following enum values:
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NoCom, SilentCom, FullCom. Figure 32 shows the mapping of this user defined type
in xtUML.

Figure 32 ComM_ModeType User Defined Type
Additionally, variables documented in the specification were mapped into class
attributes of the FrSM class definition in xtUML as shown in Figure 33. xtUML has
been extended to record the default value and max value for each variable so that it
can be used to generate boundary conditions theorems in SAL notation.

Figure 33 Variable Definition
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FlexRay Manager States, state machine and transitions were also implemented in
xtUML in accordance to FlexRay State Manager specification document. Figure 34
shows the xtUML implementation of the state machine. Each FlexRay State machine
state checks for the conditions and triggers actions as documented in the AUTOSAR
FlexRay State Manager specification.

Figure 34 FlexRay xtUML State Machine
The xtUML state machine as shown in Figure 34 implements the states INIT,
READY, HALT_REQ, WAKEUP, STARTUP, ONLINE and ONLINE_Passive as
documented in the AUTOSAR FlexRay State manager specification. All specification
transitions are implemented in xtUML to match the specification. Each state/transition
actions in the specification are also mapped to xtUML action language to manipulate
the variables in accordance to the specification as shown in Figure 13.

State hosts action language that checks conditions and takes actions in accordance to
the specification. Figure 35 shows the OAL (Object Action Language) in the
FRSM_READY state that checks variables and triggers transitions T01a, T01b, T01c
and required actions once the conditions are satisfied. In xtUML, the state change is
triggered via events that trigger the specified transition.
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Figure 35 xtUML Implementation of FrSm072
Functions are mapped to operations in the FrSM class. Each operation manipulates
the state variables and takes the actions specified in the specification. Figure 36 shows
an example of FrSM_Init implementation in xtUML as documented in the
specification where the configuration parameters are stored and accessible via other
functions and a transition is made to FRSM_READY once the initialization has taken
place.
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Figure 36 FrSM Initialization in xtUML
Once the design is complete in xtUML, a build is triggered in C/C++ perspective to
launch the model compiler and generate SAL model counterpart. Figure 37 Shows
generated output after a successful build. Figure 38 shows the console output during
SAL generation/build.

At this point in the flow, xtUML model of the design under test has been
automatically compiled into a formal SAL model and theorems. Sample SAL output
is documented in APPENDIX B.

Figure 37 Generated SAL Model
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Figure 38 SAL Generation
6.1.2

Model Checking Results

This section details the results of running the model checkers on the generated SAL
model. The intention is to show sample design defects that can be uncovered via the
model checkers in the early design stage. FlexRay SAL model shall be checked via a
SAL compiler to validate syntax, SAL deadlock checker to validate that the state
machine has no deadlock state, and finally a BDD checker to verify theorems
(Boundary check and requirement compliance).

6.1.2.1 SAL Model Compilation
The SAL compiler is triggered on the generated SAL model to verify that the
generated SAL syntax is correct and that the formal model is complete. This step will
fail if there are non-bounded variables, non-initialized variables or syntax defects. We
have left an uninitialized variable in the xtUML model to check that the SAL model
compiler will report any un-initialized variable. In the FlexRay State manager xtUML
model, we left the configuration class member as un-initialized as shown in Figure 39
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Figure 39 Un-initialized Data Member
The output below shows the result of the compilation which basically can be
summarized as mismatch between the defined FrSM_Comp type and the initiation
instance of REC_FrSM as elements in the structure are not initialized. In the case
below, the variable FrSM_Config was not part of the initialization in xtUML and thus
the SAL compiler generated the error below.
$ sal-wfc FrSM_Comp.sal --verbose=3
importing context "FrSM_Comp"...
parsing SAL file "FrSM_Comp.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "FrSM_Comp"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "FrSM_Comp"...
Error:
[Context:
FrSM_Comp,
line(173),
column(2)]:
Incompatible types in assignment.
The following types are incompatible:
FrSM_Comp!REC_FrSM
[# AllChannelIsAwake: bool,
FrSMCheckWakeupReason: bool,
FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup: bool,
FrSMIsColdstartEcu: bool,
FrSMIsDualChannelNode: bool,
FrSMIsWakeupEcu: bool,
FrSMNumWakeupPatterns: nat,
FrSMStartupRepetitions: nat,
FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup: nat,
WUReason: FrSM_Comp!WUReason_type,
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busTrafficDetected: bool,
reqComMode: FrSM_Comp!ComM_ModType,
startupCounter: nat,
t1: bool,
t1_IsActive: bool,
t2: bool,
t3: bool,
t3_IsNotActive: bool,
t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive: bool,
t_Trcv_StdbyDelay: nat,
wakeupCounter: nat,
wakeupTransmitted: bool,wakeupType:

FrSM_Comp!wakeup_Type

#]

Once the issue was corrected in xtUML, the SAL compiler compiled the file
successfully and gave the below generated output.
$ sal-wfc FrSM_Comp.sal --verbose=3
importing context "FrSM_Comp"...
parsing SAL file "FrSM_Comp.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "FrSM_Comp"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "FrSM_Comp"...
type-checker time: 0.0 secs
Ok.
total execution time: 0.0 secs

6.1.2.2 SAL Deadlock Checker
The SAL deadlock checker is triggered on the generated SAL model to verify that the
state machine has no deadlock state. The deadlock checker shall be executed before
the SAL model checker as the theorems cannot be verified if a tree can only be built
with a deadlock state. Our first run of the deadlock checker against the FlexRay State
Manager SAL model revealed a set of variable assignments that lead up to a deadlock
state in our state machine. The Deadlock checker output below shows the set of
assignments that lead up to being stuck in FRSM_INIT State in the FlexRay State
manager state machine. In summary, the model compiler reports a set of variable
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assignments that lead to being in FRSM_INIT state and deadlocking there given the
reported set of variable assignments.
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$ sal-deadlock-checker FrSM_Comp MOD_FrSM --verbose=3
detecting deadlock states...
computing set of reachable states...
iteration: 1
frontier lower bound: 90 nodes, upper bound: 90 nodes
using frontier with 90 nodes
total bdd node count: 876
iteration: 2
frontier lower bound: 87 nodes, upper bound: 93 nodes
using frontier with 87 nodes
total bdd node count: 978
number of visited states: 19.0
time to compute set of reachable states: 0.0 secs
deadlock state detection time: 0.0 secs
Total number of deadlock states: 18.0
Deadlock states:
State 1
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = false
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
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FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = NoCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 2
FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T06
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_INIT
----------------------------total execution time: 0.281 secs

6.1.2.3 SAL Model Checker
In this run, the experiments will aim to verify that any violation to the specification
boundary conditions are detected and any incompliance to specification in the state
machine is detected as well. Initially, we introduced a defect in the design where
startupCounter is incremented infinitely in the FRSM_READY state machine.
According to the specification (Requirement FrSm033 as shown in 5.1.1.2), the value
should not exceed 255. We launched the model checker against the SAL model and
the automatically generated SAL LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) theorem below to
validate the requirement.
THEOREM system |- G(FrSM.startupCounter <= 255 AND FrSM.startupCounter >= 0 );

The above theorem map textually to,
Globally, it is always true that startupCounter
is less or equal to 255 and greater than or equal to 0.

We also embedded an invalid statement in FRSM_READY state that increments the
startup counter. The model checker captured the violation and indicated all the
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variable assignments/state paths that lead up to the violation. A snapshot of the
violation is shown below:
$ sal-smc FrSM_Comp Safe_FrSM_033
Counterexample:
========================
Path
========================
Step 0:
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = false
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
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FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = NoCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 0
FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T00
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_INIT
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(416), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(409),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(396),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 1:
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = true
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = true
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 0
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FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T01
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(416), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(409),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(334),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 2:
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = true
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = true
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 1
FrSM.t1 = true
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = true

140

FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = DualChannelWakeup
EVT = EVT_T01
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY
-----------------------Transition Information:(module instance at [Context:
FrSM_Comp, line(416), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(409),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(334),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 3:
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = true
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = true
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 2
FrSM.t1 = true
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = true
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
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FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = DualChannelWakeup
EVT = EVT_T01
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY
-----------------------.
.
Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(416), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(409),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(334),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 257:
--- System Variables (assignments) --FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = true
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = true
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 256
FrSM.t1 = true
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = true
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = DualChannelWakeup
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EVT = EVT_T01
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY

Once the defect was removed from xtUML and Model compiler was launched to
regenerate the fixed SAL model, the model checker reported that the theorem is
proven as shown below:
$ sal-smc FrSM_Comp Safe_FrSM_033 --verbose=1
importing context "FrSM_Comp"...
parsing SAL file "FrSM_Comp.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "FrSM_Comp"...
type checking context "FrSM_Comp"...
number of system variables: 86, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
using forward search
proved.
total execution time: 0.328 secs

The second experiment was to validate that conditions that should take place for the
state machine to be in FRSM_READY state are correct in the design. The
requirement is captured on the xtUML model in the state as per the specification as
shown in Figure 40 FrSM Requirement 073 in xtUML.
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Figure 40 FrSM Requirement 073 in xtUML
The model compiler generated an LTL theorem in the SAL model that maps to the
captured state level requirement expressed in xtUML as shown below:
THEOREM system |- G(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom AND ((FrSM.WUReason =
ALL_WU_BY_BUS) OR (FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = FALSE)) AND
(FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = FALSE) => G(FrSM_State =
ST_FRSM_READY));

The model compiler generated an LTL theorem in the SAL model that maps to the
captured state level requirement expressed in xtUML as shown below:
Globally, it is always true that when communication mode = ‘FullCom’ AND ( WUReason=
‘ALL_WU_BY_BUS’ OR is Wakeup ECU flag is false ) AND Delay startup with wakeup
flag is false then globally, FlexRay State should be FRSM_READY.
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The BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) based model checker initially proved the above
theorem as shown below:
$ sal-smc FrSM_Comp Safe_FrSM_073 --verbose=1
importing context "FrSM_Comp"...
parsing SAL file "FrSM_Comp.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "FrSM_Comp"...
type checking context "FrSM_Comp"...
number of system variables: 88, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
proved.
total execution time: 0.437 secs

We introduced a defect in the xtUML model where the initialization state sets the
same conditions and transitions to FRSM_WAKEUP state in violation to the
specification, which mandates that the FlexRay Manager state machine should be in
READY State given these conditions/assignments. We ran the model checker that
reported successfully the counter example/violation shown below which clearly
shows a violation against the above theorem as the conditions lead up to being in both
the Wakeup followed by the startup states:
$ sal-smc FrSM_Comp Safe_FrSM_073
Counterexample:
========================
Path
========================
Step 0:
--- System Variables (assignments) ---
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ba-pc!1 = 2
FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = false
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = NoCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 0
FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T00
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_INIT
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(408), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(403),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(388),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 1:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 2
FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
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FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = false
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 0
FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
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FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T03
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP
Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(408), column(8)]
(module instance at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(403),
column(17)]
transition at [Context: FrSM_Comp, line(234),
column(10)]))
-----------------------Step 2:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
FrSM.AllChannelIsAwake = false
FrSM.FrSMCheckWakeupReason = false
FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = false
FrSM.FrSMIsColdstartEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = false
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = false
FrSM.FrSMNumWakeupPatterns = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitions = 0
FrSM.FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup = 0
FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS
FrSM.busTrafficDetected = false
FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom
FrSM.startupCounter = 0
FrSM.t1 = false
FrSM.t1_IsActive = false
FrSM.t2 = false
FrSM.t3 = false
FrSM.t3_IsNotActive = false
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FrSM.t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive = false
FrSM.t_Trcv_StdbyDelay = 0
FrSM.wakeupCounter = 0
FrSM.wakeupTransmitted = false
FrSM.wakeupType = NoWakeup
EVT = EVT_T03
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP
total execution time: 0.405 secs

6.2

Automatic Transmission Controller
The Automatic Transmission controller is responsible for automatically

changing gears in the vehicle. It is inevitable that engaging the right gear at right
speed is a defined and reliable behavior as any failure could lead to damage in the
transmission, which could introduce undefined behavior of the car while speeding.
Several automotive recalls were done historically due to faulty automatic
transmission. It has been reported that Honda recalled 2.5 million 2005-2010 4
cylinder Accord to update the software that controls the automatic transmission as a
sudden shift could lead to damaged shaft bearing. The update was intended to handle
sudden gear change transitions to reduce possibility of damage. General Motors also
recalled their 2013 Cadillac due to a software defect in the ATC module that
introduce a 3-4 second lag in acceleration.

Automatic Transmission Controller specification [104] served as a baseline for
implementation of the design in BridgePoint xtUML. The xtUML project consisted of
a root package called ATC. The root package contained a component named ATC.
The component consisted of another package, Shift Gear that contained two classes,
gearController and gearPosition. The classes contain attributes and state machine
design as documented in the ATC specification. Figure 41 shows a summary of the
xtUML design elements of ATC
specification into the xtUML design.

module. 6.2.1 details the mapping of the
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Figure 41 ATC xtUML Design
6.2.1

xtUML Design

The input to the shift logic block as stated in the specification [104] is a vehicle speed
and the output is the desired gear number. There are two state machines to keep track
of the gear state and the state of the gear selection process.

In gear process selection state machine, while in steady_state, the model compares up
threshold and down threshold values to the present vehicle speed to determine if a
shift is required. If so, it enters one of the confirm states (upshifting or downshifting),
which records the time of entry.

If the vehicle speed no longer satisfies the shift condition, while in the confirm state,
the model ignores the shift and it transitions back to steady_state. This prevents
extraneous shifts due to noise conditions. If the shift condition remains valid for a
duration, the model transitions through the lower junction and, depending on the
current gear, it broadcasts one of the shift events. Subsequently, the model again
activates steady_state after a transition through one of the central junctions. The shift
event, which is broadcast to the gear_selection state, activates a transition to the
appropriate new gear [104].
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The ATC module specification was mapped into xtUML design. Variables
documented in the ATC specification were mapped into class attributes of
gearController and GearPosition classes’ definition in xtUML. xtUML has been
extended to record the default value and max value for each variable so that it can be
used to generate boundary conditions theorems in SAL notation.
ATC state machine, transitions and states were also implemented in xtUML in
accordance to ATC specification. Figure 42 and Figure 43 show the xtUML
implementation of the ATC state machines. Each state checks for the conditions
(vehicle speed against current gear position) and triggers actions (switch to proper
gear) as documented in the specification.

Figure 42 Gear Controller State Machine in xtUML

Figure 43 Gear Position State Machine in xtUML
Every ATC state machine state hosts action language that checks conditions and takes
actions in accordance to the specification [104]. Figure 44 shows the OAL (Object
Action Language) in the Steady State that checks vehicle speed against the threshold
to take an action to either transition to down shifting, up shifting or stay at steady
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state. In xtUML, the state change is triggered via events that trigger the specified
transition.

Figure 44 Steady State Action in xtUML
Once the ATC design is complete in xtUML, a build is triggered in C/C++
perspective to launch the model compiler and generate ATC SAL model counterpart.
Figure 45 shows generated output after a successful build. Figure 46 shows the
console output during SAL generation/build of the SAL ATC model.

Figure 45 ATC SAL Model Generation
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Figure 46 ATC Generation Console Output
At this point in the flow, xtUML model of the design under test has been
automatically compiled into a formal SAL model and theorems. ATC SAL model
output is documented in APPENDIX B.
6.2.2

Model Checking Results

This section details the results of running the model checkers on the generated ATC
SAL model. The intention is to show sample design defects that can be uncovered via
the model checkers in the early design stage. ATC model shall be checked via a SAL
compiler to validate syntax, SAL deadlock checker to validate that the ATC state
machine has no deadlock state, and finally a BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) based
checker to verify generated theorems (Boundary check and requirement compliance).

6.2.2.1

SAL Model Compilation

The SAL compiler is triggered on the generated ATC SAL model to verify that the
generated SAL syntax is correct and that the ATC formal model is complete. This
step will fail if there are non-bounded variables, non-initialized variables or syntax
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defects as shown in previous section. The output below shows the result of successful
compilation on the generated ATC file.
$ sal-wfc ATC.sal --verbose=1
importing context "ATC"...
parsing SAL file "ATC.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "ATC"...
type checking context "ATC"...
Ok.
total execution time: 0.0 secs

6.2.2.2

SAL Deadlock Checker

The SAL deadlock checker is triggered on the generated SAL model to verify that the
ATC state machine has no deadlock states. The deadlock checker shall be executed
before the BDD model checker as the theorems cannot be verified if a BDD tree can
only be built with a deadlock state. Our first run of the deadlock checker against the
ATC SAL model revealed a set of variable assignments that lead up to a deadlock
state in our state machine. The Deadlock checker output below shows the set of
assignments that lead up to being stuck in ST_UPSHIFTING in the gear controller
state machine given a specific assignments as shown below.
$ sal-deadlock-checker ATC.sal system --verbose==1
Total number of deadlock states: 1.0
Deadlock states:
State 1
--- System Variables (assignments) --CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 240
EVT = EVT_UP
PState = ST_POSITION4
Position.downThreshold = 71
Position.upThreshold = 100
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------------
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6.2.2.3 SAL Model Checker
In this run, the experiments will aim to verify that any violation to the specification
boundary conditions are detected and any incompliance against ATC specification in
the ATC state machine is detected as well. Initially, we introduced a defect in the
design where it is possible to be in Position1 in the gear position state machine while
vehicle speed is 22 while setting up an xtUML requirement that gear position can only
be in Position 1 if vehicle speed is between 0 and 21. We launched the model checker
against the SAL model and the automatically generated SAL LTL (Linear Temporal
Logic) theorem below to validate the requirement.
Req1_Th1: THEOREM system |- AG(PState = ST_POSITION1 =>
AF(CONT.vehicleSpeed > 0 AND CONT.vehicleSpeed <= 21));

The above theorem map textually to,
Globally, it is always true that Gear Position is in Position 1
For all paths when vehicle speed is greater than 0 and less or equal to 21

We introduced a bug whereby it is possible to be in Position1 while vehicle speed is
22 in xtUML ATC model. The model checker captured the violation and indicated all
the variable assignments/state paths that lead up to the violation. A snapshot of the
violation is shown below:
$ sal-smc ATC Req1_Th1 --verbose=1
importing context "ATC"...
parsing SAL file "ATC.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "ATC"...
type checking context "ATC"...
number of system variables: 44, number of auxiliary variables:
8
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
proving or producing counterexample using BDDs...
Counterexample:
========================
Path
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========================
Step 0:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 20
EVT = EVT_CHECKINPUT
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
else transition at [Context: ATC, line(138), column(9)]))
-----------------------Step 1:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_CHECKINPUT
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(116), column(7)]))
------------------------
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Step 2:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(119), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 3:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(122), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 4:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
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CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(125), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 5:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(129), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 6:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
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CONT.timerStarted = false
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_UP
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(122), column(7)]))
Step 7:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 21
EVT = EVT_UP
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
else transition at [Context: ATC, line(138), column(9)]))
-----------------------Step 8:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 1
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 22
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EVT = EVT_CHECKINPUT
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_UPSHIFTING
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(132), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 9:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 0
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 22
EVT = EVT_CHECKINPUT
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(116), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 10:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 0
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 22
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
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Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
========================
Begin of Cycle
========================
Step 10:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 0
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 22
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
-----------------------Transition Information:
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(222), column(20)]
(module instance at [Context: ATC, line(207), column(19)]
transition at [Context: ATC, line(116), column(7)]))
-----------------------Step 11:
--- System Variables (assignments) --ba-pc!1 = 0
CONT.gearTimeTHreshold = 10
CONT.gearTimer = 20
CONT.timerStarted = true
CONT.vehicleSpeed = 22
EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE
PState = ST_POSITION1
Position.downThreshold = 0
Position.upThreshold = 20
State = ST_STEADY
total execution time: 1.482 secs

161

Once the defect was removed from xtUML and Model compiler was launched to
regenerate the fixed SAL model, the model checker reported that the theorem is
proven as shown below:
$ sal-smc ATC Req1_Th1 --verbose=1
importing context "ATC"...
parsing SAL file "ATC.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "ATC"...
type checking context "ATC"...
number of system variables: 44, number of auxiliary variables:
8
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
proving or producing counterexample using BDDs...
proved.
total execution time: 0.124 secs

6.3

WatchDog State Manager Results

AUTOSAR WatchDog Manager SWS served as a baseline for implementation of the
design in BridgePoint xtUML. It is a critical module in the AUTOSAR BSW Services
stack that provide services for monitoring the timing and the correctness of execution
of an entity in the application or basic software of AUTOSAR stack. It avoids crash of
the system via detecting anomalies during supervision and taking configurable actions
when the anomalies happen. Therefore, verifying this module is crucial in automotive
and shows that all managers in the services layer could be verified at the design stage
in a similar manner.
The xtUML project consisted of a root package called WdgM. The root package
containes a WdgM component. The root component has a Manager package which
hosts all data types as documented in the specification and a class named WdgM. The
class contains attributes, functions and state machine designs as documented in the
Watchdog manager specification. Figure 47 shows a summary of the xtUML design
elements of Watchdog manager module. Section 6.3.1 details the mapping of the
specification into the xtUML design.
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Figure 47 WatchDog Manager xtUML Design
6.3.1

xtUML Design

WatchDog Manager AUTOSAR specification [102] describes the module in the
following order:
1- Defines all states in the Watchdog Local state machine (DEACTIVATED,
OK, FAILED, EXPIRED) as shown in Figure 14.
2- Defines all transition preconditions and actions in the state machine. An
example is shown in Figure 15 where specification mandates that a
transition from OK to Expired shall be triggered if at least one supervised
entity alive flag is incorrect and a fault tolerance of zero is configured OR
at least one deadline /logical supervision value of supervised entity is
incorrect.
3- DataTypes are specified. An example is shown in Figure 48 where
SupervisedEntityIdType is a uint16 or uint8 in the specification.
4- Function definitions and actions to be taken inside functions. An example
is shown in Figure 49 where specification indicates that a function
WdgM_Init needs to be defined that returns void and accepts a
configuration parameter of type pointer to WdgM_ConfigType. The intent
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of this function is to initialize the manager and set the configuration
parameters.

Figure 48 WdgM_SupervisedEntityId Type Definition

Figure 49 WdgM_Init Function
The module specification was mapped into xtUML design. All defined types were
mapped into user defined types in xtUML. An example is WdgMMode user defined
type

enum

that

should

SUPERVISION_OK,

be

defined

with

the

SUPERVISION_FAILED,

following

enum

values:

SUPERVISION_EXPIRED,

SUPERVISION_STOPPED, SUPERVISION_DEACTIVATED. Figure 50 shows the
mapping of this user defined type in xtUML.
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Figure 50 WdgMMode User Defined Type
Additionally, variables documented in the specification were mapped into class
attributes of the WdgM class definition in xtUML as shown in Figure 51. xtUML has
been extended to record the default value and max value for each variable so that it
can be used to generate boundary conditions theorems in SAL notation.

Figure 51 WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter Variable Definition
Watchdog Manager States, state machine and transitions were also implemented in
xtUML in accordance to Watchdog local state machine specification document.
Figure 52 shows the xtUML implementation of the state machine.
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Figure 52 Watchdog Local xtUML State Machine
The xtUML state machine as shown in Figure 34 implements the states INIT, OK,
DEACTIVATED, FAILED, and EXPIRED as documented in the AUTOSAR
Watchdog manager specification. All specification transitions are implemented in
xtUML to match the specification. Each state/transition actions in the specification are
also mapped to xtUML action language to manipulate the variables in accordance to
the specification as shown in Figure 53.

State hosts action language that checks conditions and takes actions in accordance to
the specification. Figure 53 shows the OAL (Object Action Language) in the WdgM
Local Status Ok state that checks variables and triggers transitions in accordance to
requirements WdgM 201(Stay in State OK given variable set values), WdgM
202(transition to State Expired given variable set values) and WdgM 203(transition to
State Failed given variable set values) and required actions once the conditions are
satisfied. In xtUML, the state change is triggered via events that trigger the specified
transition.
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Figure 53 xtUML Implementation of WdgM201, WdgM203 and WdgM202
Functions are mapped to operations in the WdgM class. Each operation manipulates
the state variables and takes the actions specified in the specification. Figure 54 shows
an example of WdgM_SetMode implementation in xtUML as documented in the
specification where SetMode is accepted when in deactivated state and it is requested
to be in OK state and rejected if it is in FAILED state and a request is made to
deactivate it.
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Figure 54 WdgM setMode function in xtUML
Once the design is complete in xtUML, a build is triggered in C/C++ perspective to
launch the model compiler and generate SAL model counterpart. Figure 55 Shows
generated output after a successful build. Figure 55 shows the console output during
SAL generation/build.

At this point in the flow, xtUML model of the design under test has been
automatically compiled into a formal SAL model and theorems. Sample SAL output
is documented in APPENDIX B.

Figure 55 Generated WdgM SAL Model
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Figure 56 WdgM SAL Generation
6.3.2

Model Checking Results

This section details the results of running the model checkers on the generated SAL
model. The intention is to show sample design errors that can be uncovered via the
model checkers in the early design stage. Watchdog SAL model shall be checked via
a SAL compiler to validate syntax, SAL deadlock checker to validate that the state
machine has no deadlock state, and finally a BDD (Binary Decision Diagram ) based
checker to verify theorems (Boundary check and requirement compliance).

6.3.2.1 SAL Model Compilation
The SAL compiler is triggered on the generated SAL model to verify that the
generated SAL syntax is correct and that the formal model is complete. This step will
fail if there are non-bounded variables, non-initialized variables or syntax defects. We
have left an uninitialized variable in the xtUML model to check that the SAL model
compiler will report any un-initialized variable. In the Watchdog manager xtUML
model, we left the WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol class member as uninitialized as shown in Figure 57
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Figure 57 Un-initialized Data Member
The output below shows the result of the compilation which basically can be
summarized as mismatch between the defined WdgM type and the initiation instance
of REC_WdgM as WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol in the structure is not
initialized which triggered the SAL compiler to generate the error below.
$ sal-wfc WdgM.sal --verbose=2
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "WdgM"...
Error: [Context: WdgM, line(80), column(2)]: Incompatible
types in assignment.
The following types are incompatible:
WdgM!REC_WdgM
[# WdgMExpectedAliveIndications: nat,
WdgMInitialMode: nat,
WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter: nat,
WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus: nat,
WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus: nat,
WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus: nat #]

Once the issue was corrected in xtUML, the SAL compiler compiled the file
successfully and gave the below generated output.
$ sal-wfc WdgM.sal --verbose=2
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
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ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "WdgM"...
type-checker time: 0.0 secs
Ok.
total execution time: 0.0 secs

6.3.2.2 SAL Deadlock Checker
The SAL deadlock checker is triggered on the generated SAL model to verify that the
state machine has no deadlock state. The deadlock checker shall be executed before
the SAL model checker as the theorems cannot be verified if a tree can only be built
with a deadlock state. Our first run of the deadlock checker against the Watchdog
local State SAL model revealed a set of variable assignments that lead up to a
deadlock state in our state machine. The Deadlock checker output below shows the set
of assignments that lead up to being stuck in WdgM_EXPIRED State in the WdgM
local State machine. In summary, the model compiler reports a set of variable
assignments that lead to being in WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED state and
deadlocking there given the reported set of variable assignments.
$ sal-deadlock-checker WdgM MOD_WdgM --verbose=3
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "WdgM"...
type-checker time: 0.0 secs
flattening module at [Context: scratch, line(1), column(1)]
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
creating BDD variables...
computing static variable ordering (minimizing support)...
collecting state variables dependencies...
static order time: 0.015 secs
number of BDD variables: 182
creating definition section BDDs...
creating valid state predicate BDDs...
creating BDD: set of initial states...
creating BDD: transition relation...
rearranging clusters...
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reordering BDD variables...
transition relation - size: 805 (nodes), number of clusters:
1
flat-module -> BDD conversion time: 0.187 secs
detecting deadlock states...
computing set of reachable states...
iteration: 1
frontier lower bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 92 nodes
using frontier
total bdd node
iteration: 2
frontier lower
using frontier
total bdd node
iteration: 3
frontier lower
using frontier
total bdd node
iteration: 4
frontier lower
using frontier
total bdd node
iteration: 5
frontier lower
using frontier
total bdd node
iteration: 6
frontier lower

with 92 nodes
count: 1270
bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 95 nodes
with 92 nodes
count: 1465
bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 99 nodes
with 92 nodes
count: 1620
bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 99 nodes
with 92 nodes
count: 1776
bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 99 nodes
with 92 nodes
count: 1984
bound: 92 nodes, upper bound: 104 nodes

using frontier with 92 nodes
total bdd node count: 2194
number of visited states: 6.0
time to compute set of reachable states: 0.0 secs
deadlock state detection time: 0.0 secs
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Total number of deadlock states: 1.0
Deadlock states:
State 1
--- System Variables (assignments) --WdgM.WdgMExpectedAliveIndications = 1
WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol = 0
WdgM.WdgMInitialMode = 0
WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter = 0
WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus = 0
EVT = EVT_WDGM202
WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED
----------------------------total execution time: 0.187 secs

6.3.2.3 SAL Model Checker
In this run, experiments will aim to verify that any violation to the specification
boundary conditions are detected and any incompliance to specification in the state
machine is detected as well. We will aim to reproduce a design defect that matches
the defect identified post production in deployed ASIL B compliant WdgM. We
introduced a defect in the design where WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol is
assigned a value outside the specified range as per the specification. According to the
specification (Requirement WdgM327 as shown in Figure 25, WdgM327), the value
should not exceed 255. We launched the model checker against the SAL model and
the automatically generated SAL LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) theorem below to
validate the requirement.
Safe_WdgM_WDGM327: THEOREM system |G(WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol <= 255 AND
WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol >= 0);

The above theorem map textually to,
Globally, it is always true that WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol
is less or equal to 255 and greater than or equal to 0.
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We updated the logic to initialize the variable to a value outside the specified range.
The model checker captured the violation and indicated all the variable
assignments/state paths that lead up to the violation. A snapshot of the violation is
shown below:
$ sal-smc WdgM Safe_WdgM_WDGM327 --verbose=1
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
type checking context "WdgM"...
flattening modules in the assertion located at [Context:
scratch, line(1), column(1)]
simplifying abstract syntax tree...
expanding function applications...
eliminating common subexpressions in an assertion...
eliminating common subexpressions in a flat module...
converting flat module to boolean flat module...
converting property to boolean property...
number of system variables: 92, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
using forward search
Counterexample:
========================
Path
========================
Step 0:
--- System Variables (assignments) --WdgM.WdgMExpectedAliveIndications = 1
WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol = 256
WdgM.WdgMInitialMode = 0
WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter = 0
WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus = 0
EVT = EVT_Startup
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WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_InitState
total execution time: 0.203 secs

Once the defect was removed from xtUML and Model compiler was launched to
regenerate the fixed SAL model, the model checker reported that the theorem is
proven as shown below:
$ sal-smc WdgM Safe_WdgM_WDGM327 --verbose=1
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
type checking context "WdgM"...
flattening modules in the assertion located at [Context:
scratch, line(1), column(1)]
simplifying abstract syntax tree...
expanding function applications...
eliminating common subexpressions in an assertion...
eliminating common subexpressions in a flat module...
converting flat module to boolean flat module...
converting property to boolean property...
number of system variables: 91, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
using forward search
proved.
total execution time: 0.218 secs

The second experiment set was to validate compliance to the state machine as
documented in the Watchdog Manager local state machine. Our experiments aimed to
verify that the design is compliant to requirements 202, 203, 204, 300, 205, 206, 207,
291, 208 and 209 as discussed in section 5.2.5. Our generated SAL theorems aim to
identify any matching conditions that lead to an incorrect state in the state machine
thus in violation to the local Watchdog Manager AUTOSAR specification. Figure 58
shows an example of WDG requirement 201 as captured in xtUML as satisfiability
conditions for the state to be active on the state level. Given the set of conditions, the
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state machine needs to be at LOCAL_STATUS_OK state as per the Watchdog
manager Specification document.

Figure 58 WdgM Requirement 202 in xtUML
The model compiler generated an LTL theorem in the SAL model that maps to the
captured state level requirement expressed in xtUML as shown below:
Safe_WdgM_WDGM201: THEOREM system |- G(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus = 0
AND

WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0 AND

WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus=0 AND WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter=1
=>

G(WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_OK));

The LTL theorem map textually to the below description:
Globally, it is always true that when Alive supervision status = No error AND Deadline
supervision status = No Error AND Logical Supervision Status = No Error and supervision
cycle counter = 1 then globally, Watchdog local State should be
WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_OK.

The BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) based model checker initially proved the above
theorem as shown below:
$ sal-smc WdgM Safe_WdgM_WDGM205 --verbose=2
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "WdgM"...
type-checker time: 0.0 secs
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flattening modules in the assertion located at [Context:
scratch, line(1), column(1)]
calculating implicit assignments of base module at [Context:
WdgM, line(70), column(0)]...
assertion flattening time: 0.0 secs
simplifying abstract syntax tree...
simplification time: 0.0 secs
LTL -> VWAA (very weak alternating automata)...
VWAA -> GBA (generalized buchi automata)...
simplifying GBA...
GBA -> BA (buchi automata)...
simplifying BA...
number of states in the BA: 3
eliminating common subexpressions...
monitor generation time: 0.0 secs
converting flat module to boolean flat module...
flat module -> boolean flat module conversion time: 0.015
secs
converting property to boolean property...
property -> boolean property conversion time: 0.0 secs
number of system variables: 93, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
creating BDD variables...
computing static variable ordering (minimizing support)...
static order time: 0.016 secs
number of BDD variables: 196
creating definition section BDDs...
creating valid state predicate BDDs...
creating BDD: set of initial states...
creating BDD: transition relation...
rearranging clusters...
reordering BDD variables...
compressing BDD clusters...
rearranging clusters...
flat-module -> BDD conversion time: 0.375 secs
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
using forward search
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iteration: 2
iteration: 2
iteration: 3
iteration: 4
verification time: 0.0 secs
proved.
total execution time: 0.39 secs

We introduced a defect in the xtUML model where an additional setup initialization
state was introduced which sets the same conditions in violation to the specification,
moreover, the state machine no longer transition to STATUS_OK state correctly in
violation to requirement WdgM201 which explains that the set of variables value map
to the state machine being in LOCAL_STATE_OK. We ran the model checker that
reported successfully the counter example/violation shown below which clearly
shows a violation against the above theorem as the conditions lead up to being in
Init_State instead of STATUS_OK state:
$ sal-smc WdgM Safe_WdgM_WDGM205_2 --verbose=2
importing context "WdgM"...
parsing SAL file "WdgM.sal"...
creating abstract syntax tree for context "WdgM"...
ast generation time: 0.0 secs
type checking context "WdgM"...
type-checker time: 0.0 secs
flattening modules in the assertion located at [Context:
scratch, line(1), column(1)]
calculating implicit assignments of base module at [Context:
WdgM, line(70), column(0)]...
assertion flattening time: 0.0 secs
simplifying abstract syntax tree...
simplification time: 0.0 secs
converting flat module to boolean flat module...
flat module -> boolean flat module conversion time: 0.016
secs
converting property to boolean property...
property -> boolean property conversion time: 0.015 secs
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number of system variables: 91, number of auxiliary variables:
5
converting flat module to BDD representation (initial states,
and transition relation)...
creating BDD variables...
computing static variable ordering (minimizing support)...
static order time: 0.0 secs
number of BDD variables: 192
creating definition section BDDs...
creating valid state predicate BDDs...
creating BDD: set of initial states...
creating BDD: transition relation...
rearranging clusters...
reordering BDD variables...
compressing BDD clusters...
rearranging clusters...
flat-module -> BDD conversion time: 0.203 secs
proving invariant or producing counterexample using BDDs...
using forward search
Counterexample:
========================
Path
========================
Step 0:
--- System Variables (assignments) --WdgM.WdgMExpectedAliveIndications = 1
WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol = 1
WdgM.WdgMInitialMode = 0
WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter = 0
WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0
WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus = 0
EVT = EVT_Startup
WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_InitState
total execution time: 0.234 secs

Similarly, we have generated LTL theorems for requirements 202, 203, 204, 300, 205,
206, 207, 291, 208 and 209 as shown below based on xtUML satisfiability conditions.
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Safe_WdgM_WDGM202: THEOREM system |- G((
NOT(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus = 0) AND
NOT(WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol = 0)) OR ( NOT
(WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0) OR
NOT(WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus = 0)) => G(WdgM_State =
ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED));
Safe_WdgM_WDGM203:

THEOREM

system

(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus

|-

G(

=

NOT

0)

NOT(WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol

AND

=

0)

AND

WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0 AND WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus
= 0) => G(WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_FAILED);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM204:

THEOREM

system

(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus

|-

=

G(

NOT

0)

AND

WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol

<

WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter AND WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus = 0
AND

WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus

=

0)

=>

G(WdgM_State

=

|-

G(

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_FAILED);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM300:

THEOREM

WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus

system
=

0

AND

WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter

>

1

AND

WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus

=

0

AND

WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus
ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_FAILED);

=

0)

=>

G(WdgM_State

=
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Safe_WdgM_WDGM205:

THEOREM

system

G(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus=0

AND

|-

WdgM

.

WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus=0 AND WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus=0
AND WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter=1 =>
G(WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_OK));
Safe_WdgM_WDGM206:

THEOREM

system

(WdgM.WdgmAliveSupervisionStatus

|-

G(

=

(NOT

0)

AND

WdgM.WdgMFailedAliveSupervisionRefCycleTol

<

WdgM.WdgMSupervisionCycleCounter)

OR

(NOT(WdgM.WdgmDeadlineSupervisionStatus
NOT(WdgM.WdgmLogicalSupervisionStatus

=
=

0)))

0)
=>

OR

G(WdgM_State

=

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM207: THEOREM system |- G(
WdgM_State

=

Function= SET_MODE AND

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_OK

)

=>

G(State

=

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_DEACTIVATED AND Response=E_OK);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM291_1: THEOREM system |- G( Function= SET_MODE AND

WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_FAILED ) =>
G(State

=

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_DEACTIVATED AND Response=E_OK);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM291_2: THEOREM system |- G( Function= SET_MODE AND

WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED ) =>
G(State
ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_EXPIRED AND Response=E_NOT_OK);

Safe_WdgM_WDGM209: THEOREM system |- G( Function= SET_MODE AND

WdgM_State = ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_DEACTIVATED ) =>

=
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G(State

=

ST_WDGM_LOCAL_STATUS_OK AND Response=E_OK);

We have successfully proved all the above theorems. We have also induced defects in
the design and attempted to verify the theorems and were successfully able to get via
the model checker the counter example that shows the violation in xtUML.
6.4

Mentor Graphics’ WatchDog Manager Results

In order to evaluate our approach, we needed to conduct a comparative analysis
between our proposal and an existing module that was developed in compliance to
ISO 26262 via a BSW supplier. In this section, we present an analysis of defects and
challenges faced while complying with ISO 26262 guidelines in a BSW watchdog
Manager Module development.
Development team faced several challenges in their endeavor to comply several
AUTOSAR BSW implementations with ISO 26262 ASIL B level1. Initially, the team
focused on ASIL B compliancy since they were unable to conduct highly
recommended guidelines in ASILs C and D, namely, semi-formal and formal
verification of the design. Our aim is to present the challenges faced during trying to
comply Watchdog Manager Implementation with ASIL B and try to overcome these
challenges to pave the way for module suppliers to comply with verification design
guidelines as recommended in ASILs C and D.

The first challenge faced was the ability to apply required verification methods. ISO
26262 formal and semi-formal verification guidelines were not feasible when working
with embedded C software. Static analysis, and control/data flow analysis were
considered as acceptable alternatives. Arguments for not performing semi-formal or
formal verifications were made. The alternative approaches apply on the source code
itself and are mainly manually driven. Control flow/data flow analysis were done by

1

Feedback based on Mentor Graphics safety team ASIL B compliance challenges for

AUTOSAR WatchDog Manager module
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manually analyzing the control statements inside source code and creating control
flow/data flow graphs for control statements and variables. This was feasible as the
modules that were required to be ASIL B compliant were small which rendered this
manual effort feasible. It is expected that this is not going to be possible with larger
modules. From a safety team perspective aiming to reach ASIL C compliancy for
developed modules, it is inevitable that the software be verified in early phases using
semi-formal and formal verification as recommended by ISO 26262 design
verification guidelines.

The second challenge faced was establishing traceability between requirements,
design, and code and test elements in an automated fashion. Manual trace and label of
the requirements were employed. Supporting traceability in an automated fashion
between requirements, design, code and test elements would decrease the number of
review/update iterations of sequence diagrams, control and data flow diagrams and
traceability to software requirements.

The third challenge was related to the test case derivation. Table 5 shows the
recommended methods for deriving test cases for software unit testing according to
ISO 26262-6 Table 11. Automation methods that help in identifying decision
points/variables to automatically generate test cases would definitely save time and
ensure compliance to ISO 26262 guidelines.

In conclusion, all safety team verification and test case derivation methods were based
on manual inspection, as recommended for ASIL B compliant modules. This will not
be feasible for ASIL C compliant modules as semi-formal verification is highly
recommended for levels greater than B.

Seventy-one defects were raised during ASIL B compliancy endeavor of the
WatchDog Manager module. Additionally, some of the reported defects were
uncovered after production and during customer module integration endeavors
although they were introduced in the design stage. The table below summarizes the
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raised defects number and classification. A defect leakage/slippage of 100% is visible
in the current approach from design to testing stage.
Table 10 Watchdog Manager Defects Classification
Defect Count
16
35
20

Classification
Logic Bugs
Non-compliance to Specification
Traceability

Defects under logic bugs category include but are not limited to, bugs such as array
bound issues, incorrect array index, invalid mathematical operator, and last array
index not being initialized properly. Defects under non-compliance to specification
includes defects such as WDGM triggers watchdog Interface to be in
WDGIF_OFF_MODE

while in WDGM_G_STATUS_STOPPED state (non-

compliance to WDGM122) and WdgMExpectedAliveIndications, which is a defined
parameter in the specification holding the amount of expected alive indications, range
does not match AUTOSAR watchdog manager specification. The remaining defects
were related to traceability (Missing text cases, missing relations between requirement
and design/code/test elements).
6.5

Evaluation of the approach

Our aim in this research was to be able to verify design in an automated and reliable
fashion to empower ASIL compliance to design verification guidelines as discussed in
Table 2. Our framework enables formal verification of a semi-formal xtUML design.
The design does not just capture architecture but also behavior via the action language
inside states, transitions and functions. The framework addresses the complexities that
discouraged the industry form moving to formal notation. The designer does not need
to write formal notations or complex mathematical theorems, as this is done
automatically via a model compiler that maps xtUML design and constraints into a
formal model and set of specification compliance theorems[105,106,107,108].

The framework allows early detection of specification incompliances, and boundary
analysis defects that was shown to be a major contributor to defects in software
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systems. ISO 26262 design verification guidelines highly recommends using semiformal verification for critical software in automotive as shown in Table 2 and highly
recommends using analysis of requirements, equivalence classes, and boundary
values to derive test cases to verify the design as discussed in Table 5. We have
shown how our framework can be used to capture requirements in xtUML model that
maps to specification requirements, equivalence classes and boundary values theorem
to uphold while formally verifying the design.
We have extended the xtUML model to capture satisfiability conditions as follows:


Variable satisfiability conditions (Upper and Lower limit): Generate theorems
to cover boundary value analysis and equivalence classes



State satisfiability conditions: capture conditions to ensure requirement
compliance of variables in a given state in the state machine



Transition satisfiability conditions: capture conditions to ensure requirement
compliance of variables in a given transition in the state machine

We showed how our framework was able to detect all introduced defects, whether
they are logic, or specification compliance defects in the design level via running SAL
model checkers against our LTL generated theorems to detect model violation against
the satisfiability conditions that is captured in our model. All requirement noncompliance defects that were previously detected on the testing/production level were
detected via our framework on the design level. Our approach allows non-compliance
to be detected on the design as opposed to the coding level in an automated way. The
reported counterexamples are using the same UML notations and states allowing the
UML designer to understand the faulty sequence and resolve the issue in UML
domain. Counterexamples are additionally reported against the specification
requirement Id ensuring traceability and ease of resolution via the application
designer.

We have verified the framework on three industrial software modules, namely,
FlexRay State Manager AUTOSAR module, Watchdog Manager AUTOSAR module,
and Automatic transmission controller. We have shown how our framework detects
software incompliances and boundary violations to variables as well as logic bugs (
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out of bound counter increment) on the use-case modules. We have introduced defects
in Watchdog Manager Module that has been found after release of a software to
customers. Our framework was able to detect all defects on the design as opposed to
post production level.

In comparison to the industrial module developed without applying our framework,
the defects slippage/leakage percentage from design to testing has decreased from
100% to 28% ( 51 out of the 71 defects were identified in the design stage as opposed
to

the

testing

stage).
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Chapter 7.

Conclusion, contributions and Future work

Our intent in this research was to address software verification in the early stage of
the software lifecycle, namely, the design stage. The research was motivated by the
steep growth of critical software functions in embedded systems, the fact that 50% of
defects are introduced by the design stage, cost of finding a defect during testing is
much higher than finding it during design, late defects are mostly due to specification
incompliance defects, and the birth of AUTOSAR Automotive standard and ISO26262.

We have reported that current V&V techniques utilized still heavily depend on testing
and little effort focuses on pushing the verification to the design stage. Our research
aimed to address the motivations while addressing the current shortcoming that have
discouraged the industry from using formal methods in the design stage of automotive
software development. Formal methods have not been widely adopted due to
complexity of notations, lack of support and lack of support tools. Automotive
suppliers are also looking for non-disruptive techniques that integrate with their used
models and design environments so that they do not have to re-invent the wheel for
their software development lifecycle.

With the above said, our aim was to propose a framework that addresses the above
motivations and challenges and fulfills the main objective of being able to identify
defects in the design stage via extensive thorough methods as opposed to a method
that is based on some selection criteria. We proposed a framework where any UML
finite state machine based model could be transformed to a formal transition model
augmented with complex data types in SAL notation. The mapping is based on a 1-1
UML to SAL mapping. We showed how we were able to formally verify several
semi-formal models via augmenting the UML model with satisfiability conditions.
We have constructed theorems that represent specification requirements in UML. A
model compiler was developed to map the UML model into SAL formal model and
LTL based theorems automatically shielding the application designer from having to
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create a formal model. A SAL solver was utilized so that formal verification can be
accomplished on the SAL model. We demonstrated how the solver through the
asserted counterexamples detected specification non-compliances. We have shown
how our framework can detect requirement non-compliances as well as support tests
of boundary conditions in an automated fashion. The application model engineer
could fix the model violations at a very early stage based on the formal verification of
the semi-formal model using the proposed approach.

We have tested the framework on three industrial modules, namely, AUTOSAR
FlexRay manager, Automatic Transmission Controller, and Watchdog Manager. We
mapped the specification requirements into UML design elements and satisfiability
conditions. We showed how the model (with behavior) was transformed from
specification to UML design to a SAL formal model. We have also shown how the
requirements were mapped into UML satisfiability conditions, which were mapped
into formal assertions (theorems). We executed several formal checkers on the formal
model with assertions to show that specification incompliances (state, transition, and
boundary conditions), static properties, logic defects and deadlock detection can
happen early in the design stage. We verified 51 requirements and introduced several
defects in the design model to show how the framework is able to detect the
incompliance. The validity of the mapping / SAL generation was established through
the correct assertions that show violations of satisfiability conditions in the UML
design. All introduced defects were properly detected and reported via the model
checker. In comparison to the industrial module developed without applying our
framework, the defects slippage/leakage percentage from design to testing has
decreased from 100% to 28% (51 out of the 71 defects were identified in the design
stage as opposed to the testing stage)

The proposed approach makes emerging ISO 26262 standard ASIL C and D test case
derivation and software unit design and implementation verification guidelines,
namely, semi-formal and formal verification guidelines possible in an automated
fashion. Our work also addresses one of AUTOSAR’s major drives, which is early
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design defects detection. Problems such as the complexity of the formal notations,
theorem construction and checkers execution and analysis have been shielded via the
use-case yet the benefits of using formal verification on a semi-formal notation are
retained.

Our research focused on UML state machine diagram. The work can be extended to
cover other behavioral UML diagrams (sequence or use-cases). We have also not
tested the framework against complex state machines to ensure reasonable execution
time via the formal model checkers. We currently support one level requirement in
UML model that is mapped into SAL model theorem. The framework can be
extended to support multi-level requirement that can be generated into several
theorems. We also need to qualify the model compiler in accordance with ISO 26262
tool qualification guidelines to ensure the safety of the tool and the generated SAL
intermediate language in preparation for industrial utilization of the tool

The research could be extended in the future to automatically generate software
implementation based on the verified design. Once the design is verified, the same
framework could be extended to generate AUTOSAR compliant C code. This will
ensure that defects uncovered and fixed in the design are not later re-introduced in the
implementation stage. We also propose work to integrate our flow to AUTOSAR
XML metamodel language that defines a system. The aim will be to interact with
existing AUTOSAR xml tools to automatically map the AUTOSAR model
architecture into starting UML structure. This proposes a system level flow where the
automotive OEM can start with a system level model in AUTOSAR XML, which
automatically can be compiled into UML modules with requirements. This output
would then become the starting point to our flow and will ensure that formally
verified design can be used to generate implementation.
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APPENDIX A
SAL Language
Types
The SAL language supports the built-in basic types for booleans, natural numbers,
integers, and reals. New basic types may be introduced using uninterpreted type
declarations. Types may be used in type constructions to create subtype, sub range,
array, function, tuple, and record types. Function, tuple, and record types may be
dependent. In addition to uninterpreted type declarations, that introduce a name
without a defining form, type declarations may be used to introduce names for
existing types, as well as scalars and data types. The grammar for types is given by

Figure 59 Types in SAL Grammar
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Expressions
Expressions in the SAL language have to be type-correct with respect to the types in
the type language. The expressions consist of constants, variables, applications with
Boolean, arithmetic, and bit-vector operations, and array, function, tuple, and record
selection and updates. Conditional (if-then-else) expressions are also part of the
expression language as shown in Figure 60 and Figure 61.

Figure 60 SAL Expressions
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Figure 61 SAL Expressions – Detailed

Transition Language
A transition system module consists of a state type, an invariant definition on this
state type, an initialization condition on this state type, and a binary transition relation
of a specific form on the state type. The state type is defined by four pairwise disjoint
sets of input, output, global, and local variables. The input and global variables are the
observed variables of a module and the output, global, and local variables are the
controlled variables of the module. The transition rules are constraints on the current
and next states of the transition. The current variables are written as X whereas the
next state variables are written as X’

Definitions are the basic constructs used to build up the invariants, initializations, and
transitions of a module. Definitions are used to specify the trajectory of variables in a
computation by providing constraints on the controlled variables in a transition
system. For variables ranging over aggregate data structures like records or arrays, it
is possible to define each component separately. For example,
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x’ = x + 1 simply increments the state variable x, where x’ is the newstate of the
variable,
y’[i] = 3 sets the new state of the array y to be 3 at index i, and to remain unchanged
on all other indices,
z.foo.1[0] = y constrains state variable z, which is a record whose foo component is a
tuple, whose first component in turn is an array of the same type as y.

The left-hand side of a definition is given by the nonterminal Lhs. For an
RhsExpression, the Lhs is simply assigned the corresponding value.

Figure 62 Rhs/Lhs Definitions

Module Language
A module is a self-contained specification of a transition system in SAL. Modules can
be independently analyzed for properties and composed synchronously or
asynchronously. Here is a fairly simple module declaration. Figure 63 shows an
example of a SAL module
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Figure 63 SAL Module
m is a BaseModule, that is intended to monitor the temperature and indicate a
problem if the temperature stays high for too long. It declares the input variable temp,
local variables high and ctr, and output variable danger. Initially danger is FALSE and
ctr is 0, and when this module is activated it sets danger to TRUE if temp exceeds 100
more than 3 times in a row. Once base modules are declared, they may be composed
synchronously or asynchronously to yield new modules. Figure 64 and Figure 65
show the grammar of module expressions.

A BaseModule identifies the pairwise distinct sets of input, output, global, and local
variables. This characterizes the state of the module. Base modules also may consist
of several sections. The grammar allows variables and sections to be given in any
order, and there may, for example, be 3 distinct TRANSITION sections. In every
case, it is the same as if there was a prescribed order, with each class of variable and
section being the union of the individual declarations.

Definitions appearing in the DEFINITION section(s) are treated as invariants for the
system. When composed with other modules, the definitions remain true even during
the transitions of the other modules. For this reason, proof obligations may be
generated for a composition where definition sections are involved. This section is
usually used to define controlled variables whose values ultimately depend on the
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inputs, for example, a Boolean variable that becomes true when the temperature goes
above a specified value.
The INITIALIZATION section(s) constrain the possible initial values for the local,
global, and output declarations. Input variables may not be initialized. The
INITIALIZATION section(s) determine a state predicate that holds of the initial state
of the base module.

The TRANSITION section(s) constrain the possible next states for the local, global,
and output declarations. As this is generally defined relative to the previous state of
the module, the transition section(s) determine a state relation. Input variables may
not appear on the Lhs of any assignments.

Modules can be combined by either synchronous or asynchronous composition. Let
module Mi consists of input variables Ii , output variables Oi , global variables Gi ,
and local variables Li . The module M1||M2 and M1[]M2 respectively represent the
synchronous and asynchronous composition of M1 and M2.

It is good pragmatics to name a module. This name can be used to index the local
variables so that they need not be renamed during composition. Also, the properties of
the module can be indexed on the name for quick look-up. Parametric modules allow
the use of logical (state-independent) and type parameterization in the definition of
modules.
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Figure 64 Module Grammar
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Figure 65 Module Grammar 2
SAL Contexts
The SAL context language provides the framework for declaring types, constants,
modules, and module properties. Figure 66 show the syntax for contexts containing
declarations for constants, types, modules, assertions, and other (imported) contexts.
SAL contexts are read from left to right, top to bottom, and an entity must be declared
before it is referenced.

Figure 66 SAL Context

APPENDIX B
SAL Generated Model Snippets
SAL Context
FrSM_Comp: CONTEXT =
BEGIN
END
Bounded Variables
%% Max Limits
FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup_idx: INTEGER = 255;
FrSMNumWakeupPatterns_idx: INTEGER = 255;
FrSMStartupRepetitions_idx: INTEGER = 255;
FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup_idx: INTEGER = 255;
FrSMIsDualChannelNode_idx: INTEGER = 2;
FrSMIsColdstartEcu_idx: INTEGER = 2;
FrSMCheckWakeupReason_idx: INTEGER = 2;
FrSMIsWakeupEcu_idx: INTEGER = 2;
wakeupCounter_idx: INTEGER = 255;
t_Trcv_StdbyDelay_idx: INTEGER = 65536;
t3_idx: INTEGER = 2;
t2_idx: INTEGER = 2;
t1_idx: INTEGER = 2;
t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive_idx: INTEGER = 2;
t3_IsNotActive_idx: INTEGER = 2;
t1_IsActive_idx: INTEGER = 2;
AllChannelIsAwake_idx: INTEGER = 2;
WUReason_idx: INTEGER = 3;
busTrafficDetected_idx: INTEGER = 2;
wakeupTransmitted_idx: INTEGER = 3;
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startupCounter_idx: INTEGER = 255;
reqComMode_idx: INTEGER = 3;
Bounded Types
t_Trcv_StdbyDelay_type: TYPE = [0..t_Trcv_StdbyDelay_idx];
t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive_type: TYPE =
[0..t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive_idx];
AllChannelIsAwake_type: TYPE = [0..AllChannelIsAwake_idx];
FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup_type: TYPE =
[0..FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup_idx];
FrSMNumWakeupPatterns_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMNumWakeupPatterns_idx];
FrSMStartupRepetitions_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMStartupRepetitions_idx];
FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup_type: TYPE =
[0..FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup_idx];
FrSMIsDualChannelNode_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMIsDualChannelNode_idx];
FrSMIsColdstartEcu_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMIsColdstartEcu_idx];
FrSMCheckWakeupReason_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMCheckWakeupReason_idx];
FrSMIsWakeupEcu_type: TYPE = [0..FrSMIsWakeupEcu_idx];
wakeupCounter_type: TYPE = [0..wakeupCounter_idx];
startupCounter_type: TYPE = [0..startupCounter_idx];
Defined States
%% States:
ST_FrSM : TYPE = {
ST_FRSM_ONLINE,
ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE,
ST_FRSM_WAKEUP,
ST_FRSM_STARTUP,
ST_FRSM_HALT_REQ,
ST_FRSM_READY,
ST_FRSM_INIT
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};
Defined Types
%% Types:

wakeup_Type : TYPE = {
SingleChannelWakeup,
DualChannelWakeup,
DualChannelWakeupForward,
DualChannelEchoWakeup,
NoWakeup
};

WUReason_type : TYPE = {
NO_WU_BY_BUS,
PARTIAL_WU_BY_BUS,
ALL_WU_BY_BUS
};

ComM_ModType : TYPE = {
NoCom,
SilentCom,
FullCom
};

REC_FrSM_Config : TYPE = [#
wakeupType : wakeup_Type,
FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup : BOOLEAN,
FrSMNumWakeupPatterns : FrSMNumWakeupPatterns_type,
FrSMStartupRepetitions : FrSMStartupRepetitions_type,
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FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup

:

FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup_type,
FrSMDurationT1 :FrSMDurationT1_type,
FrSMDurationT2 :FrSMDurationT2_type,
FrSMDurationT3 :FrSMDurationT3_type
#];

REC_FrSM : TYPE = [#
FrSm_Config : REC_FrSM_Config,
t_Trcv_StdbyDelay : t_Trcv_StdbyDelay_type,
t3 : BOOLEAN,
t2 : BOOLEAN,
t1 : BOOLEAN,
t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive : BOOLEAN,
t3_IsNotActive : BOOLEAN,
t1_IsActive : BOOLEAN,
AllChannelIsAwake : BOOLEAN,
WUReason : WUReason_type,
FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup : BOOLEAN,
FrSMNumWakeupPatterns : FrSMNumWakeupPatterns_type,
FrSMStartupRepetitions : FrSMStartupRepetitions_type,
FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup
FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup_type,
FrSMIsDualChannelNode : BOOLEAN,
FrSMIsColdstartEcu : BOOLEAN,
FrSMCheckWakeupReason : BOOLEAN,
FrSMIsWakeupEcu : BOOLEAN,
wakeupCounter : wakeupCounter_type,
busTrafficDetected : BOOLEAN,

:
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wakeupTransmitted : BOOLEAN,
wakeupType : wakeup_Type,
startupCounter : startupCounter_type,
reqComMode : ComM_ModType
#];
Events
%% Events
EVT_FrSM_Comp: TYPE = {
EVT_T09,
EVT_T31,
EVT_T03,
EVT_T05,
EVT_T14,
EVT_T33,
EVT_T17,
EVT_T10,
EVT_T08,
EVT_T32,
EVT_T06,
EVT_T04,
EVT_T02,
EVT_T12,
EVT_T13,
EVT_T01,
EVT_T11,
EVT_T00
};
Module Definitions
MOD_FrSM : MODULE =
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BEGIN
%% Global Section
GLOBAL FrSM: REC_FrSM
GLOBAL EVT: EVT_FrSM_Comp
GLOBAL FrSM_State: ST_FrSM

INITIALIZATION

FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_INIT;
FrSM = (# t_Trcv_StdbyDelay := 0, t3 := FALSE, t2 := FALSE, t1 := FALSE,
t_TrcvStdby_Delay_IsActive := FALSE, t3_IsNotActive := FALSE, t1_IsActive :=
FALSE,

AllChannelIsAwake := FALSE,

WUReason := NO_WU_BY_BUS,

FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup := FALSE,
FrSMStartupRepetitions
FrSMIsDualChannelNode

:=

0,
:=

FrSMNumWakeupPatterns := 0,

FrSMStartupRepetitionsWithWakeup
FALSE,

FrSMIsColdstartEcu

:=

:=

0,

FALSE,

FrSMCheckWakeupReason := FALSE, FrSMIsWakeupEcu := FALSE, wakeupCounter
:= 0, busTrafficDetected := FALSE, wakeupTransmitted := FALSE, wakeupType :=
NoWakeup , startupCounter := 2, reqComMode := NoCom #);

TRANSITION
[
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_ONLINE
%% event = EVT_T09

( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_ONLINE ) AND (EVT = EVT_T09) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_HALT_REQ;
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%% event = EVT_T10
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_ONLINE ) AND (EVT = EVT_T10) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE
%% event = EVT_T14
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE ) AND (EVT =
EVT_T14) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_HALT_REQ;
%% event = EVT_T33
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE ) AND (EVT =
EVT_T33) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE;
%% event = EVT_T17
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_ONLINE_PASSIVE ) AND (EVT =
EVT_T17) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP
%% event = EVT_T31
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T31) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
%% event = EVT_T03
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T03) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
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%% event = EVT_T13
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T13) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_READY;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_STARTUP
%% event = EVT_T05
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T05) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
%% event = EVT_T08
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T08) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_ONLINE;
%% event = EVT_T32
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T32) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% event = EVT_T06
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T06) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% event = EVT_T04
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T04) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% event = EVT_T12
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_STARTUP ) AND (EVT = EVT_T12) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_READY;
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%% stateName = ST_FRSM_HALT_REQ
%% event = EVT_T11
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_HALT_REQ ) AND (EVT = EVT_T11) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_READY;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_READY
%% event = EVT_T02
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY ) AND (EVT = EVT_T02) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_STARTUP;
%% event = EVT_T01
[]
( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY ) AND (EVT = EVT_T01) AND
(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom) AND (FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS) AND
(FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = TRUE) AND (FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = FALSE) ->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
FrSM'.startupCounter = 1;
FrSM'.wakeupType = SingleChannelWakeup;
FrSM'.wakeupTransmitted = FALSE;
FrSM'.t1 = TRUE;
FrSM'.t3 = TRUE;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_INIT
%% event = EVT_T00

[]
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( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY ) AND (EVT = EVT_T01) AND
(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom) AND (FrSM.WUReason = NO_WU_BY_BUS) AND
(FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = TRUE) AND (FrSM.FrSMIsDualChannelNode = TRUE) ->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
FrSM'.startupCounter = 1;
FrSM'.wakeupType = DualChannelWakeup;
FrSM'.wakeupTransmitted = FALSE;
FrSM'.t1 = TRUE;
FrSM'.t3 = TRUE;
[]

(

FrSM_State

=

ST_FRSM_READY

)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_T01)

AND

(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom) AND (FrSM.WUReason = PARTIAL_WU_BY_BUS)
AND (FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = TRUE) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
FrSM'.startupCounter = 1;
FrSM'.wakeupType = DualChannelWakeupForward;
FrSM'.wakeupTransmitted = FALSE;
FrSM'.t3 = TRUE;
%% stateName = ST_FRSM_INIT
%% event = EVT_T00

[]
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( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY ) AND (EVT = EVT_T01) AND
(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom) AND (FrSM.WUReason = ALL_WU_BY_BUS OR
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = FALSE) AND (FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup =
FALSE) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
FrSM'.startupCounter = 1;
FrSM'.wakeupType = NoWakeup;
FrSM'.t2 = TRUE;
FrSM'.t3 = TRUE;

%% stateName = ST_FRSM_INIT
%% event = EVT_T00

[]

(

FrSM_State

=

ST_FRSM_READY

)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_T01)

AND

(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom) AND (FrSM.WUReason = ALL_WU_BY_BUS OR
FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu = FALSE) AND (FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup =
TRUE) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_WAKEUP;
FrSM'.startupCounter = 1;
FrSM'.wakeupType = NoWakeup;
FrSM'.t1 = TRUE;
FrSM'.t2 = TRUE;
FrSM'.t3 = TRUE;

%% stateName = ST_FRSM_INIT
%% event = EVT_T00
[]
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( FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_INIT ) AND (EVT = EVT_T00) -->
FrSM_State' = ST_FRSM_READY;
]
END;
Sample Theorems
Safe: THEOREM SYS_TwoTraffics |- G(NOT(ARR_ST_TrafficLight[1] =
ST_TrafficLight_Green

AND

ARR_ST_TrafficLight[2]

=

ST_TrafficLight_Green));

Safe_FrSM_6: THEOREM system |- G(FrSM.reqComMode = FullCom AND
((FrSM.WUReason = ALL_WU_BY_BUS) OR (FrSM.FrSMIsWakeupEcu =
FALSE)) AND (FrSM.FrSMDelayStartupWithoutWakeup = FALSE)
FrSM_State = ST_FRSM_READY);

Safe_FrSM_7:
THEOREM system |- G(FrSM.startupCounter <= 255 AND
FrSM.startupCounter >= 0 );

SAL ATC Model
ATC: CONTEXT =
BEGIN
% ------------------------% Max Limits
vehicleSpeed_idx: INTEGER = 240;
upThreshold_idx: INTEGER = 240;
downThreshold_idx: INTEGER = 240;
gearTimeTHreshold_idx: INTEGER = 20;
timerStarted_idx: INTEGER =1;
gearTimer_idx: INTEGER = 20;

AND
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turn_idx: INTEGER = 2;

% Bounded Ranges
vehicleSpeed_type: TYPE = [0..vehicleSpeed_idx];
upThreshold_type: TYPE = [0..upThreshold_idx];
downThreshold_type: TYPE = [0..downThreshold_idx];
gearTimeTHreshold_type: TYPE = [0..gearTimeTHreshold_idx];
gearTimer_type: TYPE = [0..gearTimer_idx];
turn_type: TYPE = [0..turn_idx];

%% States:

ST_GEARPOSITION: TYPE = {
ST_POSITION1,
ST_POSITION2,
ST_POSITION3,
ST_POSITION4
};

ST_GEARCONTROLLER: TYPE = {
ST_STEADY,
ST_UPSHIFTING,
ST_DOWNSHIFTING
};

%% Events:

EVT_ATC: TYPE = {
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EVT_CHECKINPUT,
EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE,
EVT_SPEEDMOREDOWNTHROTTLE,
EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARDOWN,
EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE,
EVT_SPEEDLESSUPTHROTTLE,
EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP,
EVT_UP,
EVT_DOWN
};

% -------------------------

%% Class Records:

REC_GEARCONTROLLER: TYPE = [#
vehicleSpeed: vehicleSpeed_type,
gearTimeTHreshold: gearTimeTHreshold_type,
timerStarted:BOOLEAN,
gearTimer: gearTimer_type

#];

REC_GEARPOSITION: TYPE = [#
upThreshold: upThreshold_type,
downThreshold: downThreshold_type
#];
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% -------------------------

%% System Records:

Global_EVT: TYPE = [#
ATC_System_EVT: EVT_ATC
#];

% ------------------------MOD_GearController : MODULE =
BEGIN

GLOBAL CONT: REC_GEARCONTROLLER
INPUT Position: REC_GEARPOSITION
GLOBAL EVT: EVT_ATC
GLOBAL State: ST_GEARCONTROLLER

INITIALIZATION
CONT = (# vehicleSpeed := 20, gearTimeTHreshold := 10,
timerStarted := FALSE, gearTimer := 20

#);

EVT = EVT_CHECKINPUT;
State = ST_STEADY;

TRANSITION
[
(State= ST_STEADY) AND (CONT.vehicleSpeed <
Position.downThreshold) -->
EVT'= EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE;
[]
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(State

=

ST_STEADY)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE) -->
State' = ST_DOWNSHIFTING;
[]
(State = ST_DOWNSHIFTING AND CONT.timerStarted
= FALSE) -->
CONT'.timerStarted = TRUE;
[]
(State = ST_DOWNSHIFTING AND CONT.timerStarted
= TRUE AND EVT = EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE) -->
EVT'

=

IF

CONT.timerStarted

=

TRUE

THEN

EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP ELSE EVT_SPEEDLESSDOWNTHROTTLE ENDIF;

CONT'.timerStarted = FALSE;
[]
(State

=

ST_DOWNSHIFTING)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARDOWN) -->
EVT'
Position.downThreshold)

=

IF

THEN

(CONT.vehicleSpeed
EVT_DOWN

<=
ELSE

EVT_SPEEDMOREDOWNTHROTTLE ENDIF;
[]
(State

=

ST_DOWNSHIFTING)

AND

(EVT

=

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_CHECKINPUT) -->
State' = ST_STEADY;
[]
(State

=

ST_DOWNSHIFTING)

EVT_SPEEDMOREDOWNTHROTTLE) -->
State' = ST_STEADY;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;
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[]
(State= ST_STEADY) AND (CONT.vehicleSpeed >
Position.upThreshold) -->
EVT' = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE;
[]
(State

=

ST_STEADY)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE) -->
State' = ST_UPSHIFTING;
[]
(State = ST_UPSHIFTING AND CONT.timerStarted =
FALSE ) -->
CONT'.timerStarted = TRUE;
[]
(State = ST_UPSHIFTING AND CONT.timerStarted =
TRUE AND EVT = EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE) -->
EVT'

=

IF

CONT.timerStarted

=

TRUE

THEN

EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP ELSE EVT_SPEEDMOREUPTHROTTLE ENDIF;

CONT'.timerStarted = FALSE;
[]
(State

=

ST_UPSHIFTING)

AND

(EVT=

EVT_TIMEELASPEGEARUP)-->
EVT' =

IF CONT.vehicleSpeed > Position.upThreshold

THEN EVT_UP ELSE EVT_SPEEDLESSUPTHROTTLE ENDIF;
[]
(State

=

ST_UPSHIFTING)

EVT_CHECKINPUT) -->
State' = ST_STEADY;
[]

AND

(EVT

=
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(State

=

ST_UPSHIFTING)

AND

(EVT

=

EVT_SPEEDLESSUPTHROTTLE) -->
State' = ST_STEADY;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;
[]

ELSE

-->

EVT'

=

EVT_CHECKINPUT;

CONT'.vehicleSpeed = CONT.vehicleSpeed +1;
]
END;

MOD_GearPosition: MODULE =
BEGIN

GLOBAL Position: REC_GEARPOSITION
GLOBAL PState: ST_GEARPOSITION
GLOBAL EVT: EVT_ATC

INITIALIZATION
PState = ST_POSITION1;
Position = (# upThreshold := 21, downThreshold := 0
#)

;

TRANSITION [
(PState = ST_POSITION1) AND (EVT = EVT_UP) -->
PState' = ST_POSITION2;
Position'.upThreshold = 50;
Position'.downThreshold = 21;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;
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[]
(PState = ST_POSITION2) AND (EVT = EVT_UP) -->
PState' = ST_POSITION3;
Position'.upThreshold = 70;
Position'.downThreshold = 50;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;

[]
(PState = ST_POSITION3) AND (EVT = EVT_UP) -->
PState' = ST_POSITION4;
Position'.upThreshold = 100;
Position'.downThreshold = 71;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;

[]
(PState = ST_POSITION4) AND (EVT = EVT_DOWN) ->
PState' = ST_POSITION3;
Position'.upThreshold = 70;
Position'.downThreshold = 51;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;

[]
(PState = ST_POSITION3) AND (EVT = EVT_DOWN) ->
PState' = ST_POSITION2;
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Position'.upThreshold = 50;
Position'.downThreshold = 21;
EVT' = EVT_CHECKINPUT;

[]
(PState = ST_POSITION2) AND (EVT = EVT_DOWN) ->
PState' = ST_POSITION1;
Position'.upThreshold = 21;
Position'.downThreshold = 1;
EVT'= EVT_CHECKINPUT;

]

END;

%% System Module:

system: MODULE = MOD_GearController [] MOD_GearPosition;

%% Boundary Conditions
Safe_Boundary_Th1: THEOREM system |- G(Position.upThreshold <
235);
Safe_Boundary_Th2: THEOREM system |- G(Position.downThreshold <
235);
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Safe_Boundary_Th3: THEOREM system |- G(Position.upThreshold <
255);

%% Requirement Mapping
%% AG : p is globally true AF - For all paths ps is true
Req1_Th1: THEOREM system |- AG(PState = ST_POSITION1 =>
AF(CONT.vehicleSpeed > 0 AND CONT.vehicleSpeed <= 21));
Req1_Th2: THEOREM system |- AG(NOT (PState = ST_POSITION2)
OR (CONT.vehicleSpeed > 21 AND CONT.vehicleSpeed <= 50));
Req1_Th3: THEOREM system |- G((PState = ST_POSITION2) <=>
F(CONT.vehicleSpeed > 21 AND CONT.vehicleSpeed < 50));

%%Logic Bugs
%% Cannot be in downthreshold unless vehcile speed is less than down
threshold
%% G p is always true while F that p will eventuually be true
Logic_Th1: THEOREM system |- G( State = ST_DOWNSHIFTING =>
F(CONT.vehicleSpeed < Position.downThreshold));

%% Timer check
%% Has to be off in steady state
Timer_Th1: THEOREM system |- G( State = ST_STEADY =>
F(CONT.timerStarted = FALSE));
Timer_Th2: THEOREM system |- G( State = ST_DOWNSHIFTING =>
F(CONT.timerStarted = TRUE AND CONT.gearTimeTHreshold<20));
%% Cannot exceed timer thresold in downshifting or upshifting state

END
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APPENDIX C
SAL Model Compiler
State Machine Marking
.//
.include "${te_file.arc_path}/t.sm_sm.c"
.select one sm_sm related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]->SM_SM[R517]
.select many instance_sm_states related by sm_sm->SM_STATE[R501]
.for each sm_state in instance_sm_states
.select one te_state related by sm_state->TE_STATE[R2037]
.select any sm_crtxn related by sm_state->SM_TXN[R506]->SM_CRTXN[R507]
where ( selected.SMspd_ID == sm_state.SMspd_ID )
.select

one

sm_act

related

by

sm_state->SM_MOAH[R511]->SM_AH[R513]-

>SM_ACT[R514]
.select one te_act related by sm_act->TE_ACT[R2022]
.if ( not_empty te_act )
.select one te_aba related by te_act->TE_ABA[R2010]
.// CDS relaxed same data needed
.select any sm_txn related by sm_state->SM_TXN[R506]
.invoke red = TE_EVT_ReceivedEventDataDeclaration( sm_txn, sm_act )
.assign received_event_declaration = red.body
.include "${te_file.arc_path}/t.class.sm_act.c"
.end if
.end for
.select any sm_crtxn from instances of SM_CRTXN where ( false )
.select any te_state from instances of TE_STATE where ( false )
.//
.select many instance_sm_txns related by sm_sm->SM_TXN[R505]
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.for each sm_txn in instance_sm_txns
.select

one

sm_act

related

by

sm_txn->SM_TAH[R530]->SM_AH[R513]-

>SM_ACT[R514]
.select one te_act related by sm_act->TE_ACT[R2022]
.if ( not_empty te_act )
.select one te_aba related by te_act->TE_ABA[R2010]
.invoke red = TE_EVT_ReceivedEventDataDeclaration( sm_txn, sm_act )
.assign received_event_declaration = red.body
.include "${te_file.arc_path}/t.class.sm_act.c"
.end if
.end for
.//
.select one sm_sm related by o_obj->SM_ASM[R519]->SM_SM[R517]
.select many class_sm_states related by sm_sm->SM_STATE[R501]
.for each sm_state in class_sm_states
.select one te_state related by sm_state->TE_STATE[R2037]
.select

one

sm_act

related

by

sm_state->SM_MOAH[R511]->SM_AH[R513]-

>SM_ACT[R514]
.select one te_act related by sm_act->TE_ACT[R2022]
.if ( not_empty te_act )
.select one te_aba related by te_act->TE_ABA[R2010]
.// CDS relaxed same data needed
.select any sm_txn related by sm_state->SM_TXN[R506]
.invoke red = TE_EVT_ReceivedEventDataDeclaration( sm_txn, sm_act )
.assign received_event_declaration = red.body
.include "${te_file.arc_path}/t.class.sm_act.c"
.end if
.end for
.select any te_state from instances of TE_STATE where ( false )
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.//
.select many class_sm_txns related by sm_sm->SM_TXN[R505]
.for each sm_txn in class_sm_txns
.select

one

sm_act

related

by

sm_txn->SM_TAH[R530]->SM_AH[R513]-

>SM_ACT[R514]
.select one te_act related by sm_act->TE_ACT[R2022]
.if ( not_empty te_act )
.select one te_aba related by te_act->TE_ABA[R2010]
.invoke red = TE_EVT_ReceivedEventDataDeclaration( sm_txn, sm_act )
.assign received_event_declaration = red.body
.include "${te_file.arc_path}/t.class.sm_act.c"
.end if
.end for
.//
.if ( ( ( empty instance_sm_states ) and ( empty class_sm_states ) ) and ( ( empty
instance_sm_txns ) and ( empty class_sm_txns ) ) )
/*
* This class is modeled as having a state chart, but it has no states.
* This makes good sense in a supertype class receiving polymorphic events.
* If this is not the intention, add states to the model or unmark the
* instance or class state chart setting.
*/
static void empty_state_chart_action( void );
static void empty_state_chart_action( void ) {}
.end if
.//
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Classes Marking
.select

many

te_classes

related

by

te_c->TE_CLASS[R2064]

where

(

not

selected.ExcludeFromGen )
.// Prepare the Instance subsystem for translation.
.select any i_ins from instances of I_INS
.if ( not_empty i_ins )
.select many o_objs related by te_classes->O_OBJ[R2019]
.invoke PEIInstanceSubsystemInit( o_objs )
.end if
.for each te_class in te_classes
.// Generate declaration implementation file.
.invoke implementation = CreateObjectImplementation( te_class, te_c, true )
${implementation.body}
.emit

to

file

"${te_file.domain_include_path}/${te_class.class_file}.${te_file.hdr_file_ext}"
.//
.// Generate definition implementation.
.invoke implementation = CreateObjectImplementation( te_class, te_c, false )
${implementation.body}
.emit

to

file

"${te_file.domain_source_path}/${te_class.class_file}.${te_file.src_file_ext}"
.end for
.//
DataTypes Marking
.//==============================================================
==============
.function GetBaseTypeForUDT .// s_dt
.param inst_ref s_udt
.select one s_dt related by s_udt->S_DT[R18]
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.select one s_udt related by s_dt->S_UDT[R17]
.if ( not_empty s_udt )
.invoke r = GetBaseTypeForUDT( s_udt )
.assign s_dt = r.result
.end if
.assign attr_result = s_dt
.end function
.//
.//==============================================================
==============
.// Get the S_DT and S_CDT object references for a given attribute
.// (O_ATTR) instance.
.//==============================================================
==============
.function GetAttributeCodeGenType .// te_dt
.param inst_ref o_attr
.//
.select one s_dt related by o_attr->S_DT[R114]
.select one s_udt related by s_dt->S_UDT[R17]
.if ( not_empty s_udt )
.invoke r = GetBaseTypeForUDT( s_udt )
.assign s_dt = r.result
.end if
.select one te_dt related by s_dt->TE_DT[R2021]
.select one s_cdt related by s_dt->S_CDT[R17]
.//
.if ( empty s_cdt )
.select one s_edt related by s_dt->S_EDT[R17]
.if ( empty s_edt )

234

.select one s_sdt related by s_dt->S_SDT[R17]
.if ( empty s_sdt )
.select one s_irdt related by s_dt->S_IRDT[R17]
.if ( empty s_irdt )
.print "Error in attribute ${o_attr.Name}"
.print "with data type ${s_dt.Name}"
.exit 100
.end if
.end if
.else
.// Enum, use integer type.
.// CDS Some day we should pass along the enumeration type.
.select any s_cdt from instances of S_CDT where ( selected.Core_Typ == 2 )
.end if
.end if
.//
.if ( not_empty s_cdt )
.if ( 7 == s_cdt.Core_Typ )
.// s_cdt.Core_Typ is "same_as<Base_Attribute>"
.select one base_o_attr related by o_attr->O_RATTR[R106]->O_BATTR[R113]>O_ATTR[R106]
.if ( empty base_o_attr )
.select one o_obj related by o_attr->O_OBJ[R102]
.print "\nCould not find O_BATTR for object ${o_obj.Name} (${o_obj.Key_Lett})
attribute ${o_attr.Name} !"
.print "\nDid you combine a referential and then rename the combined attribute?"
.exit 101
.end if
.// Note: the following is a recursive call to this function
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.invoke r = GetAttributeCodeGenType( base_o_attr )
.assign te_dt = r.result
.end if
.end if
.assign attr_result = te_dt
.end function
.//
.//==============================================================
==============
.// Map a user defined data types precision into its corresponding instance
.// of Data Type (S_DT).
.// Note: Might prefer POSIX type support here, but doubt we can count
.// on most embedded targets thinking this way. Thus brute force the types.
.//==============================================================
==============
.function MapUserSpecifiedDataTypePrecision .// boolean
.param inst_ref te_dt
.param string mapping
.assign error = false
.assign type = mapping
.if ( (type == "uchar_t") or ((type == "u_char") or (type == "unsignedchar")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "unsigned char"

.elif ( (type == "char_t") or (type == "char") )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "char"

.elif ( type == "signedchar" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "signed char"

.elif ( (type == "ushort_t") or ((type == "u_short") or (type == "unsignedshort")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "unsigned short"

.elif ( (type == "short_t") or (type == "short") )
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.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "short"

.elif ( type == "signedshort" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "signed short"

.elif ( (type == "uint_t") or ((type == "u_int") or (type == "unsignedint")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "unsigned int"

.elif ( type == "s1_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "s1_t"

.elif ( type == "u1_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "u1_t"

.elif ( type == "s2_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "s2_t"

.elif ( type == "u2_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "u2_t"

.elif ( type == "s4_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "s4_t"

.elif ( type == "u4_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "u4_t"

.elif ( type == "i_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "i_t"

.elif ( (type == "int_t") or (type == "int") )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "int"

.elif ( type == "signedint" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "signed int"

.elif ( (type == "ulong_t") or ((type == "u_long") or (type == "unsignedlong")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "unsigned long"

.elif ( (type == "long_t") or (type == "long") )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "long"

.elif ( type == "signedlong" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "signed long"
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.elif ( (type == "u_longlong_t") or ((type == "u_longlong_t") or (type ==
"unsignedlonglong")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "unsigned long long"

.elif ( (type == "longlong_t") or ((type == "longlong") or (type == "signedlonglong")) )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "long long"

.//
.elif ( type == "float" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "float"

.elif ( type == "r4_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "r4_t"

.elif ( type == "double" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "double"

.elif ( type == "r8_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "r8_t"

.//
.elif ( type == "size_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "size_t"

.elif ( type == "ssize_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "ssize_t"

.elif ( type == "time_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "time_t"

.elif ( type == "clock_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName

= "clock_t"

.elif ( type == "volatile_clock_t" )
.assign te_dt.ExtName
.//
.else
.assign error = true
.end if

= "volatile unsigned long"
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.assign attr_result = error
.end function
.//
.// Return the structure type for persistent links.
.function UserSuppliedDataTypeIncludes .// string
.select any te_file from instances of TE_FILE
.assign sys_types_file_name = ( te_file.types + "." ) + te_file.hdr_file_ext
.select many special_te_dts from instances of TE_DT where ( ( selected.Include_File !=
"" ) and ( selected.Include_File != sys_types_file_name ) )
.assign s = ""
.for each special_te_dt in special_te_dts
.assign s = ( s + "#include """ ) + ( special_te_dt.Include_File + """\n" )
.invoke oal( "s = Escher_strcpy( s, Escher_stradd( Escher_stradd( s, #include
Escher_stradd( special_te_dt->Include_File, \n ) ) ); // Ccode" )
.end for
.assign attr_result = s
.end function
.//
Action Language Marking
.//
.function TE_ABA_rollup
.invoke oal( "char b[1000000]; // Ccode" )
.assign parseSuccessful = ( 1 ) .COMMENT ParseStatus::parseSuccessful
.select any empty_act_blk from instances of ACT_BLK where ( false )
.select many te_cs from instances of TE_C where ( selected.included_in_build )
.for each te_c in te_cs
.select many te_abas related by te_c->TE_ABA[R2088]
.for each te_aba in te_abas
.select one te_blk related by te_aba->TE_BLK[R2011]

),
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.if ( not_empty te_blk )
.invoke oal( "te_aba->code = &b[0]; *te_aba->code = 0; // Ccode" )
.invoke blck_xlate( te_c.StmtTrace, te_blk, te_aba )
.invoke oal( "te_aba->code = Escher_strcpy( te_aba->code, &b[0] ); // Ccode" )
.else
.assign te_aba.code = ( "\n /" + "* WARNING! Skipping unsuccessful or unparsed
action. *" ) + "/\n"
.end if
.end for
.end for
.// Process EEs outside of components.
.select many te_ees from instances of TE_EE where ( ( selected.RegisteredName !=
"TIM" ) and selected.Included )
.for each te_ee in te_ees
.select one te_c related by te_ee->TE_C[R2085]
.if ( empty te_c )
.select many s_brgs related by te_ee->S_EE[R2020]->S_BRG[R19]
.for each s_brg in s_brgs
.select one act_blk related by s_brg->ACT_BRB[R697]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R666]
.select one te_aba related by s_brg->TE_BRG[R2025]->TE_ABA[R2010]
.if ( not_empty act_blk )
.select one te_blk related by act_blk->TE_BLK[R2016]
.invoke oal( "te_aba->code = &b[0]; *te_aba->code = 0; // Ccode" )
.invoke blck_xlate( false, te_blk, te_aba )
.invoke oal( "te_aba->code = Escher_strcpy( te_aba->code, &b[0] ); // Ccode" )
.end if
.end for
.end if
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.end for
.end function
SAL File Generation
.select any s_sys from instances of S_SYS
.select any c_cs from instances of C_C
%---------------------------------------------------------------------------% File: ${c_cs.Name}.sal
% SAL Generated Model
% Component/Module Name: ${c_cs.Name}
%
% Copyright - AUC 2017
% --------------------------------------------------------------------------

${c_cs.Name}: CONTEXT =
.print "Starting the generation of ${c_cs.Name} SAL Model"
BEGIN

.print "Generating SAL Bounded Values"
%% Max Limits
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
.select many o_attr related by o_obj->O_ATTR[R102]
.for each attribute in o_attr
.select one datatype related by attribute->S_DT[R114]
.if (datatype.Name != "state<State_Model>" )
${attribute.Name}_idx: INTEGER = ${attribute.Descrip};
.end if
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.end for
.end if
.end for

%% Bounded Ranges
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
.select many o_attr related by o_obj->O_ATTR[R102]
.for each attribute in o_attr
.select one datatype related by attribute->S_DT[R114]
.if (datatype.Name != "state<State_Model>" )
${attribute.Name}_type: TYPE = [0..${attribute.Name}_idx];
.end if
.end for
.end if
.end for

.print "Generating SAL States Structures"
%% States:
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
ST_${o_obj.Name} : TYPE = {
.select one sm_ism related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]
.if ( not_empty sm_ism )
.select
>SM_SM[R517]

one

sm_sm

related

by

sm_ism-
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.select

many

sm_states

related

by

>SM_STATE[R501]
.assign objCount = cardinality sm_states
.assign count = 1
.for each sm_state in sm_states
.if (count < objCount)
ST_${sm_state.Name},
.else
ST_${sm_state.Name}
.end if
.assign count = count + 1
.end for
.end if
};
.end if
.end for

.print "Generating SAL Events mapping"
%% Events
EVT_${c_cs.Name}: TYPE = {
.assign obCount2 = 1
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.assign objCount2 = cardinality o_ob
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.select one sm_ism related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]
.if ( not_empty sm_ism )
.select one sm_sm related by sm_ism->SM_SM[R517]
.select many sm_evt related by sm_sm->SM_EVT[R502]
.assign objCount = cardinality sm_evt

sm_sm-

243

.assign count = 1
.for each smevt in sm_evt
.if ((count < objCount) AND (obCount2 != objCount2))
EVT_${smevt.Mning},
.else
.if ((count == objCount) AND (obCount2 == objCount2))
EVT_${smevt.Mning}
.else
EVT_${smevt.Mning},
.end if
.end if
.assign count = count + 1
.end for
.end if
.assign obCount2 = obCount2 + 1
.end for
};

.print "Generating SAL Class Mapping"
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
REC_${o_obj.Name} : TYPE = [#
.select many o_attr related by o_obj->O_ATTR[R102]
.assign objCount = cardinality o_attr
.assign count = 1
.for each attribute in o_attr
.select one datatype related by attribute->S_DT[R114]
.assign comma = 1
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.if (count < objCount)
.assign comma = 1
.else
.assign comma = 0
.end if
.if ((datatype.Name == "integer" ) AND (comma == 1))
${attribute.Name} : ${attribute.Name}_type,
.elif ((datatype.Name == "integer" ) AND (comma == 0))
${attribute.Name} : ${attribute.Name}_type
.elif ((datatype.Name == "boolean" ) AND (comma == 1))
${attribute.Name} : BOOLEAN,
.elif ((datatype.Name == "boolean" ) AND (comma == 0))
${attribute.Name} : BOOLEAN
.//elif ((datatype.Name == "state<State_Model>" ) AND (comma == 1))
.//${attribute.Name} : ST_${o_obj.Name},
.//elif ((datatype.Name == "state<State_Model>" ) AND (comma == 0))
.//${attribute.Name} : ST_${o_obj.Name}
.elif ((datatype.Name == "inst_ref<Timer>" ) AND (comma == 1))
${attribute.Name} : ${attribute.Name}_type,
.elif ((datatype.Name == "inst_ref<Timer>" ) AND (comma == 0))
${attribute.Name} : ${attribute.Name}_type
.elif ((comma == 1) AND (datatype.Name != "state<State_Model>" ))
${attribute.Name} : ${datatype.Name},
.elif ((comma == 0) AND (datatype.Name != "state<State_Model>" ))
${attribute.Name} : ${datatype.Name}
.end if
.assign count = count + 1
.end for
#];
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.end if
.end for

.print "Generating SAL Modules"
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
MOD_${o_obj.Name} : MODULE =
BEGIN
.print "Generating Module Global Section"
%% Global Section
GLOBAL ${o_obj.Name}: REC_${o_obj.Name}
GLOBAL EVT: EVT_${c_cs.Name}
GLOBAL ${o_obj.Name}_State: ST_${o_obj.Name}
.select many o_ob2 from instances of O_OBJ
.for each o_obj2 in o_ob2
.if (o_obj.Name != o_obj2.Name)
.if (o_obj2.Name != "Test")
INPUT ${o_obj2.Name}: REC_${o_obj2.Name}
.end if
.end if
.end for

.print "Generating SAL Initialization Section"
INITIALIZATION

.select many o_attr related by o_obj->O_ATTR[R102]
.assign objCount = cardinality o_attr
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.assign count = 1
.assign classInit = ""
.assign initState = ""
.for each attribute in o_attr
.select one datatype related by attribute->S_DT[R114]
.if (datatype.Name == "state<State_Model>" )
.assign initState = attribute.DefaultValue
.else
.if (objCount == count)
.assign

classInit

=

classInit

+

"

${attribute.Name}

:=

classInit

=

classInit

+

"

${attribute.Name}

:=

${attribute.DefaultValue} #); "
.else
.assign
${attribute.DefaultValue}, "
.end if
.end if
.assign count = count + 1
.end for
${o_obj.Name}_State = ST_${initState};
${o_obj.Name} = (# ${classInit}

.print "Generating SAL Transitions"
TRANSITION
[
.assign firstEntry = 0
.select any sm_instance related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]
.if ( not_empty sm_instance )
.select one sm_sm related by sm_instance->SM_SM[R517]
.select many states related by sm_sm->SM_STATE[R501]
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.for each state in states
%% stateName = ST_${state.Name}
.select many MatrixEntrys related by state->SM_SEME[R503]
.select many salStat from instances of ACT_SR
.if (not_empty salStat)
.assign nehadStat = cardinality salStat
all state count = ${nehadStat}

.else
.//no statement found at all xxssss
.end if
.for each MatrixEntry in MatrixEntrys
.select

one

event

related

by

MatrixEntry->SM_SEVT[R503]-

>SM_EVT[R525]
.select

one

newState

related

by

MatrixEntry-

>SM_NSTXN[R504]
.if (not_empty newState)
%% event = EVT_${event.Mning}
.select

one

tranSition

related

by

newState-

.select

one

destStateX

related

by

tranSition-

>SM_TXN[R507]

>SM_STATE[R506]
.select any block1 related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]>SM_AH[R513]->SM_ACT[R514]->ACT_SAB[R691]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R666]
.select many block2 related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]>SM_AH[R513]->SM_ACT[R514]->ACT_SAB[R691]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R601]
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.select any block3 related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]>SM_AH[R513]->SM_ACT[R514]->ACT_SAB[R691]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R650]
.select many block4 related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]>SM_AH[R513]->SM_ACT[R514]->ACT_SAB[R691]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R612]
.select any block5 related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]>SM_AH[R513]->SM_ACT[R514]->ACT_SAB[R691]->ACT_ACT[R698]>ACT_BLK[R699]
.assign blkCount2 = cardinality block2
.assign blkCount4 = cardinality block4
.if (not_empty block1)
.//block 1 is not empty
.end if
.if (not_empty block3)
.//block 3 is not empty
.end if
.if (not_empty block5)
.//block 5 is not empty
.end if
.if (firstEntry == 0)
.assign firstEntry = 1
.else
[]
.end if
( ${o_obj.Name}_State = ST_${state.Name} ) AND (EVT
= EVT_${event.Mning}) -->
${o_obj.Name}_State' = ST_${destStateX.Name};
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.end if
.end for
.end for
.end if
]
END;
.end if

.end for
.print "Generating System Module"
.assign output = ""
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.assign objCount = cardinality o_ob
.assign count = 1
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.assign count = count + 1
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
.assign output = output + "MOD"
.assign output = output + "_${o_obj.Name}"
.if (count < objCount)
.assign output = output + " [] "
.end if
.end if
.end for

%% System Module:
system: MODULE = ${output};
END
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.print "Generating THEOREMS"
%%Generate Theroems
.select many o_ob from instances of O_OBJ
.assign objCount = cardinality o_ob
.assign count = 1
.for each o_obj in o_ob
.assign count = count + 1
.if (o_obj.Name != "Test")
.select any sm_instance related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]
.if ( not_empty sm_instance )
.select one sm_sm related by sm_instance->SM_SM[R517]
.select many states related by sm_sm->SM_STATE[R501]
.assign count=0
.for each state in states
.assign count = count +1
.select one action related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]->SM_AH[R513]>SM_ACT[R514]
.if (not_empty action)
.if (action.Descrip != "")
%% stateName = ST_${state.Name}
Safe_${o_obj.Name}_${count}: THEOREM system |- G(${action.Descrip} AND
${o_obj.Name}_State = ST_${state.Name})
.end if
.end if
.//Safe_${o_obj.Name}_${count}:
G(${o_obj.Name}_State)
.end for
.end if
.end if

THEOREM

system

|-
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.end for

.//select any sm_instance related by o_obj->SM_ISM[R518]
.//if ( not_empty sm_instance )
.//select one sm_sm related by sm_instance->SM_SM[R517]
.//select many states related by sm_sm->SM_STATE[R501]
.//for each state in states
.//%% stateName = ST_${state.Name}
.//select one action related by state->SM_MOAH[R511]->SM_AH[R513]>SM_ACT[R514]
.//if
.//end for
.//end if
.emit to file "${c_cs.Name}.sal"

